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Foreword
Over	 the	 past	 decade,	 the	 boom	 in	 commodity	 prices,	 global	 imbalances	
between	savings	and	investment	in	major	countries	and	the	massive	accumulation	
of	 foreign	 exchange	 reserves	 have	 resulted	 in	 the	 rise	 of	 Sovereign	 Wealth	
Funds	(SWF)	as	major	forces	on	international	financial	markets	and	the	global	
economy.	In	2011,	according	to	the	SWF	Institute,	the	largest	Sovereign	Wealth	
Funds	manage	well	 over	$4	 trillion	 in	assets.	The	growing	 influence	of	SWFs	
has	far-reaching	consequences	for	both	host	and	sponsoring	countries.	On	the	
one	hand,	SWFs	can	play	a	positive	role	by	financing	development	projects	and	
serving	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 shield	 economies	 against	 shocks.	 	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	the	economic	weight	of	SWFs	may	hamper	the	implementation	of	effective	
macroeconomic	policies	and	create	additional	opportunities	for	corruption	in	the	
sponsoring	 countries.	 Furthermore,	 the	 economic	 reach	 of	 SWFs	 engenders	
concerns	about	the	potential	destabilization	of	financial	markets	in	host	countries.	
Some	Western	governments	are	also	concerned	about	transparency	and	politically	
motivated	 investments	 of	 SWFs.	 To	 address	 these	 issues,	 the	 International	
Monetary	Fund,	jointly	with	the	International	Working	Group	of	SWFs,	developed	
voluntary	guidelines	for	the	operations	of	SWFs	in	2008.	These	principles,	known	
as	the	Santiago	Principles,	were	adopted	by	many	SWFs,	enhancing	their	overall	
credibility	and	strengthening	transparency	of	SWF	activities.	
The	 recent	 global	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008-09	 elevated	 the	 importance	 of	
SWFs	 and	 temporarily	 shifted	 the	 focus	 of	 SWFs	 from	 long	 term	 investment	
issues	 to	 short-term	 economic	 stabilization.	 SWFs	 have	 helped	 to	 stabilize	
economies	 in	a	various	countries	such	as	Chile,	Kazakhstan	and	Russia;	and	
in	 some	 instances	 provided	 liquidity	 to	 troubled	Western	 financial	 institutions.	
SWFs	also	experienced	significant	financial	losses	during	the	crisis	which	forced	
them	to	re-evaluate	their	investment	strategies.	The	lessons	from	the	crisis	stress	
the	need	for	strengthening	risk	management,	financial	regulation	and	achieving	
greater	 transparency.	 Specifically,	 SWFs	 tend	 to	 be	 more	 successful	 if	 their	
operations	are	integrated	into	the	national	development	goals	of	their	sponsoring	
governments.	In	addition,	it	is	important	for	SWFs	to	provide	adequate	information	
to	all	stakeholders	(particularly	citizens,	civil	society	groups	and	the	media)	and	
be	 accountable	 to	 public	 oversight	 bodies	 (national	 parliaments	 and	 supreme	
audit	institutions).	
This	volume	advances	our	understanding	of	SWFs	by	presenting	a	critical	
analysis	of	resource-based	SWFs	in	Azerbaijan,	Kazakhstan	and	Russia.	Based	
upon	compelling	evidence,	this	volume	makes	a	strong	case	for	the	significance	
of	 transparency	and	accountability	 in	strengthening	 the	performance	of	SWFs.	
Most	importantly,	this	volume	discusses	activities	of	SWFs	from	the	perspective	of	
nations	that	established	these	funds.	The	present	volume	pushes	the	boundaries	
of	public	oversight	over	resource	revenue	management	by	demonstrating	that	the	
Santiago	Principles	are	insufficient	to	ensure	full	transparency	and	accountability	
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of	SWFs.	While	SWFs	in	the	Caspian	region	enabled	the	countries	to	weather	
the	global	financial	crisis,	their	investment	choices	have	failed	to	promote	long-
term	development	in	countries	that	created	these	funds.	Moreover,	the	volume	
critically	reviews	the	existing	methodologies	of	assessing	performance	of	SWFs	
and	proposes	new	criteria	for	evaluating	performance	of	SWFs.
This	volume	provides	a	valuable	resource	for	anyone	interested	in	assessing	
the	recent	performance	of	SWFs	in	the	Caspian	region.		
 Antoine Heuty 
 Deputy Director
 Revenue Watch Institute 
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1. Introduction
Since	1997	the	world’s	markets	have	been	experiencing	the	toughest	financial	
crisis	since	the	1930s.	The	financial	architecture	that	was	considered	to	be	the	
basis	of	the	economic	welfare	of	the	world	is	collapsing.	Under	this	crisis	saving	
commodity	windfalls	in	several	resource-rich	countries	has	mitigated	the	impact	
of	commodity	price	volatility	while	it	has	helped	several	countries	to	smooth	the	
impact	of	 the	ongoing	financial	crisis.	The	debate	around	the	“invasive”	nature	
of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	has	been	growing	prior	to	the	emergence	of	the	
financial	crisis	being	very	much	a	US/G7	concern	focusing	on	the	risk	of	having	
opaque	state	controlled	foreign	investment	vehicles	possibly	taking	over	strategic	
economic	interests	in	developed	economies.	Nevertheless,	this	has	not	proved	to	
be	the	case	in	the	G7	countries	where	the	drying	up	of	investments	has	added	a	
new	shift	to	the	ongoing	debate.	Developed	countries	are	reconsidering	the	role	
and	the	investment	operations	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds,	looking	at	possible	
investments	 from	 the	 latter	 into	developed	economies.	 In	 this	 reality	 the	need	
becomes	apparent	 for	a	 thorough	and	profound	understanding	and	discussion	
on	the	governance	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	at	the	domestic	level,	on	the	
accountability	of	 the	saving	and	 the	spending	decisions	 to	 the	citizens	and	on	
the	role	of	the	legislative	bodies	in	overseeing	the	management	of	the	Sovereign	
Wealth	 Funds.	 Furthermore,	 the	 economic	 implications	 of	 investing	 windfall	
gains	abroad	also	have	to	be	clarified.	While	this	does	shelter	resource-abundant	
countries	from	commodity	price	volatility,	it	does	little	to	change	the	structure	of	the	
economy	and	to	sustain	a	public	investment	strategy	aimed	at	increasing	human	
development	and	long-term	sustainable	sources	of	growth	inside	the	respective	
domestic	 economies.	 In	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 ongoing	 financial	 crisis,	 financial	
liquidity	constraints	may	force	even	those	countries	that	have	been	successful	
so	 far	 to	 resort	 to	 this	 type	of	 investment.	Besides,	 the	 fact	 that	 these	assets	
are	possessed	by	economically	unstable	and	politically	unpredictable	countries	
causes	serious	concerns	by	the	world	community.	
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The	nature	of	the	investment	policy	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	substantially	
changes	during	 (and	possibly	 after)	 financial	 turmoil.	 If	 previously	 the	 primary	
goal	 of	 the	 Sovereign	Wealth	 Funds	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 transparency	
of	windfall	 funds	and	 their	preferable	management	abroad,	at	 the	present	and	
in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 exigency	 to	 stimulate	 the	 economy	 in	 natural-resource-rich	
countries,	the	management	of	these	assets	domestically	becomes	an	imperative.	
This	 in	 its	 turn	 can	 darken	 the	 actual	 evaluation	 of	 the	 government	 on	 the	
withdrawal	of	the	country	out	of	the	crisis	and	worsen	the	problem	of	ensuring	the	
accountability	of	public	finance	management,	thus	increasing	unlimited	transfers	
and	bailout	plans.	Thus,	 the	ongoing	crisis	considerably	changes	 the	 role	and	
the	philosophy	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	and	it	introduces	the	need	for	a	
thorough	understanding	of	these	institutions.	The most important impediment 
to the understanding of the Sovereign Wealth Fund remains the absence 
of the precise institutional as well as procedural limitations capable of 
decreasing the government’s appetite to waste financial funds within the 
respective economy. The	 absence	 of	 such	 limitations	 creates	 a	 self-willed	
atmosphere	on	fund	spending,	consequently	misbalancing	the	financial	structure	
and	establishing	deep	inflationary	conditions	in	the	domestic	economies.	In	other	
words,	the	absence	of	limitations	on	transfers	from	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	
to	 the	 state	 budget	 leads	 to	 adverse	 impacts	 for	 macroeconomic	 equilibrium	
and	 has	 comprehensive	 socio-economic	 consequences	 such	 as	 rent-seeking	
effects,	social	inequality,	ineffective	decision	making	and	emergence	of	economic	
authoritarian	governance.	
Taking	 the	 above	 into	 consideration,	 the	 immediate	 need	 becomes	 clear	
for	a	careful	 investigation	and	clarification	of	 the	 role	of	 the	Sovereign	Wealth	
Funds,	 of	 their	 nature	 and	 operational	 aspects,	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	 their	
investment	strategies	and	the	interaction	of	the	latter	with	the	recipient	countries.	
All	of	the	latter	cannot	be	assessed	without	looking	at	governance	aspects	of	the	
Sovereign	Wealth	 Funds	 and	without	 setting	 some	generally	 accepted	 quality	
norms	 and	 interaction	 levels	with	 the	 general	 public	 and	 other	 economic	 and	
political	settings.		For	this	purpose	the	present	paper	develops	as	follows:	Section	
1	develops	the	argument	of	how	the	changing	global	financial	balances	and	the	
emergence	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	as	key	players	in	the	financial	arena	
urge	for	a	deep	understanding	of	the	nature	and	the	role	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	
Funds.	In	an	attempt	to	address	this	challenge	this	section	details	some	definitive	
operational	and	governance	aspects	of	the	funds,	offering	some	comprehensive	
categorization	 of	 the	 latter.	 Section	 2	 looks	 into	 the	 risk	 types	 that	 Sovereign	
Wealth	 Funds	 may	 be	 faced	 with	 while	 it	 further	 investigates	 the	 absorptive	
capacity	of	the	domestic	economies	and	the	transparency	levels	experienced	in	
Sovereign	Wealth	Funds.	Section	3	looks	into	governance	developments	of	the	
Sovereign	Wealth	Funds,	identifying	the	determinants	of	good	governance	and	
the	different	parties	involved	in	the	evolution	and	the	establishment	of	the	latter.	
The	last	section	draws	conclusions.
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2. Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
A crucial element of the world economy
Global	 imbalances	 deriving	 from	 large	 current	 account	 deficits	 in	 major	
economies	 like	 that	of	 the	USA	and	counterbalancing	 large	surpluses	 in	Asian	
and	 oil-producing	 countries	 have	 attracted	 significant	 attention.	 These	 have	
boosted	 the	 foreign	 reserves	 of	many	 surplus	 countries	 clearly	 beyond	 levels	
seen	as	necessary	 for	securing	 their	 international	 liquidity.	Decision-makers	 in	
the	surplus	countries	are	seeking	to	increase	the	return	on	their	“excess”	reserves	
by	managing	 their	 foreign	 reserves	more	actively.	For	 this	purpose,	 they	have	
established	special	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	(hereafter	SWFs),	with	many	of	them	
injecting	significant	amounts	of	capital	into	major	Western	financial	organizations.	
Despite	the	fact	that	this	flow	of	finance	is	welcomed	by	the	organizations	hit	by	
the	financial	crisis	and	it	is	good	for	market	stability,	concerns	have	been	raised	
in	the	United	States	and	Europe	about	the	nature	and	the	intentions	of	the	SWFs.	
SWFs’	 design,	 establishment,	 operation	 and	 investment	management	 and	
allocation	 are	 receiving	 an	 increasing	 amount	 of	 interest	 on	 national	 as	 well	
as	 international	 levels.	The	relatively	new	and	unclear	operations	of	the	SWFs	
urge	 greater	 investigation	 and	 clarification	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 SWFs	 as	well	
as	 of	 their	 importance	 to	 and	 interaction	 with	 international	 financial	 markets.	
The	exploration	of	SWFs	emerges	as	of	primary	 importance	when	considering	
the	 ongoing	 financial	 crisis,	 where	 the	 SWFs	 emerge	 as	 key	 players	 in	 the	
international	financial	arena.	Understanding the nature of the SWFs remains 
particularly important especially after considering the high degree of 
misconception, confusion and consequent skepticism around the SWFs. 
Much	of	 the	 interest	 in	 the	SWFs	 is	 related	 to	political	considerations	such	as	
the	reintroduction	of	the	failures	of	public	ownership	into	market	economies	by	
the	back	door	where	SWFs	serve	as	the	moving	instrument,	whether	SWFs	use	
their	ownership	rights	to	pursue	political	goals	or	whether	resistance	to	foreign	
ownership	emerges	as	a	new	form	of	protectionism.	Further	concerns	related	to	
the	SWFs	regard	economic	outcomes	such	as	the	relationship	of	the	SWFs	to	the	
imbalances	in	the	world	economy,	how	they	are	affecting	financial	markets	and	
the	policy	implications	of	their	growth1.
In	the	current	global	financial	developments	SWFs	are	perceived	to	represent	
a	permanent	re-direction	in	investment	flows	and	a	shift	in	the	dominant	sources	
of	financial	capital.	To	date,	global	financial	operations	were	dominated	by	Anglo-
American	 financial	 institutions	 but	 recent	 developments	 suggest	 increasing	
capital	flows	from	emerging	to	mature	economies.	In	these	flows	SWFs	imply	a	
redistribution	of	financial	and	political	capital	throughout	the	world.	In	this	reality	
the	presence	of	a	blurring	line	between	finance	and	politics	raises	concerns	that	
SWFs	will	be	used	illegitimately	to	advance	political,	as	opposed	to	commercial,	
agendas.	In	many	cases	SWFs	may	even	be	seen	as	the	source	of	a	new	“state	
1		Rautava	(2008),	Gieve	(2008),	Raphaeli	and	Gersten	(2008)
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financial	 capitalism”	 raising	 questions	 on	 whether	 the	 introduction	 of	 public	
investors	into	private	markets	will	do	for	efficiency.	Furthermore	SWFs	investments	
may	be	regarded	as	potentially	disguising	attempts	by	 foreign	governments	 to	
obtain	technology	and	expertise	benefiting	national	strategic	interests.	
Figure 1. Regional distributions of official reserves in 1996 and 2006 
(official reserves in % of world total)2
1996
2006
2		Source:	Kern	(2007),	Sovereign	Wealth	SWFs	Institute
47%
17%
36%
Industrial	countries Asia Others
33%
7%
2%
54%
4%
Industrial	countries Latin	America Middle	East Asia CEE
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In	 all	 cases,	 SWFs	 are	 a	 new	 source	 of	 political	 intrigue	 and	 concern	
emerging	for	many	as	one	of	the	hottest	topics	in	global	financial	markets.	In	any	
respect,	 SWFs	 are	 reshaping	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 landscape.	Although	
concerns	about	emerging	market	 investors	are	not	novel,	SWFs	do	appear	 to	
have	 attracted	 special	 attention	 from	 policymakers.	 Explorations	 of	 the	 latter	
have	 resulted	 in	new	policy	proposals	 for	dealing	with	SWFs	being	at	various	
stages	of	consideration	and	implementation	(for	example,	the	U.S.	has	created	a	
SWF	task	force	to	consider	its	options,	Australia	and	Germany	have	implemented	
new	 rules	 targeting	SWFs,	 and	 the	 International	Working	Group	of	Sovereign	
Wealth	Funds	has	developed	a	series	of	voluntary	‘generally	accepted	principles	
and	practices’-	known	as	GAPP	or	the	‘Santiago	Principles’)3.	
When	taking	these	later	developments	into	consideration,	 it	becomes	clear	
that	in	order	to	understand	the	urgency	of	SWFs’	exploration	a	clear	definition	of	
such	funds	should	be	derived.	The	consideration	of	the	aspects	that	lead	to	the	
composition	of	the	definition	of	SWFs	can	provide	a	first	indication	of	the	crucial	
urgency	of	the	SWF	topic	indicating	why	SWFs	have	become,	and	will	continue	
to	emerge	as,	key	players	in	the	world	economy.
2.1. Understanding SWFs: 
Definitions, nature, financial and regional features
A general definition of SWFs would state that SWFs are government 
owned investment funds operating in private financial markets.	 Recent	
interest	in	SWFs	has	failed	to	come	to	a	consensus	as	to	how	SWFs	differ	from	
other	public	 investment	 funds	and	how	they	should	be	defined.	 Indeed,	SWFs	
differ	 in	 ownership,	 underlying	 assets,	 degree	 of	 dependence,	 operational	
aspects,	etc.	From	 the	existing	SWFs,	some	are	 funded	 from	fiscal	 surpluses	
or	foreign	exchange	reserves,	while	others	are	funded	from	borrowings	from	the	
market.	Of	 the	 existing	 SWFs,	 almost	 half	 operate	 as	 separate	 legal	 entities,	
while	 the	 rest	 consist	 of	 a	 dependent	 entity	 within	 the	Ministry	 of	 Finance	 or	
the	Central	Bank	of	the	relevant	country.	Finally,	the	SWFs	themselves	declare	
various	objectives	ranging	from	fiscal	stabilization	to	general	savings	for	future	
generations	to	covering	expected	future	pension	expenditures.	Thus	it	becomes	
clear	 that	 SWFs	 vary	 in	 nature,	 operations	 and	 ownership,	 not	 permitting	 the	
crystallization	of	a	clear	image	of	these	establishments.
In	this	reality	it	remains	relevant	to	identify	any	commonalities	among	SWFs	
that	could	serve	as	the	basis	of	an	SWF	definition.	In	this	direction	the	following	
questions	can	be	named	as	crucial4:
•	 Who owns the SWF? 
An	 overview	 of	 the	 existing	 SWFs	 reveals	 that	 governments,	 at	 central	
or	 at	 sub-national	 levels,	may	 own	 the	SWFs	 and	 exercise	 control	 directly	 or	
3		International	Working	Group	of	SWFs	(2008),	Pihlman	(2009)
4  For	a	detailed	discussion	see	Monk	(2009),	Das	et	al	(2009),	Bartsch	(2006),	Coper	(2007),	Eifer	et	
al	(2002),	Fasano	(2000),	Friends	of	Earth	(2002),	Tsalik	(2003),	Bacon	and	Tordo	(2006),	Goldsmith	(2001)
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indirectly	through	the	appointment	of	the	SWF	board.	In	this	respect	SWFs	are	a	
meeting	point	of	high	politics	with	high	finance;	therefore	the	understanding,	the	
exploration	and	the	observation	of	the	latter	remains	crucial.
•	 What are the liabilities of the SWF?
When	 considering	 this	 question	 the	 interesting	 finding	 is	 that	 SWFs	 have	
no	direct	 liabilities.	Several	SWFs	have	 liabilities,	 such	as	sterilization	debt	or	
some	deferred	contractual	liability	to	transfer	money	out	of	the	fund	and	into	the	
general	budget	or	a	social	security	system.	Nevertheless,	it	appears	that	SWFs	
have	no	non-governmental	 or	 outside	 liabilities.	For	 those	 funds	 that	 do	have	
a	 liability,	 it	 is	 typically	 intra-governmental,	with	one	branch	of	 the	government	
owing	money	to	another	branch	of	the	government	(i.e.	the	fund	may	owe	to	the	
Ministry	of	Finance,	the	Central	Bank	or	the	social	security	reserve	funds).	SWFs	
have	no	external	creditor,	hence	accumulated	assets	are	not	subject	to	outside	
non-governmental	owners	property	rights.	Therefore	any	existing	fund	liabilities	
are	part	of	the	broader	national	balance	sheet.
•	 Who benefits from the SWF?
Despite	 certain	 explicit	 goals	 (e.g.	 financing	 future	 pension	 payment	
requirements),	 SWFs	 are	 managed	 according	 to	 the	 interests	 and	 objectives	
of	 the	government	and/or	 the	sovereign.	The	final	beneficiary	of	a	SWF	 is	not	
a	 specific	 individual,	 but	 rather	 it	 remains	 the	 government,	 the	 host	 country’s	
citizens	or	the	taxpayer	in	general.
Figure 2. World map of SWFs and respective SWFs volume
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Considering	the	answers	to	the	above	questions,	SWFs	can	also	be	defined	in	
more	detail	as	directly	or	indirectly	government-owned	and	controlled	investment	
SWFs	with	no	outside	beneficiaries	or	liabilities	involved	in	asset	investments	in	
the	short	or	long	term,	according	to	the	interests	and	the	objectives	of	the	sovereign	
sponsor.	 In	other	words,	SWFs	can	be	considered	government-owned	special	
purpose	 investment	 SWFs	 or	 arrangements.	 Serving	 further	 macroeconomic	
purposes	of	the	government,	SWFs	hold,	manage	and/or	administer	assets	with	
financial	objectives,	developing	a	set	of	investment	strategies.	The	latter	may	also	
include	investments	in	foreign	assets.	Investment	strategies	in	any	case	exclude,	
among	other	 elements,	 foreign	 currency	 reserve	assets	held	by	 the	monetary	
authorities	for	the	traditional	balance	of	payments	or	monetary	policy	purposes,	
state-owned	enterprises	in	the	traditional	sense,	government-employee	pension	
funds,	or	assets	managed	for	 the	benefit	of	 individuals.	SWFs are commonly 
established out of a balance of payment surpluses, official foreign currency 
operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts 
resulting from commodity exports.	While	SWF	is	an	all-encompassing	term,	it	
describes	a	group	of	heterogeneous	funds	existing	and	operating	for	years.	What	
remains	common	 to	 the	group	of	 these	 funds	 is	 the	public	ownership	and	 the	
fact	that	these	funds	are	often	established	to	meet	a	macroeconomic	purpose,	
though	 these	 purposes	may	 at	 times	 be	multiple	 in	 nature	 (e.g.	 savings	 and	
fiscal	stabilization).	In	general	SWFs	have	the	capacity	to	operate	over	a	long-
term	investment	horizon,	hence	they	are	usually	less	risk	averse	than	agencies	
managing	traditional	foreign	exchange	reserves.	
Typically,	 SWF	establishment	 follows	 commodity	 price	 booms,	while	more	
recently	SWF	establishment	has	followed	large	export	booms	like	in	the	case	of	
China.	Following	immense	accumulation	of	international	assets,	policymakers	in	
most	of	the	empirical	cases	have	set	up	a	number	of	objectives	considered	as	
“optimal.”	When	 taking	 this	 into	 consideration	 the	presence	and	 the	operation	
of	 an	 SWF	 is	 primarily	 linked	 to	 whether	 the	 country	 has	 an	 “adequate”	 or	
“optimal”	 level	 of	 international	 reserves.	 Even	 if	 the	 level	 is	 “ample”	 enough,	
policymakers	 should	 decide	 whether	 they	 will	 use	 SWF	 assets	 to	 meet	 the	
balance	of	payment	needs.	In	this	respect	a	fund’s	presence	and	operation	are	
also	related	to	whether	there	exist	better	alternatives	to	setting	up	a	SWF.	Once	
an	SWF	is	established,	policymakers	have	to	decide	on	a	number	of	operational	
questions	ensuring	that	the	fund	is	consistent	with	its	broad	policy	objectives.	In	
this	reality,	 the	 identification	of	 the	operational	objectives	 is	needed	in	order	to	
derive	an	appropriate	 investment	policy	 that	will	envisage	 funding,	withdrawal,	
and	spending	 rules	of	 the	 fund5.	 In	 line	with	 the	sources	of	 their	 funds,	SWFs	
can	 be	 distinguished	 along	 their	 objectives.	Broad categorization based on 
the objectives of the fund would consider the following different objective 
categories: (i) reserve investment corporations that aim to enhance returns 
on reserves, (ii) pension-reserve funds, (iii) fiscal stabilization funds, (iv) 
fiscal savings funds, and (v) development funds that use returns to invest 
for development purposes.
Pension	reserve	funds	seek	to	build	assets	to	cover	an	identified	liability	often	
5  IMF	Fiscal	Affairs	Department	(2007),	Le	Borgne	and	Midas	(2007),	Manzano	and	Rigobon	
(2001),	Mohohlo	(2007)
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related	to	an	aging	population	with	the	latter	being	a	cause	of	future	economic	
vulnerability	 and	 expenditure,	 often	 related	 to	 entitlements	 that	 were	 funded	
by	a	pay-as-you	go	system	resulting	 in	high	economic	and	social	costs.	Fund	
operation	under	this	objective	can	be	identified	in	the	case	of	Australia,	Ireland,	
New	Zealand,	and	Chile.	Depending	on	the	macroeconomic	framework	in	each	
country	these	assets	are	often	invested	abroad,	so	that	they	can	be	disinvested	
and	 used	 for	 imports	 when	 the	 domestic	 population	 comes	 of	 age.	 Fiscal	
stabilization	and	fiscal	savings	funds	are	related	to	natural	resource	wealth	(as	
in	the	case	of	Venezuela	or	Chile).	Natural	resource	endowments	are	related	to	
volatile	and	fluctuating	prices	as	well	as	to	often	highly	discontinuous	quantities,	
especially	in	smaller	countries	with	limited	resource	capacity.	Savings	funds	are	
concerned	with	 intergenerational	equity	and	 transfers.	 Intergenerational	equity	
focuses	on	benefiting	the	current	and	future	generations	as	equally	as	possible.	
This	may	be	done	by	setting	up	an	endowment	type	fund	that	converts	a	finite	
(extractive)	 asset	 with	 an	 infinite	 string	 of	 financial	 cash	 flows	 to	 benefit	 the	
present	and	all	 future	generations.	 In	 some	economies,	 saving	assets	abroad	
in	 an	 SWF	 can	 assist	 in	 mitigating	 “Dutch	 Disease”	 symptoms	 and	 related	
macroeconomic	consequences.	At	times,	stabilization	funds	grow	beyond	what	
is	needed	for	stabilization	purposes,	especially	when	prices	are	elevated	over	a	
prolonged	period,	and	are	consequently	redesigned	as	stabilization	and	savings	
funds	(e.g.	Russia).
When	considering	the	objectives	of	SWF	establishment,	the	urgency	of	the	
topic	and	the	exploration	of	SWF	becomes	clearer	especially	after	realizing	that	
as	circumstances	change,	the	objectives	of	the	SWFs	do	as	well.	Considering	this	
reality	it	is	important	to	recognize	what	the	SWFs’	policy	objective	and	activities	
are	 and	 whether	 they	 are	 consistent	 with	 a	 country’s	 overall	 macroeconomic	
framework.	This	is	because	the	funds’	assets,	and	the	returns	it	generates,	impact	
a	country’s	public	finances,	monetary	conditions,	the	balance	of	payments,	and	
the	overall	balance-sheet.	They	may	also	affect	public	sector	wealth	and	impact	
private	 sector	 behavior	 while	 having	 a	 significant	 impact	 upon	 international	
financial	markets	through	their	investment	decisions	and	choices6.	
Operational	and	policy	objectives	as	well	as	the	nature	of	the	financial	tools	of	
funds	differ	according	to	the	underlying	establishment	purpose.	Stabilization	funds	
having	a	smoothing	government	revenue	policy	objective	typically	formulate	calls	
for	saving	commodity	revenues	if	the	actual	commodity	price	exceeds	a	certain	
reference	price,	based	on	a	long-term	trend,	and	withdrawing	from	the	fund	if	the	
actual	price	drops	below	the	reference	price	(e.g.	Algeria	and	Russia).	Savings	
funds	formulate	their	operational	objective	to	spread	wealth	across	generations	
by	aiming	to	maximize	the	real	annual	payout	per	capita	or	the	payout	as	a	share	
of	gross	domestic	product	(GDP).	Depending	on	the	size	of	population	growth	and	
real	GDP	growth,	the	variations	in	formulating	the	underlying	objective	can	have	
profound	implications.	For	instance	in	a	country	with	a	declining	population	while	
GDP	is	growing	rapidly,	transfers	in	 line	with	GDP	imply	far	 larger	distributions	
to	distant	generations.	Assumptions	about	the	discovery	of	future	wealth	can	be	
even	more	important.	In	practice,	several	large	economies	have,	over	time,	found	
6  Jensen	and	Watchekon	(2004),	Robinson	and	Torvik	(2005),	Sala-I-Martin	and	Subramanian	
(2003),	Steigum	and	Thogersen	(1995)
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new	natural	resource	deposits	 that	replace	those	exploited.	 Ignoring	this	basic	
fact	could	lead	to	the	accumulation	of	too	high	a	sum	of	financial	assets,	as	the	
commodity	wealth	is	massively	underestimated.
Funds	that	aim	to	improve	the	return	on	funded	assets	tend	to	maximize	returns	
subject	 to	 a	 given	 risk	 tolerance.	The	 expected	 additional	 return	 is	 a	 function	
of	 the	risk	that	 the	government	or	 the	owner	 is	willing	to	take.	The	operational	
objective	can	be	 formulated	as	a	 return	objective	based	on	an	assessment	of	
historic	data	on	the	tradeoff	between	enhanced	return	and	risk.	As	the	longevity	
of	these	funds	is	not	always	clear,	the	risk	tolerance	and	investment	horizon	often	
remain	 implicit.	 The	 operationalization	 of	 the	 objectives	 of	 pension	 and	 other	
liability-focused	wealth	 funds	 follows	 the	 asset	 liability	management	 approach	
applied	by	the	pension	funds.	In	contrast	to	the	reserve	investment	corporations,	
the	horizon	over	which	the	liabilities	materialize	is	often	well	identified.	This	allows	
for	 the	explicit	maximization	of	 the	net	 value	of	 the	 funds	 (in	essence	 the	net	
present	value	of	the	investments	minus	expected	payments	for	the	liabilities)	over	
the	 identified	time	horizon	subject	 to	risk	 tolerance.	 In	practice,	 this	process	 is	
also	summarized	in	the	formulation	of	a	concrete	return	target	as	the	operational	
objective	(e.g.	Australia	and	New	Zealand).	
SWFs	have	emerged	as	crucial	operators	in	the	international	financial	markets	
and	developments	 in	the	world	economy	after	considering	their	key	 interaction	
with	 further	 institutional	 arrangements.	 The	 experience	 to	 date	 suggests	 that	
governance	framework	in	the	respective	countries	provide	little	indications	as	to	
what	institutions	determine	the	SWF’s	policy	objectives	and	overall	risk	tolerance,	
its	 operational	 objectives,	 its	 investment	 guidelines	 and	who	will	 ultimately	 be	
the	 executor	 of	 the	 latter.	 This	 remains	 of	 particular	 interest	 especially	 when	
considering	 that	 the	 latter	determine	where	SWFs’	assets	are	 invested.	 In	any	
case,	the	investment	policy	should	be	consistent	with	the	broad	policy	objectives.	
While	the	operational	objectives	drive	the	investment	horizon,	the	risk	tolerance	
and	 the	 investment	environment	 (including	asset	classes	and	 their	correlation,	
asset	 liability	 management	 and	 other	 constraints)	 will	 determine	 the	 strategic	
asset	allocation.	All	of	the	latter	are	key	issues	and	particularly	prone	to	political	
pressure	(especially	when	considering	the	decision	to	invest	a	share	of	the	funds’	
assets	domestically	or	abroad).	In	this	context	institutional	arrangements	emerge	
as	detrimental	to	the	fund’s	investment	policy.	
2.2. The magnitude of the SWFs: An assessment
SWFs,	like	other	financial	institutions,	have	not	been	immune	to	the	effects	
of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 and	 to	 the	 sharp	 downturn	 in	 asset	 prices	 since	
early	2008.	Many	SWFs	have	suffered	significant	losses	in	the	presence	of	the	
financial	crisis.	A	major	part	of	the	financial	losses	has	not	yet	been	realized,	as	
many	SWFs	are	long-term	investors	and	have	not	needed	to	liquidate	positions.	
Nevertheless,	these	losses	have	to	be	communicated	to	the	stakeholders	like	the	
government	and	the	public	sooner	or	later.	Overall	SWFs,	spurred	on	by	yawning	
global	trade	imbalances	and	a	commodity	price	boom,	have	roughly	$3-4	trillion	
under	management,	which	are	more	assets	than	the	global	hedge	funds	industry.	
At	the	end	of	2008	SWFs based on oil and gas revenues accounted for 2/3 
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of total SWFs; nevertheless, the proportion of non-raw material SWFs is 
on the rise.	Forecasts	suggest	that	this	number	could	approach	$10	trillion	by	
2015	while	further	estimations	suggest	that,	despite	the	economic	and	financial	
crisis,	SWF	assets	under	management	increased	by	18%	in	2008.	In	large	part,	
this	increase	can	be	attributed	to	the	creation	of	new	SWFs.	Indeed,	while	some	
SWFs	have	been	around	for	decades,	28	of	the	48	SWFs	identified	by	the	U.S.	
Government	Accountability	Office	were	created	since	2000,	with	12	alone	being	
established	 since	 2005.	 These	 SWFs	 appear	 to	 be	 investing	 their	 capital	 in	
private,	risky	assets	with	considerable	focus	on	the	financial	sector.      
Table 1. Outlook of several SWFs 
Country Fund name
Assets 
managed
(in bn USD)
Incep-
tion 
year
Com-
modity7
Algeria	 Reserve	Fund 25 2000 Oil
Angola	 Reserve	Fund	for	Oil	 na 2007 Oil
Australia	
Australian	Government	Future	Fund	
(AGFF)	
50 2004 N.C
Azerbaijan	 State	Oil	Fund 1.5 1999 Oil
Botswana	 Pula	Fund	 4.7 1993
Dia-
monds
Brunei	 Brunei	Investment	Agency	(BIA)	 35 1983 Oil
Canada	 Alberta	Heritage	Fund	(AHF) 17 1976 	Oil
Chile	
Economic	and	Social	Stabilization	Fund	
(ESSF)
6 2007 Copper
Chile	Pension	Reserves	Fund	 0.6 2007 Copper
China	 China	Investment	Company	Ltd. 200 2007 N.C
Central	Hujin	Investment	Corp.	 100 2003 N.C
East	Timor Timor-Leste	Petroleum	Fund 1.2 2005 Oil,	gas
7  N.C	stands	for	non-commodity	funds
16                                                                                                                                   
Hong	Kong	
Hong	Kong	Monetary	Authority	Invest-
ment	Portfolio	
140 1998 N.C
Iran Foreign	Exchange	Reserve	Fund	 15 1999 	Oil
Ireland	
National	Pensions	Reserve	Fund	
(NPRF)	
29 2001 N.C
Kazakh-
stan	
Kazakhstan	National	Fund	(KNF)	 18 2000
Oil,	gas,	
metals
Kiribati	
Revenue	Equalisation	Reserve	Fund	
(RERF)
0.6 1956
Phos-
phates
Kuwait	 Kuwait	Investment	Authority	(KIA)	 250 1953 Oil
Libya Reserve	Fund 50 2006 	Oil
Malaysia	 Khazanah	Nasional	BHD	(KNB)	 18 1993 N.C
Mauritania	
National	Fund	for	Hydrocarbon	Re-
serves
0 2006 Oil,	gas
New	Zea-
land	
New	Zealand	Superannuation	Fund	 10 2003 N.C
Nigeria 	Excess	Crude	Account 11 2004 Oil
Norway	
Government	Pension	Fund	-	Global	
(GPFG)	
322 1990 Oil
Government	Petroleum	Insurance	Fund	
(GPIF)
2.6 1986 	Oil
Oman	
State	General	Stabilisation	Fund	
(SGSF)
8.2 1980 	Oil,	gas
Papua	
New	
Guinea
	Mineral	Resources	Stabilization	Fund	
(MRSF)
0.2 1974 Minerals
Qatar	 Qatar	Investment	Authority	(QIA)	 40 2000 Oil
Russia
Stabilization	Fund	of	the	Russian	Fed-
eration	(SFRF)	
127 2003 Oil
Saudi 
Arabia	
Various	Funds	 300 various Oil
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Singapore
Government	of	Singapore	Investment	
Corporation	(GIC)	
330 1981 N.C
Temasek	Holdings	 108 1974 N.C
South	
Korea 
Korea	Investment	Corporation	(KIC) 20 2006 N.C
Taiwan	
Taiwan	National	Stabilisation	Fund	
(TNSF)	
15 2000 N.C
Uganda	 Poverty	Action	Fund	 0.4 1998 Aid
United	
Arab	Emir-
ates
	Dubai	Intern.	Financial	Centre	Invest-
ments	(DIFC)	
na 2002 Oil
Abu	Dhabi	Investment	Authority	(ADIA)	 875 1976 Oil
United	
States
Alaska	Permanent	Reserve	Fund	Cor-
poration	(APRF)
40 1976 Oil
New	Mexico	State	Investment	Office	
Trust	Funds	
15 1958 	N.C
Permanent	Wyoming	Mineral	Trust	
Fund	(PWMTF)	
3.2 1974 	Minerals
Venezuela	
Investment	Fund	for	Macroeconomic	
Stabilization	(FIEM)
0.8 1998 Oil
Total	 assets	 under	 SWFs	 emerge	 as	 an	 impressive	 figure,	 representing	
a	multiple	 of	 the	 assets	 held	 a	 decade	ago;	 nevertheless,	 they	make	up	 less	
than	1/2	of	 global	 foreign	exchange	 reserves,	 less	 than	1/6	of	 global	 pension	
assets,	around	1/7	of	global	investment	SWFs	and	insurance	assets,	less	than	
1/10	of	global	stock	market	capitalization	and	only	3%	of	bank	assets	worldwide.	
However,	 the	 aggregate	 comparison	 cannot	 diminish	 the	 importance	 of	
individual,	often	high-profile-investment	transactions.	Current	account	surpluses	
of	parent	countries	of	major	SWFs	have	narrowed	as	trade	surpluses	declined	
and	dramatically	diminished	oil	and	other	commodity	prices	 reduced	revenues	
from	sales	of	natural	resources,	leading	to	a	visibly	decelerated	accumulation	of	
foreign	exchange	reserves.	Market-to-market	values	of	SWF	portfolios	are	likely	
to	have	suffered	during	the	financial	crisis.	Typical	equity	portfolios	held	by	SWFs	
may	have	 lost	 45%	between	end-2007	and	early	 2009.	Additional	 changes	 in	
portfolio	values	may	result	from	price	variations	in	other	asset	classes.	Overall,	
such	changes	in	portfolio	values	have,	with	very	few	exceptions,	not	been	realized	
so	far,	as	SWFs	are	holding	on	to	their	investments.
Long-term	prospects	for	SWFs	remain	positive	albeit	the	losses	in	the	current	
financial	 crisis.	 Scenarios	 for	 the	 development	 of	 assets	 managed	 by	 SWFs	
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based	on	past	performance	of	 foreign	exchange	reserves		suggests	that	 in	10	
years,	total	assets	under	SWF	management	are	likely	to	amount	to	USD	7	tr	with	
the	 latter	 figure	 being	 two	 times	 larger	 than	 the	 current	 accumulated	 volume.	
Nevertheless,	the	underlying	SWF	growth	potential	is	contingent	upon	the	future	
of	globalization.	On the assumption that current account balances resume 
their recent trend of widening deficits in the US and strongly growing 
surpluses in the emerging markets, the fundamentals for SWF development 
remain strong.	If	significant	reductions	in	current	account	balances	occur,	then	
SWF	inflows	are	set	to	remain	clearly	below	the	levels	seen	in	the	recent	past.	
From	the	latter	 it	becomes	clear	that	SWFs	remain	particularly	sensitive	to	the	
global	 macroeconomic	 risks	 such	 as	 exchange	 rate	 movements,	 commodity	
price	 changes,	 trade	movements,	 capital	 flows,	 global	 political	 risks,	 potential	
protectionism	in	recipient	countries,	and	the	political	climate	between	the	origin	
and	the	recipient	governments.	
SWFs	 have	 long	 investment	 horizons	 and	 generally	 have	 no	 commercial	
liabilities,	hence	in	periods	of	market	stress	they	are	likely	to	face	less	pressure	
than	most	private	 investors	 to	 reduce	 the	size	or	 increase	 the	 liquidity	of	 their	
investments.	They	are	well	placed	to	play	a	contrarian	role	and	help	to	stabilize	
markets	by	investing	in	times	of	stress.	For	example,	when	the	global	equity	market	
fell	sharply	between	2000	and	2002,	the	Norwegian	Government	Pension	SWF	
was	a	large	buyer	of	global	equities.	A	number	of	SWFs	have	played	an	important	
stabilizing	role	during	the	current	financial	crisis	by	providing	around	$40	billion	
of	new	capital	to	some	of	the	world’s	biggest	commercial	and	investment	banks.	
Taking	a	broader	view,	 the	switch	of	some	reserves	from	government	debt	
into	SWFs	which	invest	in	a	wider	range	of	instruments	should	help	to	improve	
the	allocation	of	resources	if	these	investments	are	based	on	commercial	criteria.	
Investing	 in	 equities	 may	 also	 help	 to	 reinforce	 and	 bring	 to	 the	 surface	 the	
common	interest	 that	emerging	markets	and	the	advanced	economies	have	 in	
the	good	performance	of	the	companies	involved	and	the	markets	they	operate	
in.	On	the	other	side	of	the	coin,	SWF	operations	raise	concerns	on	their	objectives	
and	how	far	their	investments	will	be	driven	only	by	financial	returns.	SWF	objectives	
might	also	serve	national	political	interests,	such	as	accessing	military	technology,	
controlling	strategic	resources	or	markets,	and	influencing	public	opinion,	with	all	of	
the	latter	being	related	to	transparency	aspects	of	the	SWFs.	
2.3. Commodity price fluctuations and the SWFs 
SWFs	 are	 related	 to	 two	 principal	 challenges	 in	 the	 accumulation	 of	
national	 wealth	 over	 time.	 First,	 natural	 resources	 are	 exhaustible;	 once	 they	
are	extracted	and	consumed	they	are	depleted.	Similarly,	superior	international	
competitiveness	 of	 domestic	 industries	 can	 be	 a	 transitory	 phenomenon	 that	
may	substantially	 change	 in	 the	course	of	 time.	 In	 this	 light,	governments	are	
confronted	with	inter-generational	equity	as	well	as	of	transforming	the	present-
day	revenue	streams	from	the	sale	of	the	resources	or	other	export	successes	into	
sustainable	income.	The	second	challenge	is	related	to	the	international	market	for	
commodities’	high	level	of	price	volatility.	This	volatility	makes	natural	resources	
comparatively	risky	assets	from	which	societies	may	wish	to	diversify.	Taking	the	
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above	into	consideration,	the	potential	advantages	of	delegating	national	wealth	
management	to	a	SWF	can	be	related	to	inter-temporal	stabilization	where	funds,	
especially	 stabilization	 funds,	 can	 help	 shield	 an	 economy	against	 volatility	 in	
markets	of	critical	 value	 for	an	economy,	such	as	oil	or	other	commodities.	 In	
this	case,	 the	SWFs	serve	as	a	 liquidity	pool	which	 is	 replenished	at	 times	of	
favorable	commodity	price	conditions	or	reserve	inflows,	and	which	can	be	drawn	
upon	in	cases	of	low	asset	prices	or	shortage	of	reserves.	
SWFs	 can	 be	 related	 to	 diversification	 outcomes.	 Oil	 or	 other	 commodity	
exporting	 economies	 often	 run	 substantial	 concentration	 risk	 from	 their	
dependence	on	the	natural	resource	they	sell	in	international	markets8.	This	risk	
is	particularly	salient	with	regard	to	the	exhaustibility	of	natural	resources	as	well	
as	to	the	danger	of	misallocation	of	capital	if	the	sale	of	natural	resources	in	turn	
leads	 to	an	appreciation	of	 the	real	exchange	rate	and	 thereby	diminishes	 the	
competitiveness	of	other	sectors	in	the	economy	(also	addressed	as	the	“Dutch	
disease”	effect).	The	diversification	of	national	wealth	by	investing	internationally	
and	 in	 a	 greater	 range	 of	 assets	 can	 help	 reduce	 these	 concentration	 risks.	
Empirical assessment to date indicates that for resource-rich countries with 
resource funds, the establishment of the fund did not have an identifiable 
moderating impact upon government spending.	In	terms	of	causality,	countries	
with	more	prudent	expenditure	policies	tended	to	establish	resource	funds,	rather	
than	 the	 fund	presence	 itself	 leading	 to	 the	 increased	expenditure	 restraint.	 In	
many	 cases	 the	 establishment	 of	 resource	 funds	 may	 have	 helped	 maintain	
cautious	policies	in	the	context	of	ongoing	revenue	variability.	Nevertheless,	the	
coordination	of	 fund	operations	with	overall	national	fiscal	policy	(to	 the	extent	
that	this	is	defined	as	a	policy	objective)	has	been	difficult.	These	results	seem	
to	be	stronger	for	countries	where	the	extent	of	reliance	on	resource	revenues	
has	been	larger.	In	terms	of	public	investment	projects,	in	many	cases	resource	
allocation	 has	 been	 determined	 by	 political	 motives	 rather	 than	 economic	
outcomes	or	optimal	allocation	of	resources.	
3. SWFs:
Transparency, risks and macroeconomic considerations
After	deriving	a	comprehensive	definition	of	the	SWFs	it	remains	of	primary	
importance	to	understand	the	risks	that	such	funds	are	faced	with	as	well	as	the	
transparency	that	funds	experience.	Let	us	first	look	at	transparency	aspects.
3.1. Assessing the transparency of the SWFs 
Several	attempts	have	been	made	at	an	official	ranking	of	the	SWFs	based	on	
risk	assessment	criteria.	BV	SWF	Risk	Index	ranks	the	top	20	prominent	SWFs	
according	to	the	potential	risk	they	present	to	the	Western	interests9.	The	index	
scores	each	SWF	from	1	to	5	in	each	one	of	the	following	criteria10:	
8  Dunning	(2008),	Bacon	and	Tordo	(2006)
9 	www.breakingviews.com
10  Detailed	values	and	respective	aspects	measured	are	detailed	in	Appendix	A
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1. Transparency:	This	criterion	assesses	aspects	such	as:
Who	calls	the	shots	for	the	fund?	
Does	the	fund	make	its	investments	using	clearly	identified	investment	criteria	
or	is	the	fund	subject	to	political	control?	
Does	the	fund	publish	details	of	its	investments	and	its	track	record?
2. Strategic control:	This	criterion	assesses	aspects	such	as:
Has	the	fund	sought	control	of	companies	in	strategic	–	i.e.	defense-related	–	
or	semi-strategic	–	such	as	banks	and	utilities	–	sectors?	
Has	the	fund	tried	to	influence	decision-making,	either	by	buying	a	large	stake	
or	via	board	representation?
3. Political threat:	This	criterion	assesses	aspects	such	as:
How	 sympathetic	 is	 the	 sponsoring	 government	 to	western	 economic	 and	
political	interests?	
Will	the	fund	try	to	interfere	and	does	it	have	the	clout	to	do	so?	
Is	the	origin	country’s	regime	stable,	preferably	a	democratic	regime?
 
Table 2. BN SWFs Risk Index11
Sovereign	
Wealth	Fund
Coun-
try
Trans-
parency
Strategic	
Control
Political	
relationship
Total	
score
1
China	Invest-
ment	Corpora-
tion
China 4 3 4 11
2
Qatar	Invest-
ment	Authority
Qatar 5 3 2 10
3
National	
Development	
Fund
Venezu-
ela
5 2 3 10
4
Abu	Dhabi	
Investment	
Authority
UAE	
(Abu	
Dhabi)
4 3 2 9
5
State	General	
RF
Oman 5 2 2 9
6 National	Fund
Kazakh-
stan
4 2 3 9
7
Stabilization	
Fund
Russia 2 2 4 8
11	 http://www.breakingviews.com/2008/01/04/Sovereign%20wealth%20SWFs%20index.
aspx?sg=breakingstories	
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8
Brunei	Invest-
ment	Agency
Brunei 4 2 2 8
9 Economic and 
Social	Stabili-
zation	Fund
Chile 4 2 2 8
10 Kuwait	Invest-
ment	Authority
Kuwait 3 2 2 7
11 National	Stabi-
lization	Fund
Taiwan 4 1 2 7
12 Istithmar UAE	
(Dubai)
3 2 2 7
13 Government	
of	Singapore	
Investment	
Corp
Singa-
pore
2 3 1 6
14 Temasek Singa-
pore
2 3 1 6
15 Dubai	Interna-
tional	Capital
UAE	
(Dubai)
2 2 2 6
16 Korea	Invest-
ment	Corpora-
tion
Korea 2 2 2 6
17 Khazanah	
Nazional
Malaysia 2 1 2 5
18 Alaska	Perma-
nent	Fund
US 1 1 1 3
19 Alberta	Heri-
tage	Savings	
Trust	Fund
Canada 1 1 1 3
20 Government	
Pension	Fund
Norway 1 1 1 3
The	BV	index	suggests	some	surprising	points	to	consider.	China	Investment	
Corporation,	 the	 giant	 $200bln	 SWF	 that	 recently	 acquired	 stakes	 in	Morgan	
Stanley	and	Blackstone,	is	the	top	with	11	points.	But	only	two	other	SWFs	are	
placed	in	this	category:	the	Qatar	Investment	Authority	and	Venezuela’s	National	
Development	Corporation	 (both	scored	10	points).	All	 three	 funds	also	scored	
high	marks	for	lack	of	transparency.	A	further	nine	SWFs	scored	between	7	and	
9	on	the	BV	index,	which	makes	them	medium	risk.	This	group	includes	Russia’s	
Stabilization	Fund,	which	turns	out	to	be	less	risky	than	the	Abu	Dhabi	Investment	
Authority,	 the	 flagship	 SWF	 for	 a	 country	 recently	 hailed	 by	 former	 President	
Bush	as	a	beacon	for	 the	Middle	East.	That	 is	because	the	Russian	fund	only	
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buys	bonds	according	to	clear	criteria,	while	ADIA,	which	recently	took	a	stake	in	
Citigroup,	won’t	even	confirm	the	size	of	its	funds.	Nevertheless,	the	index	omits	
several	high-profile	state-owned	entities	that	have	also	caused	alarm.	Russia’s	
Gazprom	and	China	Development	Bank	would	no	doubt	score	highly	on	the	index	
criteria	but	are	operating	companies,	not	SWFs.	Also	excluded	are	some	western	
investment	groups	with	close	state	links,	such	as	Calpers	and	Hermes,	the	US	
and	UK	pension	funds	which	are	occasionally	painted	with	the	SWF	brush	–	since	
these	have	clear	obligations	to	scheme	members.	
Overall,	the	index	points	to	two	clear	considerations:	The	first	is	for	western	
politicians	suggesting	that	they	should	acknowledge	the	fact	that	the	bulk	of	the	
SWFs	pose	little	threat	to	western	interests.	8	out	of	the	top	20	SWFs	scored	6	
points	or	less.	That	ranks	them	on	a	par	with	many	respected	US	and	European	
private	 equity	 firms	 and	 hedge	 funds,	 which	 also	 take	 controlling	 interests	 in	
companies	 and	 are	 often	 far	 from	 transparent.	 The	 index	 suggests	 that	 even	
high	 ranking	 SWFs	 should	 not	 be	 automatically	 penalized.	 They	 just	 require	
closer	scrutiny.	Deals	should	be	assessed	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	The	second	
consideration	 regards	 the	SWFs	 themselves:	 if	 they	are	alarmed	at	 their	 high	
ranking	–	and	the	risk	unscrupulous	western	politicians	might	use	it	as	a	cover	
for	protectionism	–	the	solution	lies	in	their	hands.	Most	SWFs	could	reduce	their	
score	simply	by	improving	their	transparency.	If	this	is	their	goal	they	should	do	so	
as	soon	as	possible,	acting	prior	to	the	publication	of	future	ranking	assessments.
An alternative index of transparency is the Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index developed by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 
The	index	assesses	10	essential	principles	that	depict	SWF	transparency	to	the	
public	using	 the	Pension	Fund	of	Norway	as	a	 leading	 transparency	example	
and	basis.	Each	of	the	principles	adds	1	point	of	transparency	to	the	index	rating.	
The	index	is	an	ongoing	project	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	Institute	(SWFI).	
The	minimum	rating	an	SWF	can	receive	is	1;	however,	the	SWFI	recommends	
a	minimum	 rating	of	8	 in	order	 to	claim	adequate	 transparency.	Transparency	
ratings	may	change	as	SWFs	release	additional	information.	There	are	different	
levels	of	depth	with	regards	to	each	principle;	judgment	of	these	principles	is	left	
to	the	discretion	of	the	SWFI.	The	principles	employed	by	the	Linaburg	-	Maduell	
Transparency	Index	assess	aspects	like:	
•	 Does	the	fund	provide	history	information	including	reason	for	creation,	
origins	of	wealth,	and	government	ownership	structure?
•	 Does	the	fund	provide	up-to-date	independently	audited	annual	reports,	
ownership	percentage	of	company	holdings,	and	geographic	locations	of	holdings,	
total	portfolio	market	value,	returns,	and	management	compensation?
•	 Does	 the	 fund	 provide	 guidelines	 in	 reference	 to	 ethical	 standards,	
investment	policies,	and	enforcement	of	guidelines?
•	 Does	the	fund	provide	clear	strategies	and	objectives?
•	 If	 applicable,	 does	 the	 fund	 clearly	 identify	 subsidiaries	 and	 contact	
information?
•	 Does	the	fund	identify	external	managers?
With	regards	to	the	countries	of	the	Caspian	region,	compatible	scores	are	
9	for	Azerbaijan,	5	for	Russia,	and	2	for	Kazakhstan.	Divergences	in	the	scores	
are	an	 indication	of	 the	willingness	of	 the	 respective	governments	 to	 disclose	
information	which	depend	on	(i)	 the	scale	of	 the	 fund,	(ii)	 the	 learning	and	the	
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harmonization	with	the	transparency	tools,	and	(iii)	the	cooperation	with	suitable	
regional	 and	 global	 organizations	 and	 initiatives	 like	 the	 Extractive	 Industries	
Transparency	Initiative	(EITI).	
Figure 3. Transparency scores for the SWFs of the Caspian basin 
countries
3.2. SWFs: Risk overview
Other	types	of	risk	to	be	considered	when	exploring	SWFs	are	related	to	the	
operational,	economic	and	political	environment,	to	the	investment	choices	and	
to	 the	existing	fiscal	and	 institutional	structures.	Starting	with	political	 risks	 the	
above	are	assessed	in	the	following	sections.
Political risk
The	 experiences	 strongly	 suggest	 that	 SWFs	 are	 likely	 to	 face	 political	
risks	 in	both	developed	and	developing	economies	due	 to	 the	 inherent	salient	
characteristic	of	the	funds,	i.e.	the	government	ownership.	However, the political 
risk in developing economies appears to be higher due to the uncertainties 
stemming from harder-to-anticipate regime changes and weaker regulatory 
frameworks. Nevertheless,	since	a	key	objective	of	the	fund	is	to	reap	returns	
higher	than	those	offered	by	fixed	income	investments	(which	generally	offer	low-
risk,	capital-protection	and	 low	returns),exposure	to	 the	higher	 level	of	political	
risks	from	developing	host	countries	can	be	justified	by	the	higher	rate	of	returns.	
Calibrated	political-risk-reduction	approach	and	strategy	that	cover	the	political,	
economic	and	social	dimensions	can	help	the	SWFs	to	reduce	their	risk	exposure	
caused	by	their	respective	investments.	Given	the	current	climate	of	skepticism	
over	the	SWFs,	the	need	for	political	risk	management	by	the	SWFs	can	only	be	
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expected	to	rise,	regardless	of	where	they	choose	to	invest12.
It	 is	 important	 to	 remember	 that	SWFs	are	partly	a	policy	 response	 to	 the	
growing	 calls	 from	 the	 general	 public	 to	 use	 the	 burgeoning	 reserves	 more	
productively	so	that	they	can	make	a	bigger	contribution	to	the	domestic	welfare.	
There	are	concerns	that	SWFs	may	pursue	geopolitical	or	strategic	objectives	and	
that	those	objectives	may	complicate	their	pursuit	of	profit	maximization.	While	
there	is	some	element	of	truth	to	this,	such	concerns	tend	to	be	overestimated.	
The	primary	impetus	behind	the	creation	of	the	SWFs	is	the	popular	belief	that	
a	potentially	valuable	national	 resource	 is	being	wasted.	More	specifically,	 the	
primary	concern	among	both	policymakers	and	the	general	public	is	that	the	rate	
of	return	on	traditional	reserve	assets	is	“too	low”	and	that	it	is	incurring	a	large	
opportunity	cost	by	foregoing	higher-return	assets.	
General economic activity risks 
The risks that SWFs face in their investment operations can be 
classified into four broad categories: financial, operational, regulatory, and 
reputation risks.	The	main	financial	risks	are	market	risk	(interest	rate,	foreign	
currency,	equity	and	commodity	price	risks),	credit	risk	(issuer,	counterparty,	and	
settlement	 risks),	 and	 liquidity	 risk.	The	main	 operational	 risks	 include	 people	
risk	(incompetence	and	fraud),	business	continuity	risk,	process	risk,	technology	
risk,	 and	 legal	 risk.	The	main	 regulatory	 risk	 stems	 from	 changes	 in	 the	 laws	
and	regulations	governing	the	operation	of	SWFs	in	countries	of	origin	as	well	
as	 recipient	 countries,	 or	 from	 changes	 in	 the	 application	 of	 such	 laws	 and	
regulations.	 Reputation	 risk	 is	 the	 potential	 that	 negative	 publicity	 regarding	
a	 SWF’s	 business	 practices,	 whether	 true	 or	 untrue,	may	 cause	 a	 decline	 in	
investment	returns,	costly	litigation,	or	loss	of	counterparties,	or	impair	the	home	
country	government’s	 international	 standing.	The	 risk	management	 framework	
should	 include	reliable	 information	and	 timely	 reporting	systems,	which	should	
enable	 the	 adequate	 monitoring	 and	 management	 of	 relevant	 risks	 within	
acceptable	parameters	and	levels,	control	and	incentive	mechanisms,	codes	of	
conduct,	business	continuity	planning,	and	an	independent	audit	function.	
The	measurement	 and	management	 of	 financial	 risks	 is	 typically	 done	 by	
using	quantitative	methodologies	and	models.	To	complement	these	models	and	
to	mitigate	“model	risk,”	stress	tests	should	regularly	be	conducted	to	evaluate	
the	 potential	 effects	 of	 macroeconomic	 and	 financial	 variables	 or	 shocks.	 To	
assess,	manage,	or	mitigate	operational	 risks,	 there	should	be	an	established	
and	 documented	 framework	 that	 has	 clear	 lines	 of	 responsibility,	 segregation	
of	duties,	and	 reliable	control	mechanisms.	Codes	of	conduct	and	 recruitment	
policies	 are	 important	 to	 ensure	 the	 professional	 and	 ethical	 behavior	 of	 staff	
involved	in	the	fund’s	operations.	To	ensure	that	the	SWF	can	continue	operating	
in	the	case	of	a	technology	breakdown	or	natural	disaster,	contingency	planning,	
including	 alternative	 sites	 of	 operation,	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 framework.	
In	mitigating	 regulatory	 and	 reputation	 risks,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 have	 adequate	
systems	 to	 track	 current	 regulatory	 and	 legal	 requirements	 in	 each	 recipient	
country	that	the	SWFs	invest	in.	To	satisfy	the	owner	and	the	governing	body	that	
12		Rajaratnam	(2008)
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those	risks	in	the	SWFs	are	managed	properly,	the	risk	management	framework	
should	be	subject	to	a	regular	independent	audit.
Risk	objectives	are	typically	determined	by	the	owner	or	the	governing	body	
of	 the	 SWF.	 While	 broad	 principles	 are	 generally	 established	 within	 the	 law	
or	 by	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 SWFs,	more	 specific	 risk	management	 objectives	 are	
typically	laid	out	by	the	fund’s	managers.	SWFs	indicate	that	these	are	usually	
set	as	tracking	error	limits	or	risk	bands	relative	to	a	benchmark	index	for	tactical	
management.	SWFs	are	particularly	sensitive	to	the	global	macroeconomic	risks	
such	as	exchange	rate	movement,	commodity	price	changes,	trade	movements,	
capital	flows,	global	political	risks,	potential	protectionism	in	recipient	countries	
and	 the	 political	 climate	 between	 governments.	 In	 addition	 to	 tactical	 risk	
limits,	 SWFs	 typically	 observe	 general	 constraints	 on	 investment	 classes	 and	
instruments.	Most	SWF	respondents	note	that	they	are	not	allowed	to	borrow	or	
use	leverage.	Several	funds	point	out	that	they	invest	in	certain	asset	classes	that	
use	leverage	(e.g.,	private	equity	and	multi-strategy	funds)	or	employ	derivatives	
for	the	purpose	of	protecting	the	value	or	return	of	their	investments.	In	addition,	
many	SWFs	have	established	limits	on	stakes	that	they	can	hold	in	companies,	
the	 types	of	 investment	 they	can	hold	 (investment	grade	assets	only),	and	on	
other	characteristics	of	their	portfolio.
For	several	SWFs	 the	operational	 risk	 is	controlled	 through	 the	separation	
of	responsibilities,	including	front,	middle,	and	back	offices.	SWFs	also	mitigate	
operational	 risk	 through	 the	 implementation	 of	 codes	 of	 conduct	 and	 policies	
on	conflict	of	 interest	 for	staff	and	the	governing	body,	regular	reconciliation	of	
accounts,	and	regular	and	active	audits.	Several	SWFs	note	that	they	use	back-
up	facilities,	global	custodian	services	and	business	continuity	plans,	as	well	as	
regularly	reviewed	operating	manuals,	to	mitigate	operating	failures.	One	SWF	
also	monitors	 operational	 risk	 with	 early	 warning	 indicators	 and	 by	 assigning	
direct	responsibility	for	operational	risk	monitoring	to	line	managers.	Some	SWFs	
note	the	use	of	workflow	automation	and	frequent	reports	by	the	middle	office	to	
management	to	ensure	timely	communication	and	early	warning	of	operational	
risks.
   
Investment risks and risk tolerance  
Risk	tolerance	refers	to	an	investor’s	willingness	and	ability	to	handle	declines	
in	the	value	of	 its	portfolio.	For	example,	 it	can	be	expressed	as	the	degree	of	
uncertainty	 that	 an	 investor	 can	 accept	 with	 regard	 to	 a	 negative	 change	 in	
the	value	of	 the	portfolio13	A	benchmark	portfolio	 is	a	 reference	portfolio	or	an	
index	constructed	on	the	basis	of	the	investment	policy.	It	serves	as	a	basis	for	
comparison	of	 the	performance	of	 the	actual	 portfolio.	Asset	 class	 refers	 to	 a	
group	 of	 securities	 that	 exhibit	 similar	 characteristics,	 and	 behave	 similarly	 in	
the	financial	market.	Examples	of	asset	classes	include	stocks,	bonds,	and	real	
estate.	The	 investment	policy	should	guide	 the	SWF’s	financial	 risk	exposures	
and	the	possible	use	of	leverage.	Exposures	to	financial	risks	(including	market,	
credit,	and	liquidity	risks),	the	use	of	derivatives,	and	leverage	commensurate	with	
the	SWF’s	investment	horizon	and	risk-bearing	capacity	are	key	determinants	of	
13		http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf
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its	ability	to	meet	its	investment	objectives	and	contribute	to	the	financial	markets	
stability.	Such	exposures	and	the	use	of	derivatives	and	leverage	should	be	well	
understood,	measured	and	managed	appropriately.	
Derivatives	are	useful	 in	SWFs’	operations	 -	 some	may	use	 them	only	 for	
hedging	purposes,	whereas	others	also	use	them	for	active	position	taking.	While 
SWFs typically do not use much leverage, this is often an integral part of an 
SWF’s investment, risk management, and cash management frameworks. 
It	may	show	up	 in	a	variety	of	 forms,	 including	 traditional	borrowing	to	finance	
investments,	 use	 of	 futures	 and	 options	 contracts,	 interest	 rate	 and	 currency	
swaps,	repos,	and	buy/sell-back	operations.	In	addition,	leverage	is	an	integral	
part	of	 investing	in	certain	asset	classes	such	as	“alternative	investments”	and	
real	 estate	 (including	 from	a	 rate	of	 return	and	 from	a	 tax	perspective,	where	
appropriate).	It	is	a	core	principle	that	SWFs’	overarching	objective	is	to	maximize	
risk-adjusted	financial	returns,	given	the	risk	tolerance	level	of	the	owner.	
SWFs’	investment	decisions	and	activities,	therefore,	should	be	guided	by	and	
be	consistent	with	this	objective.	The	SWF	may	have	a	framework	that	identifies,	
assesses,	and	manages	the	risks	of	its	operations.	It	is	important	for	the	SWF	to	
have	a	strong	risk	management	culture,	where	senior	management	is	engaged	
in	crafting	and	enforcing	risk	management	processes,	and	a	well-functioning	risk	
management	framework	to	ensure	that	it	is	able	to	identify,	assess,	and	manage	
its	 risks	 to	protect	 its	assets	and	stay	within	 the	 tolerance	 levels	as	set	 in	 the	
investment	policy.	Adherence	to	high	standards	in	risk	management	with	sound	
operational	 controls	 and	 systems	will	 also	help	 achieve	 the	aim	of	 preserving	
international	 financial	 stability	 as	 well	 as	 maintaining	 a	 stable,	 transparent,	
and	 open	 investment	 environment.	 The	 general	 approach	 to	 the	 SWF’s	 risk	
management	 framework	should	be	publicly	disclosed.	Public	disclosure	of	 the	
SWF’s	general	approach	to	its	risk	management	policies	and	key	actions	related	
to	 governance	 and	 the	 soundness	 of	 its	 operations	 reassures	 that	 the	 fund,	
its	 governing	 body,	 or	management	 adheres	 to	 a	 high	 standard	 of	managing	
operational,	regulatory	and	reputation	risks.	
The	investment	policy	guides	the	SWF	in	implementing	activities	consistent	
with	 the	approved	 investment	objectives	and	strategies,	and	risk	 tolerance,	as	
well	as	 its	 investment	monitoring	procedures.	Although	 there	 is	no	set	 formula	
that	 suits	 all	 situations,	 the	 investment	 policy,	 including	 the	 strategic	 asset	
allocation,	should	draw	upon	appropriate	portfolio	management	principles.	The	
strategic	 asset	 allocation	 is	 typically	 embodied	 in	 a	 benchmark	 portfolio	 and	
determined	 by	 the	 SWF’s	 policy	 purpose,	 liability	 profile,	 horizon	 over	 which	
expected	 returns	 and	 risk	 are	 defined,	 and	 characteristics	 of	 different	 asset	
classes.	The	investment	policy	normally	defines	permissible	asset	classes	and	
gives	guidance	on	concentration	of	risk	with	regard	to	individual	holdings,	liquidity,	
and	geographical	and	sectoral	concentration.	In	 line	with	the	policy	purpose	of	
the	fund,	the	strategic	asset	allocation	may	set	certain	investment	parameters,	
for	 example,	 exclusively	 investing	 in	 foreign	 assets.	 In	 addition,	 the	 strategic	
asset	allocation	may	consider	the	SWF’s	investments	in	conjunction	with	other	
assets	or	 liabilities	of	 the	country,	resulting	 in,	 for	example,	 investing	 in	assets	
negatively	 correlated	 with	 the	 country’s	 natural	 resources.	As	 the	 parameters	
and	assumptions	underlying	the	SWF’s	investment	policy	–	including	its	strategic	
asset	allocation	–	change	over	time,	a	periodic	review	is	needed	(as	it	is	currently	
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done	by	funds	in	Australia,	New	Zealand	and	Singapore).
The	risk	 tolerance	 is	a	key	constraint	on	 the	maximization	of	 the	expected	
return	over	the	investment	horizon.	The	risk	constraint	is	based	on	the	ultimate	
stakeholders’	 willingness	 and	 ability	 to	 take	 risk.	 Ideally,	 the	 risk	 preference	
focuses	on	the	entire	investment	horizon,	and	can	take	the	form	of	a	maximum	
acceptable	 deviation	 at	 the	 points	 of	withdrawals	 and	 the	 risk/return	 tradeoffs	
at	 these	points.	 In	other	words,	 there	 is	 less	of	a	need	to	be	concerned	about	
daily	volatility	if	the	investment	horizon	is	a	year.	For	example,	the	value	of	the	
investment	can	increase	and	decrease	daily	by	ten	percent	but	the	key	aspect	
is	 the	 value	 in	 a	 year’s	 time	 when	 the	 withdrawal	 takes	 place.	 However,	 in	
practice,	investors	may	have	some	concerns	about	short-term	volatility.	A	typical	
constraint	 in	new	funds	 is	 therefore	the	sponsor’s	desire	to	preserve	capital.	A	
capital	preservation	objective	is	equivalent	to	zero	tolerance	for	negative	returns,	
in	either	nominal	or	real	terms.	If	formulated	with	regard	to	the	start	of	the	fund,	
this	constraint	has	a	time	dimension:	over	time	a	buffer	is	built	up	to	allow	more	
risk.	In	other	words,	adding	this	constraint	of	capital	preservation	allows	easing	
into	a	risk	tolerance	that	is	more	reflective	of	the	real	investment	horizon.	In	this	
regard,	 an	 early	 start	with	 investing	 resources	 to	 build	 up	 a	 buffer,	 having	 an	
oversight	body	with	experienced	and	respected	professionals,	and	educating	lay	
stakeholders	can	help	limit	the	cost	imposed	by	this	additional	constraint14.
Cross-border investments and the risk of protectionism
The	biggest	external	risk	faced	by	new	SWFs	is	that	of	financial	protectionism,	
especially	 from	 industrialized	 countries.	 The cross-border investments of 
SWFs not only affect the legitimate interests of home countries but also 
those of host countries.	As	 such,	 foreign	 investors,	whether	 state-owned	or	
not,	have	to	conform	to	host-country	laws	and	regulations.	However,	host-country	
governments	and	citizens	are	sometimes	more	wary	of	state-owned	investors	than	
private	sector	investors,	and	are	particularly	concerned	that	their	investments	may	
be	partly	driven	by	non-commercial	objectives.	At	a	minimum,	those	concerns	will	
subject	SWFs	to	greater	scrutiny	by	host-country	governments	than	their	private	
sector	counterparts.	More	seriously,	those	concerns	may	give	way	to	various	forms	
of	 financial	 protectionism	 in	 host	 countries.	 Financial	 protectionism	 constrains	
how	and	where	the	new	SWFs	can	invest	and	thus	imposes	a	significant	cost.
The	first	major	 rejection	of	an	Arab	SWF	 investment	 involved	Dubai	Ports	
World's	acquisition	of	P	&	O,	a	British	company	 that	operated	six	major	ports	
in	the	eastern	United	States.	Concerns	about	national	security	led	many	in	the	
U.S.	Congress	to	try	to	block	the	Dubai	company's	operation	of	U.S.	ports,	an	
issue	 settled	 only	 when,	 in	 March	 2006,	 Dubai	 Ports	 World	 agreed	 to	 hand	
over	operation	of	those	ports	to	the	U.S.	entities.	Similar	concerns	were	raised	
both	in	New	Zealand	and	Sweden	following	Dubai's	offers	to	buy	the	Auckland	
International	 Airport,	 and	 the	 Swedish	 stock	 exchange	 OMX.	 Though	 Dubai	
withdrew	its	offer	for	the	Auckland	airport	in	the	face	of	opposition,	it	continues	to	
seek	the	purchase	of	OMX,	as	part	of	a	deal	in	which	it	will	exchange	OMX	for	
NASDAQ's	28%	share	in	the	London	Stock	Exchange	and	an	as-yet	unspecified	
14 	Das	et	al	(2009)
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amount	of	equity	in	NASDAQ	itself.	On	September	20,	2007,	President	George	
W.	 Bush	 stated	 in	 a	 news	 conference	 about	 the	 then-pending	 acquisition	 of	
NASDAQ	 that	 an	 investment	 by	 a	 government-owned	 company	 in	 NASDAQ	
would	be	subject	to	review	by	national	security	agencies,	although	he	provided	a	
provisional	welcome	of	the	deal15.
Fiscal and institutional risks
The	 prospect	 of	 government	 support	 for	SWFs	may	 encourage	 excessive	
risk-taking.	 The	 flip	 side	 of	 this	 argument	 is	 that	 using	 SWFs	 to	 support	 the	
government	will	also	create	serious	 risks	 for	SWFs.	 In	particular,	 there	has	 to	
be	a	clear-cut	separation	between	the	foreign	exchange	assets	controlled	by	the	
Central	Bank	and	those	controlled	by	the	fund.	There	must	be	clear	ground	rules	
for	ensuring	that	SWF	resources	will	not	be	used	to	supplement	the	central	bank’s	
traditional	reserves	in	the	event	of	a	financial	crisis.	Otherwise,	having	to	liquidate	
long-term	assets,	which	are	 likely	 to	be	a	major	part	of	an	SWF’s	portfolio,	on	
short	notice	will	bring	about	major	losses	for	the	SWF.	More generally, serious 
financial risks for SWFs will ensue if the government views their assets as 
free fiscal resources to be used ad hoc so as to meet various fiscal needs. 
The	vast	majority	of	reserves	are	not	fiscal	reserves	but	Central	Bank	reserves	
with	 counterpart	 liabilities.	The	 balance	 sheet	 of	 even	 the	 best-run	SWFs	will	
suffer	if	the	government	views	SWF	assets	as	fiscal	assets	to	be	used	freely	at	
its	own	discretion.
Overall,	 new	 SWFs	 simply	 do	 not	 yet	 have	 the	 institutional	 capacity	 to	
effectively	manage	a	 portfolio	 of	 high-risk,	 high-return	 investments.	SWFs	are	
financially	 sophisticated	 investors	 with	 large	 investments	 in	 alternative	 asset	
classes	such	as	private	equity,	venture	capital,	and	real	estate.	Furthermore,	they	
are	often	active	investors	seeking	to	control	or	at	least	influence	the	management	
of	companies.	 It	 is	not	only	unrealistic	but	also	downright	dangerous	 for	some	
countries	to	believe	that	it	is	possible	to	build	capacity	overnight.	In	the	absence	
of	 adequate	 investment	 management	 capacity,	 including	 risk	 management	
capacity,	 pursuing	 investment	 strategies	 creates	 dangerously	 high	 levels	 of	
risk.	Nevertheless,	popular	pressures	for	profits	may	encourage	SWFs	to	try	to	
run	before	 they	can	walk,	 to	pursue	high-risk,	high-return	 investments	without	
adequate	capacity	to	handle	risk.	Succumbing	to	such	pressures	entails	a	clear	
risk	of	large,	even	catastrophic,	investment	losses.	In	addition,	the	participation	
of	a	 foreign	SWF	 in	a	financial	 institution	 (credit	 institution)	may	endanger	 the	
effective	 supervision	 of	 this	 institution.	 Financial	 supervisors	 could	 experience	
difficulties	when	they	attempt,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	exercise	of	 their	supervisory	
function,	to	determine	whether	the	participation	of	the	SWF	in	a	bank	jeopardizes	
the	‘sound	and	prudent	management’	of	the	credit	institution16.
15		http://www.meforum.org/1863/sovereign-wealth-funds-investment-vehicles-for	
16		Bart	De	Meest.	Need	for	a	multilateral	approach	to	sovereign	wealth	funds.	Policy	Brief	No.	
4	–	May	2008
29                                                                                                                                  
3.3. SWFs and the macroeconomic implications 
   
Where	the	SWF’s	activities	have	significant	direct	domestic	macroeconomic	
implications,	 those	 activities	 should	 be	 closely	 coordinated	 with	 the	 domestic	
fiscal	 and	monetary	 authorities,	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 consistency	 with	 the	 overall	
macroeconomic	 policies.	 Since	 SWFs	 are	 often	 created	 for	 macroeconomic	
purposes,	 their	 operations	 should	 support	 and	 be	 consistent	 with	 a	 sound	
overall	macroeconomic	policy	 framework.	The SWF’s operations can have a 
significant impact on public finances, monetary conditions, the balance 
of payments, and the overall sovereign balance sheet.	Thus,	operations	of	
the	SWF	that	have	significant	macroeconomic	implications	should	be	executed	
in	 coordination	 and	 consultation	with	 the	 competent	 domestic	 authorities.	 For	
instance,	transactions	that	 involve	an	exchange	between	domestic	and	foreign	
currencies	by	a	SWF	may	affect	monetary	conditions,	 the	exchange	 rate,	and	
the	domestic	demand	conditions.	Broadly	speaking,	there	are	three	main	kinds	
of	sovereign	wealth	funds.	The	first	group	contains	the	natural	resources	funds,	
with	an	estimated	70%	of	total	sovereign	wealth	fund	asset	holdings	in	the	hands	
of	resource-rich	countries,	such	as	the	United	Arab	Emirates	and	Norway.	The	
focus	of	 these	funds	 is	 to	maintain	economic	stability	against	commodity	price	
fluctuations	and	to	ensure	that	future	generations	will	not	be	disadvantaged	by	
the	exploitation	of	natural	resources	by	the	current	generation.	The	second	group	
relates	 to	 the	 foreign	 reserve	 funds,	 and	 notably	 includes	 a	 number	 of	Asian	
countries	such	as	China,	Korea	and	Singapore.	The	focus	of	these	funds	should	
be	to	hedge	away	the	impact	of	risk	factors	behind	these	commercial	surpluses,	
and	also	to	generate	higher	returns	than	local	sterilization	bond	costs	related	to	
the	issuance	of	sovereign	debt	aimed	at	reducing	the	monetary	base	expansion	
related	 to	 capital	 inflows.	The	 last	 group	of	 funds,	which	accounts	 for	 a	more	
marginal	fraction	of	total	sovereign	wealth,	contains	the	pension	reserve	funds	for	
countries	such	as	New	Zealand,	France	or	Ireland,	which	have	set	aside	a	portion	
of	 their	 pension	 funds	 and	 manage	 them	 separately	 to	 prepare	 for	 an	 aging	
society.	Recent	advances	in	dynamic	asset	pricing	theory	have	in	fact	paved	the	
way	for	a	better	understanding	of	optimal	dynamic	asset	allocation	decisions	for	
such	long-term	investors,	by	precisely	taking	into	account	the	stochastic	features	
of	the	sovereign	funds	endowment	process	(where	the	money	is	coming	from),	
the	stochastic	features	of	the	sovereign	fund's	expected	liability	value	(what	the	
money	is	going	to	be	used	for),	and	the	stochastic	features	of	the	assets	held	in	
its	portfolio.	
For	example,	in	the	case	of	the	Norwegian	sovereign	fund,	which	is	a	natural	
resource	fund	that	has	been	set	up	to	help	meet	future	pension	payments,	the	
optimal	allocation	strategy	should	involve	a	short	position	in	oil/gas	commodity	
futures,	or	a	 long	position	 in	stocks	of	companies	such	as	airlines,	companies	
that	 benefit	 from	decreases	 in	 oil	 prices,	 so	as	 to	diversify	 away	 some	of	 the	
risk	exposure	in	the	countries'	revenues.	It	should	also	include	a	long	position	in	
inflation-linked	securities	that	will	help	the	sovereign	state	to	hedge	away	some	
of	the	inflation	uncertainty	in	future	pension	payments.	Such	portfolio	strategies	
are	 the	equivalent	 for	 sovereign	wealth	 funds	of	 the	 liability-driven	 investment	
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strategies	recently	developed	in	the	pension	funds	industry17.
Two	major	considerations	usually	guide	the	allocation	and	distribution	of	SWF	
assets.	The	first	 is	 the	accumulation	and	withdrawal	rules	regarding	the	fund’s	
future	cash	flows	where	applicable.	The	second	is	the	fund’s	objectives.	Together,	
these	considerations	drive	the	strategic	asset	allocation,	which	reflects	the	return	
objective,	risk	tolerance,	and	identified	constraints	(such	as	liquidity	and	financing	
needs,	investment	horizon,	legal	and	regulatory	requirements).	SWFs	may	hold	
assets	with	negative	correlation	to	the	country’s	major	exports	(oil)	or	offset	the	
price	risk	of	future	imports	(depending	on	the	country’s	risk	profile)	via	its	strategic	
asset	 allocation	 decisions.	 SWFs	without	 identified	 liabilities	 allow	 for	 a	more	
exclusive	focus	on	a	return	objective	and	acceptable	level	of	risk.	However,	for	
some	SWFs,	sterilization	instruments	used	to	mop	up	excess	liquidity	may	need	
to	be	considered	as	 liabilities,	especially	 from	an	 integrated	asset	and	 liability	
management	perspective.	The	objectives	of	SWFs	could	be	undermined	by	the	
accumulation	of	 liabilities	elsewhere	 in	 the	public	sector.	Some	funds,	such	as	
the	pension	reserve	funds,	may	have	identified	liabilities	to	be	matched	within	the	
strategic	asset	allocation	framework	to	allow	for	a	clear	operational	 framework	
and	transparent	objectives.
Funds’	allocations	of	sovereign	reserve	assets	to	domestic	investments	have	
macroeconomic	 implications,	 especially	 for	 developing	 and	 emerging	 market	
economies.	To invest domestically, SWFs would typically need to convert 
part of their accumulated assets back into domestic currency, possibly 
reversing the economic policies that led to reserve accumulation.	Investing	
domestically	could	stimulate	domestic	demand	with	 inflationary	consequences.	
Issues	of	 fiscal	 accounting,	 transparency,	 and	 risk	 could	also	emerge	 if	 those	
investments	 are	 actually	 government	 spending	 operations	 that	 should	 take	
place	within	the	budget.	Therefore,	domestic	investments	are	generally	seen	to	
be	 ruled	out	 in	SWFs.	Different	 types	of	SWFs	could	 have	markedly	 different	
strategic	asset	allocations	reflective	of	their	different	objectives	and	constraints.	
Stabilization	 funds,	 for	 instance,	 are	 generally	 conservative	 in	 their	 strategic	
asset	allocation,	using	shorter	investment	horizons	and	low	risk	return	profiles,	or	
other	instruments	(perhaps	longer-term)	that	vary	inversely	with	the	risk	the	fund	
is	meant	to	cover.	Typically,	such	funds	are	designed	to	insulate	the	budget	from	
terms-of-trade	 shocks	 and	 to	 meet	 contingent	 financing	 requirements.	 In	 this	
regard,	they	are	akin	to	reserves,	which	are	managed	for	safety	and	liquidity,	and	
it	is	only	after	such	considerations	are	satisfied	that	higher	risk/return	objectives	
are	set.	Funds	with	long-term	objectives,	such	as	savings	funds,	may	be	better	
able	to	accommodate	short-term	volatility	in	asset	returns.	Nonetheless,	savings	
funds	 and	 pension	 reserve	 funds	 also	 aim	 to	 preserve	 a	minimum	amount	 of	
capital,	 in	 real	 terms,	so	 that	 the	purchasing	power	of	 the	 fund	 is	guaranteed.	
Pension	 reserve	 funds	 with	 explicit	 liabilities	 typically	 design	 strategic	 asset	
allocation	benchmarks	that	preserve	their	solvency.
17		http://www.edhec-risk.com/edito/RISKArticleEdito.2009-02-24.4440
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Despite	these	benefits,	many	governments	in	the	West	are	concerned	about	
investments	 by	 SWFs.	 The	 concerns	 are	 based	 on	 three	 domains:	 national	
security,	 corporate	 governance,	 and	 financial	 stability.	 The	 worries	 that	 are	
expressed	 the	most	 involve	concerns	of	national	security.	Governments	 in	 the	
West	fear	that	SWFs	are	being	used	by	governments	to	pursue	their	geo-strategic	
goals,	rather	than	pure	profit-maximization.	The	government	as	a	shareholder,	by	
means	of	investments	through	SWFs,	distinguishes	itself	from	other	shareholders	
because	 the	government	may	draw	benefits	 from	 its	participation	 in	ways	 that	
other	 shareholders	 cannot.	 As	 has	 been	 indicated,	 SWFs	 were	 at	 one	 time	
considered	the	‘saviors'	of	financial	institutions	that	ran	into	trouble	as	the	credit	
crisis	widened.	However,	some	economists	wondered	whether	it	is	really	desirable	
that	credit	institutions	that	have	made	serious	errors	of	judgment	when	granting	
mortgage	 loans	should	not	suffer	 the	consequences	of	 their	mistakes.	 Indeed,	
the	functioning	of	the	free	market	is	based	on	weak	companies	disappearing	and	
on	the	survival	of	only	the	best	corporations.	States	are	also	concerned	with	the	
possible	consequences	of	investments	by	SWFs	upon	financial	stability.	This	is	
arguably	 the	most	 real	 and	 pressing	 concern.	 The	 enormous	 amounts	 SWFs	
have	at	their	disposal	make	their	activities	of	‘systemic	importance.’	This	means	
that	negative	consequences	of	their	activities	may	endanger	the	entire	financial	
system.	When	a	SWF	would,	for	instance,	suddenly	sell	its	stake	in	a	corporation,	
this	could	give	rise	to	unrest	of	the	financial	markets.	Other	shareholders	of	this	
corporation	may	fear	that	the	SWF	has	obtained	more	information	than	they	have	
and	consequently	they	may	want	to	sell	their	stakes	too.	This	may	spill	over	to	
other	market	participants	and	result	in	general	financial	unrest.	
Turning	 to	supportive	arguments	 in	 favor	of	 the	SWFs,	 recent	 investments	
in	 developed	 financial	 institutions	 are	 not	 financial	 resources	 buried	 in	
the	 Persian	 Gulf	 and	 discovered	 by	 the	 leaders	 of	 those	 institutions.	 The	
assets	 of	 the	 SWFs	 already	 are	 invested	 abroad	 -	 by	 definition.	A	 significant	
proportion	 already	 is	 in	 US	 dollars	 probably	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 Thus,	
when	 SWFs	 invest	 in	 a	 US	 financial	 institution,	 only	 the	 form	 of	 its	 US	
investment	 is	 changed.	 The	 SWFs	 sells	 one	 US	 asset	 and	 buys	 another 
18.	Contrary	to	what	the	comforting	narrative	might	suggest,	a	country	seeking	to	
use	its	holdings	of	dollars	so	as	to	influence	suitable	policy	has	options	that	fall	short	
of	the	“nuclear	option”	of	dumping	large	quantities	of	dollar	reserves.	A	creditor	
government	could	sell	holdings	of	“risk”	assets	and	purchase	“safe”	assets,	creating	
instability	in	certain	segments	of	the	market.	This	could	be	done	without	triggering	
the	appreciation	of	its	own	currency	against	the	dollar	or	directly	jeopardizing	its	
exports.	A	creditor	government	could	change	how	it	 intervenes	 in	the	currency	
market.	A	 country,	 for	 example,	 could	 halt	 its	 accumulation	 of	 dollars	 without	
ending	all	intervention	in	the	currency	market	if	it	sells	all	the	dollars	it	buys	in	the	
market	for	other	currencies.	Also,	a	creditor	government	could	stop	intervening	in	
the	currency	market,	halting	its	accumulation	of	foreign	assets,	whether	in	dollars	
18	 http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=892
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or	other	currencies.	A	creditor	government	could	halt	its	intervention	and	sell	its	
existing	stocks	of	dollars	and	dollar-denominated	financial	assets,	 the	“nuclear	
option.”	 If	 it	 held	 a	 large	 equity	 portfolio,	 this	 could	 include	 large	 stock	 sales 
19.
4. SWFs: Assessing governance
Assessment	of	the	nature	of	the	SWFs	and	of	the	risks	associated	with	the	
latter	indicates	the	primary	importance	of	the	governance	quality	experienced	by	
the	funds.	In	this	context	it	remains	interesting	to	identify	the	segments	and	the	
factors	that	affect	the	development	of	the	latter.
 
4.1. SWFs, public control and public disclosure policy
Often,	the	officials	of	the	countries	of	similar	SWFs	indicate	that	even	if	the	
SWFs	do	need	regular	promulgation	of	information	on	their	activity,	this	information	
should	be	measured	out	in	doses	under	the	strict	control	of	the	government.	The	
arguments	behind	that	are	well	known	–	the	SWF	is	a	specific	structure,	operating	
sometimes	with	colossal	resources.	SWFs	aim	at	the	solution	of	strategic	issues	
of	the	state	and	thus	they	remain	very	vulnerable	in	the	eyes	of	outsiders.	Leaks	
of	 important	 information	 could	 harm	 the	 state	 interests.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 better	
to	 be	 reassured	 and	 preclude	 all	 possibilities	 of	 promulgation	 of	 information	
regarding	 questions	 of	 how	 and	 where	 the	 SWF’s	 resources	 are	 managed.	
Actually, amid the existent 56 similar SWFs, as we can see from practice, 
the best performing ones are those which truly have real public control and 
access to most of the information. Adherence	to	state	interests,	i.e.	profitable	
work	of	the	SWF	and	better	integrity	with	the	macroeconomic	goals	of	the	state,	
is	particularly	well	traced	here.	On	the	contrary,	closed	SWFs	are	very	dubious	in	
their	state	goals	and	information	on	their	efficient	operation	is	missing	or,	to	put	it	
mildly,	is	open	to	question.
SWFs	 as	 financial	 structures	 working	 in	 extremely	 sensitive	 financial	 and	
investment	sites	should	of	course	have	a	special	promulgation	policy,	say,	different	
from	that	of	the	state’s	budget.	However,	that	does	not	disaffirm	the	availability	
of	a	more	clear-cut	and	firm	policy	of	public	control	of	information	and	access	to	
it,	but	strongly	implies	it.	Following	circumstances,	need	for	rather	focused	public	
control	could	possibly	be	explained	in	this	case:
1. The state establishes and manages the SWF on behalf of the society 
and it is accountable to the society.	Therefore,	mentioning	some	separate	and	
out-of-public-control	policy	of	the	SWFs	contradicts	the	generally	known	canons	
of	state	building.	That	is	particularly	the	case	if	the	matter	regards	the	democratic	
state.	 It	 is	 important	 to	ensure	 that	 the	control	 is	public	and	not	 imitated.	 It	 is	
also	important	to	consider	the	actual	situation,	the	conditions	and	the	developed	
practice	of	decision	making	in	the	state.	With	regards	to	the	case	of	Azerbaijan:	in	
the	Supervisory	Board	of	the	State	Oil	Fund	of	Azerbaijan	(SOFAZ),	officially	only	
the	President	of	the	Academy	of	Sciences	of	Azerbaijan	represents	the	society.	
19  Setser	(	2008)
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Indifference	and	inactivity	of	the	aforesaid	person	to	this	issue	brings	the	public	
control	over	the	fund	to	nothing.	At	the	same	time	the	EITI	is	successfully	being	
realized	in	the	country	and	there	is	a	strong	civil	sector,	capable	enough	to	not	
only	criticize	the	government	but	to	also	introduce	a	motion	on	improvement	of	
the	 funds’	 policy.	 Thus,	 the	 conventionality	 of	Azerbaijan	 implies	 that	 the	 civil	
sector	 successfully	 engaged	 in	 the	 EITI	 can	 effectively	 exert	 control	 over	 the	
fund.						
2. An SWF administers colossal resources, which occasionally exceed 
the capacity of the state budget, thus mistakes could cost too much.	In	the	
overwhelming	majority	of	cases,	total	assets	of	the	SWFs	exceed	the	budgets	of	
the	countries	 they	represent.	Stepwise	examination,	discussion	and	eventually	
adoption	 of	 the	 state	 budget	 by	 the	 respective	 Parliaments	 have	 become	 a	
practice	with	an	established	foothold.	However	in	the	case	of	the	SWFs,	this	kind	
of	tracking	system	differs	from	country	to	country	and	in	the	majority	of	cases,	it	
is	just	being	formed.	Adoption	of	the	next	year’s	state	budget	as	a	law	implies	the	
same	necessary	public	responsibility	which	is	still	missing	in	many	SWFs.	It	 is	
generally	known	that	discussion	and	adoption	of	the	law	on	the	next	year’s	budget	
in	the	Parliament,	in	addition	to	everything	else,	has	the	purpose	of	securing	the	
government	against	possible	mistakes	and	a	lop-sided	approach.	The	essential	
consensus	on	more	optimal	registration	of	financing	of	state	priorities	between	
the	 government	 and	 the	 legislators	 is	 reached	 in	 Parliament.	 The	 practice	 of	
SWFs’	future	budget	discussions	in	the	Parliament	in	the	context	of	consolidated	
budgets	 certainly	 smoothes	away	 these	defects.	However,	 this	 practice	 is	 not	
the	case	in	all	countries,	and	most	importantly,	it	covers	only	the	fund	resource	
spending	 in	 the	framework	of	 the	assets’	budget	 for	 the	next	year.	Meanwhile,	
SWF	assets	and	their	management	in	the	vast	majority	of	cases	remain	out	of	
discussions	and	effective	control	of	the	legislators.	
3. Assets of the SWFs are generated not by atomized taxpayers, but 
rather from a single source of raw materials.	 The	 difference	 of	 the	 SWFs	
from	the	state	budget	consists,	among	other	things,	in	the	SWFs’	accumulation	
of	assets	from	a	single	source	–	sales	of	hydrocarbons	(hereby	we	mean	only	
commodity	funds).	At	the	same	time,	it	is	well	known	that	budget	is	basically	formed	
at	the	expense	of	atomized	taxpayers.	Like	a	mirror,	the	state	budget	displays	the	
efficiency	of	the	government’s	economic	policy.	A	sequent	of	this	policy	could	be	
a	stout	or	conversely	weak	budget.	However,	a	good	budget	could	also	be	the	
sequent	of	successful	economic	performance	conducive	 to	 the	greater	budget	
growth	in	the	future.	The	goal	in	this	case	is	to	compare	the	economic	nature	of	
these	two	financial	instruments	in	order	to	elicit	to	what	extent	the	public	control	
over	SWFs	is	important.	Accumulation	of	SWFs’	assets	out	of	hydrocarbons	may	
not	display	the	real	economic	situation	and	it	may	cause	the	illusive	impression	
of	successful	work	of	the	SWFs.	In	the	case,	with	a	budget,	economic	realities	
very	quickly	 “bring	 round”	 the	government,	which	brokenly	 looks	 for	means	of	
budget	improvement	and	generally	economic	policy,	whereas	with	SWFs	such	a	
direct	link	may	not	appear.	For	example,	if	a	country	is	at	its	peak	of	production	
of	hydrocarbons	and	there	is	an	advantageous	market	situation,	then	the	rate	of	
investments	may	grow	even	if	the	economy	is	heading	in	the	opposite	direction	
but	not	demonstrating	an	adequate	 trend.	Professional	public	 control	 and	 full-
fledged	information	access	could	minimize	such	deformations	and	serve	as	the	
34                                                                                                                                   
missing	critical	 indicator,	which	 in	 the	case	of	a	state	budget	would	display	 its	
deficit	performance.			
4. The vast majority of the SWFs pertain to the countries of risk, which 
institutionally still remain weak.	Internal	control	in	this	case	is	insufficient,	whilst	
external	is	often	ineffective.	Only	9	out	of	56	SWFs	belong	to	the	OECD	countries	
(Australia,	Canada,	France,	Ireland,	Japan,	South	Korea,	New	Zealand,	Norway	
and	USA)	and	the	remaining	pertain	to	the	countries	of	high	risk.	As	a	rule,	no	
solid	good	governance	 is	 recorded,	but	 it	 is	 rather	observed	a	 lack	of	precise	
system	of	effective	self-control	–	system	of	an	“iron	triangle”	(one	of	the	groups	
grants	a	power,	whilst	the	other	manages	and	a	third	runs	a	business	and	earns	
a	profit).	International	Financial	Institutions	(IFI)	who	see	this	gap	are	trying	to	fill	
it	by	strengthening	the	international	control.	However,	in	the	majority	of	cases	that	
happens	to	no	effect,	because	one	cannot	replace	the	lack	of	immanent	internal	
control,	which	at	the	primary	level	could	ensure	a	balance	of	power	and	natural	
responsibility	 of	 the	 subject	 instances	 before	 others,	 with	 merely	 an	 external	
impact.	 As	 a	 result,	 we	 can	 observe	 periodically	 recurring	 recommendations	
of	 international	 agencies,	 although	 implementation	 of	 these	 recommendations	
leaves	much	to	be	desired.	One	should	accept	the	fact	that	for	the	independent	
states,	 these	 recommendations	 will	 always	 remain	 as	 recommendations	 and	
their	implementation	is	left	to	the	discretion	of	the	states.	Once	implemented,	a	
practice	of	effective	public	control	could	move	all	these	issues	away	from	the	dead	
point.	The	public	itself	(civil	sector	would	be	more	successful	in	this	role)	would	
be	an	initiator	of	such	legislative	and	practical	improvement	of	more	accountable	
management	of	the	SWFs.
5. Traditions of strong non-governmental movements in the 
vast majority of those states which have similar SWFs are not 
developed and are even alien to the public mentality.	 30	 out	 of	 56	SWFs	
belong	 to	 countries	 with	 poorly	 developed	 traditions	 of	 civil	 movements 
20.	In	some	countries	such	movements	do	not	exist	at	all.	In	such	conditions,	it	is	
extremely	difficult	to	set	up	public	control	embodied	by	civil	organizations.	However,	
these	 very	 countries	 above	 all	 others	 need	 control.	 Norway,	 demonstrating	
brilliant	experience	of	open	management	of	the	SWF,	is	not	in	acute	need	of	such	
control.	However,	it	is	brilliant	here.	Yet	in	Iran	where	there	is	no	experience,	no	
traditions,	and	no	capacity	for	such	undertaking,	the	vulnerability	of	the	Reserve	
Fund	is	very	apparent	from	the	view	of	its	predictable	management.	Society	is	on	
the	lookout	for	the	purposes	on	which	the	assets	of	the	fund	will	be	spent	due	to	
the	state	of	affairs	and	the	nature	of	the	power	in	the	country.
The	 importance	of,	and	simultaneously	acute	need	 for,	 the	 increase	of	 the	
role	of	the	civil	sector	in	countries	of	risk	and	intensification	of		formation	works	of	
the	first	shoots	of	civil	capacity	could	be	a	new	challenge	for	the	world	community	
in	the	light	of	the	impact	of	the	SWFs	upon	the	international	scene.	Civil	sector	
capacity-building	efforts	in	these	countries	may	have	far-reaching	objectives.	The	
civil	sector,	initially	engaged	for	this	local	goal	(although	from	the	scope	of	SWFs’	
capacity	growth	 this	 is	 far	 from	 the	 local	objective)	 can	 later	 focus	entirely	on	
other	important	state	objectives.	A	typical	example	of	that	could	be	the	civil	sector	
focused	on	 the	oil	and	gas	field	of	Azerbaijan.	Established in 2004, the EITI 
20		http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/transparencyindex.php
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coalition has evolved from year to year and is capable enough today to set 
some greater global tasks.	The	capacity	building	that	was	realized	significantly	
advanced	 the	 coalition	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 study,	 watchdog	 and	 other	 activities.	
Reinforcement	of	SWFs’	 international	role	should	become	a	new	challenge	for	
the	strengthening	of	the	civil	sector	capacity	in	resource-rich	countries	the	same	
way	that	the	EITI	has	become	an	important	international	initiative	due	to	which	
knowledge	capacity	in	resource-rich	countries	was	built	up.	
In	this	light,	the	question	of	how	effective	control	over	the	activity	of	the	SWFs	
by	the	civil	society	can	be	arranged	remains	of	primary	importance:	in	an	attempt	
to	answer	this,	four	different	angles	have	to	be	taken	into	consideration,	namely	
non-governmental	 organizations	 (NGOs),	 the	media,	 independent	 parties	 and	
political	parties.	In	order	to	ensure	effective	public	control,	it	is	important	to	have	
every	element	of	this	four-angled	scheme	functioning	as	a	separate	component	
of	a	single	whole.
Figure 4. Public control and the SWFs
 
NGOs
 
NGOs at this point are entrusted with a special mission. NGOs alongside 
the media are the structure most interested in securing the transparency of 
the SWFs.	Apart	 from	this	keen	 interest,	non-governmental	organizations	also	
have	the	greatest	capacity	in	this	activity.	This	capacity	was	accumulated	within	
the	 last	 decade	owing	 to	different	 programs,	 initiatives	and	other	 international	
instruments.	The	campaign	“Publish	What	You	Pay,”	which	is	an	initiative	of	more	
than	400	united	NGOs	(in	70	countries	around	the	world)	and	EITI,	where	 the	
NGO	stands	as	a	key	chain	of	 trilateral	partnership	(the	state,	companies	and	
civil	sector)	has	gained	great	recognition21.	However,	the	problem	lies	in	the	fact	
that	 none	 of	 the	 previously	mentioned	 instruments	 are	 applicable	 to	 our	 end.	
As	was	 already	mentioned,	 SWFs	 have	 specific	missions	 and	 peculiarities	 of	
21  www.eiti.org
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work.	Obviously,	in	the	course	of	the	development	of	this	work	NGOs	will	have	to	
improve	the	skills	pertaining	to	the	above	initiatives	to	secure	the	transparency	of	
the	work	of	the	SWFs.	NGOs	will	have	to	come	up	with	a	new	hybrid	and	perhaps	
a	 brand	 new	 instrument	 to	 ensure	 the	 transparency	 of	 the	 SWFs.	 The	 good	
news	is	that	after	the	adoption	of	the	“Santiago	principles”	there	is	a	favorable	
opportunity	for	the	NGOs.	Thus,	based	on	this,	an	International	Working	Group	
(IWG)	should	deliberate	 the	mechanism	of	practical	work	of	NGOs	with	 these	
principles.
Media
Media	is	an	extremely	important	component	in	ensuring	the	transparency	of	
the	SWFs.	It	is	generally	known	that	for	transparency	there	should	be	access	to	
information	and	all-round	disclosure	of	it	to	the	wider	public.	This	is	a	particularly	
important	mission	of	the	media.	Thanks	to	the	media,	the	wider	audience	learns	
about	SWFs’	activity	and	 their	growing	capacities.	Unfortunately, in the vast 
majority of cases, it is mostly a question of international level and world-
renowned print agencies and electronic means that rarely get to have 
materials about SWFs in countries of risk.	Meanwhile,	herein	one	may	feel	
the	acute	 lack	of	 impartial	coverage	of	 the	activity	of	 these	SWFs.	The	media	
has	an	irreplaceable	role	in	the	organization	of	the	journalistic	investigations	on	
the	expenditures	and	the	management	of	the	SWFs’	assets.	Certainly,	essential	
qualification	is	the	requirement	for	this	genre	as	well	as	any	professional	activity.	
Acute	 lack	 of	 this	 qualification	 is	 felt	 almost	 in	 all	 countries.	 If	 the	 SWFs	 are	
truly	 interested	in	a	qualified	army	of	reporters	covering	their	activity	then	they	
should	act	as	initiators	of	the	organization	of	periodic	extensive	courses	for	the	
journalists,	creating	opportunities	for	them	to	obtain	new	skills	and	knowledge.	
In	this	view,	the	experience	of	the	State	Oil	Fund	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	
(SOFAZ)	is	positive,	as	the	SOFAZ	has	sponsored	such	courses	for	journalists	
in	Baku.	
Independent investigation
Activities of the SWFs, just like the activities of any other financial 
structure, are multidimensional and in their content, they require not only 
regular press coverage but also thorough elaboration. This	 is	beyond	 the	
power	 of	 a	 regular	 observer.	 It	 requires	 special	 qualifications.	 For	 instance,	
the	 fact	 of	 how	 well	 information	 access	 is	 arranged	 and	 how	 regularly	 and	
comprehensively	it	is	disclosed	is	a	basis	to	judge	the	transparency	of	the	SWFs;	
however,	 this	 information	 is	 insufficient	 to	 judge	 its	 efficiency.	 Even	 regularly	
updated	information	on	profitability	level	is	not	yet	sufficient,	as	any	rate	of	the	
profitability	of	 the	SWF	relates	 to	hundreds	of	 factors	which	 require	study	and	
consideration.	Only	professional	experts	and	financiers	can	handle	this	specific	
job.	There	is	a	need	for	a	parallel	independent	investigation	considering	the	fact	
that	the	specialists	even	of	the	highest	qualification	involved	in	public	institutions	
are	 subject	 for	 engagement.	 Therefore,	 independent	 and	 simultaneously	
professional	study	 focused	on	 the	appraisal	of	 the	SWFs	and	 their	successful	
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connections	with	the	macroeconomic	architecture	can	be	valuable	material	not	
only	for	the	international	community,	but	also	for	the	management	of	the	SWFs.
Political Parties 
    
SWFs	are	always	a	sensitive	object	for	politicians,	populists	and	other	layers	
of	society,	which	is	understandable.	The	ultimate	mission	of	the	vast	majority	of	
SWFs	 is	 the	accumulation	of	 assets	 received	 from	 the	sale	of	 non-renewable	
resources	 for	 the	 next	 generations	 as	well.	That	makes	 this	 structure	 socially	
sensitive	 and	 politically	 vulnerable.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 in	 the	
majority	 of	 the	 resource	 rich	 countries,	 such	 SWFs	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 sharp	
criticism	from	the	political	opponents.	Political parties, as a rule, criticize the 
authorities for ineffective management of the SWFs’ assets and urge the 
government to have better consideration of the interests of all the layers 
of society.	The	populists	propose	to	distribute	part	of	the	assets	among	citizens,	
allegedly	 for	 the	 fair	 consideration	 of	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 entire	 population.	
However,	 as	 practice	 shows,	 for	 the	majority	 of	 resource-rich	 countries,	 apart	
from	single	instances	(the	Alaska	fund	can	be	considered	a	positive	exceptional	
case),	such	an	experience	can	hardly	be	edifying.	Thus,	politicians	try	to	use	any	
mistake	in	the	management	of	the	SWFs	as	a	“trump	card”	to	stress	their	own	
political	activity	and	to	win	more	supporters	with	this	tide.	However,	the	majority	
of	closed	countries’	authorities	leave	fewer	chances	to	political	opponents	due	to	
the	amounts	of	such	funds.	Thus,	on	the	one	hand,	existence	of	the	SWF	from	
the	standpoint	of	development	of	critics	may	look	like	a	blessing;	nevertheless,	
being	a	good	advantage	in	the	hand	of	a	government,	 it	 turns	against	 them.	It	
is	 not	 a	 wonder	 that	 political	 activity	 in	 the	 respective	 countries	 leaves	much	
to	be	desired,	while	opposition	is	extremely	weak	to	gain	in	the	majority	of	the	
examined	countries.
4.2. Assessing good governance in the SWFs
 
So	far	the	different	parties	involved	in	SWF	control	and	overview	have	been	
identified.	Nevertheless,	the	nature	and	the	aim	of	this	control	depend	on	what	is	
perceived	to	be	good	governance.	In	this	respect,	it	remains	important	to	identify	
the	characteristics	of	the	latter.	These	can	be	summarized	as	follows:
a) Clarity of goals, roles and responsibilities
This	generally-known	principle	in	the	case	of	the	SWFs	has	a	special	semantic	
assignment.	 SWFs	 are	 relatively	 new	 agencies	 in	 the	 public	 administration	
system.	Unlike	traditional	state	structures	(for	example,	the	Ministry	of	Finance),	
it	is	sometimes	not	so	easy	to	clearly	define	the	roles	and	the	destination	of	the	
funds,	and	optimally	connect	this	agency	to	the	management	system	developed	
in	the	country.	The risk of the SWF remaining an alien element in the state 
organism is high. In this case, as practice shows, this gap is not that 
much a matter of concern of preservation of assets for future generations. 
Meanwhile, a policy of stabilization and promotion of macroeconomic 
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development may not gain the necessary support from the SWFs.	 That	
is	particularly	traceable	in	Middle	Eastern	funds.	On	the	contrary,	in	the	OECD	
countries,	we	can	observe	the	policy	of	a	good	combination	of	SWFs	with	both	
current	and	strategic	policy	of	the	state.	Unlike	the	countries	of	risk,	in	developed	
countries,	as	a	rule,	we	see	a	more	clear	definition	of	the	role	and	the	significance	
of	the	SWFs,	and	that	is	not	a	minor	factor.	Functions	and	goals	are	well	defined.	
Thereby,	 sound	 legislative	 basis	 and	 strong	 institutional	 frameworks	 have	
significant	importance	in	the	successful	functioning	of	the	SWFs.	In	the	absence	
of	such	a	basis	and	framework,	the	respective	governments	should	create	all	the	
necessary	attributes	on	the	level	of	the	SWF	itself	to	realize	the	status	and	the	
place	of	 the	SWF	and	hence	determine	 the	adequate	mechanism	of	 decision	
making	in	the	management	of	the	SWF.
b) Sustainable development for the benefit of future generations
			 Resource-rich	 countries	 suffer	 most	 of	 all	 from	 the	 volatility	 of	 the	
market,	 hence	 they	 have	 continuous	 problems	 stemming	 from	 the	 lack	 of	
stable	economic	growth.	Provision	of	the	long-term	stability	herein	is	the	priority	
task	 of	 the	 government.	 Exhaustibility	 of	 resources	 aggravates	 the	 execution	
of	 this	 task.	For this very reason, the countries extracting for more than 
one decade show preference to the establishment of SWFs for future 
generations. Thus,	 the	mission	of	 the	SWFs	directly	aims	at	 the	provision	of	
long-term	stability,	which	is	further	ensured	by	the	effective	management	of	the	
SWF	assets.	 It	 is	worth	noting	that	 in	a	number	of	countries,	whilst	separating	
the	 two	 functions	 of	 the	SWF	 (stabilizing	 and	 accumulative),	 authorities	 show	
preference	to	the	establishment	of	two	separate	SWFs	(e.g.	Russia,	Alaska,	etc).	
In	other	examples,	like	the	case	of	Azerbaijan,	the	government	prefers	to	combine	
these	 two	 functions	 in	 one	SWF.	With	 a	 purpose	of	 the	provision	of	 essential	
long-term	stability,	governments	are	paying	more	attention	to	the	finding	of	the	
optimal	proportion	between	the	volumes	of	the	current	expenses	and	the	assets	
preserved	for	the	future	generations.	Discovery	of	an	optimal	point	herein	is	quite	
a	hard	task	and	it	depends	on	many	circumstances.	Factors	predetermining	the	
level	of	 the	correlation	are	 the	volume	of	predicted	reserves,	production	rates,	
macroeconomic	strategy,	social	demographics	and	other	features.
c) Transparency and accuracy of information
Transparency	is	the	key	principle	of	good	governance.	How	is	transparency	
ensured	in	the	case	of	SWFs	and	what	should	be	the	optimal	policy	of	information	
access?	As	a	rule,	the	transparency	of	the	SWFs	implies	disclosure	of	regular,	
comprehensive	 and	 understandable	 information.	 It is important to have 
an opportunity to compare the potential and efficiency of SWF activity 
with analogical SWFs in other countries based on available information 
and within its boundaries and its own dynamics.	 Once	 the	 determinants	
of	 good	 governance	 are	 clarified	 it	 remains	 interesting	 to	 examine	 how	 these	
principles	of	good	governance	can	be	ensured.	All	 things	equal,	 the	better	 the	
SWF	is	administered	the	more	successfully	it	will	develop.	Poor	management	is	
associated	with	poor	outcome.	An	SWF,	even	if	it	is	an	independent	legal	entity,	
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does	not	operate	in	a	vacuum	and	bears	the	marks	of	the	public	administration	
system	 formed	 in	 the	 country.	 However,	 does	 that	 mean	 that	 there	 is	 a	 rule	
according	to	which	the	success	of	the	SWF	follows	the	level	of	provision	of	good	
governance?	Would	it	be	appropriate	to	mention	here	the	proverb	“one	can	do	no	
more	than	one	can”?	The	short	answer	is	“no.”	More	comprehensively,	we	can	
operate	with	historical	examples	and	economic	regularities.	
A	typical	example	of	such	inconsistency	is	the	State	Oil	Fund	of	Azerbaijan	
(SOFAZ),	which	takes	its	well-deserved	place	among	the	top	5	in	all	the	listings,	
while	Azerbaijan	as	a	country	in	a	similar	appraisal	enjoys	a	considerably	poorer	
ranking.	The	 level	 of	 SOFAZ’s	 success	 leaves	 behind	 the	 national	 indicators.	
Besides,	the	principal	distinction	of	the	SWFs	from	other	public	financial	structures	
consists	 in	the	fact	 that	 the	title	“independent”	 in	this	content	plays	a	key	part.	
Unlike	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	these	structures	are	not	entirely	incorporated	into	
the	single	public	administration	scheme	and	they	enjoy	a	certain	autonomy.	Even	
if	there	is	not	a	practice	of	legal	entity	and	service	of	the	accounts	is	performed	
on	a	trust	basis	(as,	for	example,	in	Kazakhstan),	the	SWF	would	still	have	an	
autonomous	regime	of	management	due	to	its	special	nature	and	mission.	This	
particular	 factor	makes	SWFs	special	and	 in	a	case	of	good	governance,	 they	
can	indeed	end	up	on	a	higher	level	of	governance	than	the	country	as	a	whole.	
However,	this	is	not	the	only	factor.	By	virtue	of	the	peculiarity	of	the	assets	
management,	SWFs,	as	a	rule,	have	a	higher	level	of	responsibility	and	financial	
accountability	 (audit)	 on	 foreign	markets;	 hence,	 these	 structures	 are	 treated	
with	 special	 requirements.	Eventually,	 the	 savings	 function	 of	 the	SWFs	adds	
serious	 requirements,	 and	 demands	 to	 have	 a	 proper	 approach	 towards	 the	
management	of	the	SWF	as	the	factor	of	preservation	of	part	of	the	assets	for	
the	next	generation	seriously	urges	politicians	on,	and	 they	are	demonstrating	
herein	a	certain	discipline.	Thus,	the	success	of	the	SWFs	with	good	governance	
can	indeed	exceed	the	success	of	the	country	and	this	appears	to	be	the	case	in	
several	countries.
The	success	and	the	efficiency	of	SWF	management	become	more	apparent	
in	a	concentrated	form	(Fig	5)	reflecting	the	process	of	decision-making	vis-à-vis	
the	SWF	management	when	considering	all	the	different	parties	involved.	These	
parties	are	the	government,	the	parliament,	the	international	financial	institutions	
(IFI)	and	the	respective	Chambers	of	Accounts	(CA).
Figure 5. Decision making process and the SWF governance
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1. Government
Government	has	the	principal	responsibility	for	the	successful	management	
of	the	SWF.	The government, usually represented by the Ministry of Finance, 
is the owner of the SWF.	In	the	majority	of	countries,	the	administration	of	the	
SWF	is	performed	by	the	highest	political	ranks	of	the	state	by	the	appointment	
of	 the	 specific	 head	 of	 this	 structure.	 The	 government	 is	 interested	 in	 the	
optimal	 incorporation	 of	 the	 SWF	 to	 the	 overall	 macroeconomic	 architecture	
of	the	country.	It	 is	further	interested	in	the	resolution	of	many	current	financial	
problems	related	to	the	SWF.	Thus,	in	a	period	of	difficulties	such	as	those	of	the	
budget	and	 its	deficit	 planning,	 the	government	would	possibly	prefer	 to	have	
unimpeded	access	to	the	SWF	reserves.	Hence,	the	government	might	not	be	
concerned	about	the	legislative	limitations	over	the	spending	of	SWF	assets	at	
the	government’s	discretion.	This	“unrestrained”	desire	to	command	the	assets	
of	 the	SWF	 in	 practice	might	 not	 bring	 anything	 positive.	Higher	 inflation	 and	
macroeconomic	imbalance	becomes	the	outcome	of	such	a	policy,	which	in	the	
end	results	 in	a	loss	of	the	competitive	advantage	for	the	country.	Considering	
that	 the	 terms	of	 the	government’s	power	are	discrete	and	 limited	 in	 time,	 the	
government	 tends	 to	 spend	 the	 assets	 of	 the	 SWF	 for	 smoothing	 purposes	
and	 economic	 development	 over	 time,	 handing	 a	 legacy	 of	 debts	 and	 poor	
economy	to	the	new	authority.	In	the	countries	with	poor	institutions,	this	risk	of	
uncontrolled	use	of	assets	(as	long	as	the	government	may	easily	trample	down	
all	 other	 supervising	 agencies	 responsible	 to	 oversee	 the	executive	 power)	 is	
imminent.	Thus,	the	goal	of	carrying	out	balanced	policy	of	the	SWF	may	make	
the	government	exceed	its	own	powers	and,	in	the	condition	of	weakness	of	other	
authority	agencies,	to	roll	down	to	the	fields	of	voluntarism.	The	latter	may	end	
with	ineffective	management	and	even	stealing	of	the	SWF’s	assets.	
2. Parliament
For	the	successful	functioning	of	the	SWFs,	it	is	a	key	requirement	to	have	
a	strong	parliament.	Parliament as the legislative body is able not only to 
ensure the necessary long-term supervision over the spending of SWF 
assets but also to restrain the appetite of the government by putting up 
a legislative screen against the unrestrained spending of the assets. 
The	experience	shows	that	successful	SWFs	are	generally	accountable	 to	 the	
parliament.	Norway	 can	 be	 considered	 a	 good	 example	 in	 this	 regard.	 In	 the	
places	where	such	accountability	and	responsibility	is	weak	or	missing,	the	result	
is	controversial	and	rather	negative.	In	this	sense,	the	important	mission	of	the	
legislative	body	is	a	legislative	restriction	of	the	level	of	spending	of	the	assets	
of	 the	SWF	 inside	 the	country	and	 the	mandatory	compliance	with	 this	 rule	 in	
practice.	In	the	case	of	Azerbaijan,	the	subordination	of	SOFAZ	to	the	head	of	
the	state	of	Azerbaijan	and	the	poor	role	of	Parliament	 is	actually	a	weak	spot	
for	SOFAZ.	The	lack	of	a	clear	restriction	line	of	the	spending	of	the	SWF	may	
(and	 it	 already	 has)	 lead	 to	 serious	 violation	 of	 macroeconomic	 proportions	
which	results	in	financial	imbalances	and	unusually	high	rates	of	inflation	for	the	
respective	countries.
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3. Chamber of Accounts
The	Chamber	 of	Accounts	 has	 a	 key	 role	 in	 securing	 the	 external	 control	
over	the	activity	of	the	SWF.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	Azerbaijan,	in	line	with	
the	article	92	of	the	Constitution,	CA	is	established	by	the	Parliament	to	which	it	
is	subordinated.	In	line	with	the	article	2	of	the	Law	on	“Chamber	of	Accounts,”	
the	Chamber	along	with	a	state	budget	represents	the	budget-financing	control	
organization	and	exercises	control	on	out-of-budget	funds	of	Azerbaijan	as	well.	
Thus,	SOFAZ	 falls	 under	 the	 full	 control	 of	 the	Chamber.	As is stipulated in 
the aforesaid law, the Chamber exercises control over the volume of the 
receipts and the expenditure assets of the state budget and out-of-budget 
SWFs, control over their structure and timely execution in line with their 
assignment. 
4. International financial institutions 
Amid	all	 international	 financial	 institutions	 (IFI),	 the	most	 actively	engaged	
in	the	process	of	promotion	of	the	successful	management	of	the	SWFs	is	the	
International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF).	IMF in the context of the country reviews 
and regularly develops recommendations on the improvement of the 
SWF management and expresses special interest in the identification of 
an optimal model of the SWF development in different countries.	That	 is	
understandable	because	in	extracting	countries,	the	process	of	the	management	
of	the	hydrocarbons’	revenues	has	colossal	importance	for	the	current	policy	and	
determination	of	the	strategy	of	the	perspective	development.	For	instance,	the	
IMF	was	very	active	in	Azerbaijan	from	the	very	beginning	of	the	generation	of	
oil	and	gas	revenues	and	it	has	offered	many	recommendations	on	this	subject	
to	the	Azeri	government22.	The	role	of	the	IMF	is	growing	in	this	respect.	The	IMF	
initiated	the	adoption	of	 the	Santiago	Principles	 in	September	of	2008	and	the	
creation	of	the	International	Working	Group	(IWG)	including	the	senior	leadership	
of	 the	 23	 significant	 SWFs	 around	 the	 world.	 Inauguration	 of	 the	 Forum	 of	
the	SWFs	 in	October	 in	Baku	can	also	be	considered	an	 important	milestone	
on	 the	 way	 to	 the	 cooperation	 of	 these	 structures.	 The	 IMF	 coordinates	 this	
activity	via	the	Secretariat	established	especially	for	the	timely	management	of	
this	activity.	The	IMF	and	to	a	lesser	degree	other	international	institutions	(such	
as	the	World	Bank,	the	European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	and	
the	Asian	Development	Bank)	pay	special	attention	to	the	work	on	SWFs.		Given	
this	reality,	and	taking	into	consideration	the	implications	of	the	ongoing	global	
economic	crisis,	the	need	for	coordination	of	efforts	by	an	international	institution	
such	as	the	IMF	remains	extremely	high.	
22  The	study	on	“Managing	oil	wealth:	the	case	of	Azerbaijan”	prepared	by	John	Wakeman-Linn	
in	2004	could	be	considered	a	more	successful	specialized	work	of	IMF	on	this	matter.	
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Conclusion
The present brief has reviewed SWFs and their emergence as key players in 
the global financial arena. The latter has stimulated a fresh look at the nature, the 
operations, the risks and the governance patterns that SWFs experience. Initial 
assessment of the current developments indicates that under the ongoing global 
financial developments, SWFs are seen to represent a permanent redirection 
in investment flows and a shift in the dominant sources of financial capital. To 
date, global financial operations were dominated by Anglo-American financial 
institutions, but recent developments suggest increasing capital flows from 
emerging to mature economies. In these flows SWFs imply a redistribution of 
financial and political capital. Considering this reality, the presence of a blurring 
line between finance and politics raises concerns that SWFs will be used 
illegitimately to advance political, as opposed to commercial, agendas. 
The conceptualization and the understanding of the latter lie with the thorough 
clarification of the nature and the operation of the respective SWFs as they seem to 
differ widely in purpose, maturity, risk attitude and investment preferences. In the 
present analysis these differences have been identified and analyzed indicating 
where the peculiarities and the dangers may lie. In particular the experiences to 
date suggest that SWFs are likely to face political risks in both developed and 
developing economies due to the inherent salient characteristic of the SWFs of 
government ownership. These political risks appear to be higher in developing 
economies due to the uncertainties stemming from harder-to-anticipated regime 
changes and weaker regulatory frameworks. When considering the financial 
risks, these are related to the fact that the respective governments might view 
SWF assets as free fiscal resources to be used ad hoc. Overall assessment of the 
SWFs and their changing role in the global financial arena indicates that the quality 
of the governance patterns of the SWFs and the relationship of the latter with the 
domestic and international economic and institutional structure remain of primary 
importance. In this context the present attempt has offered some crystallized 
characteristics of good governance looking at transparency, accountability and 
public awareness. In this direction of governance strengthening and overall 
improvements the respective governments, parliaments, civil society groups and 
international financial organizations emerge as players of key importance. 
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Recommendations
1. Stakeholders should take into account that the political risk related to SWF 
activities in developing economies appears to be higher due to the uncertainties 
stemming from harder-to-anticipate regime changes and weaker regulatory 
frameworks.
2. In order to assess, manage, or mitigate overall risks, there should be a 
prescribed and documented framework that has clear lines of responsibility, 
segregation of duties, and reliable control mechanisms in SWFs.
3. SWFs’ financial supervisors could experience difficulties when they attempt 
the exercise of their supervisory function, to determine whether the participation of 
the SWF in a financial institution jeopardizes the ‘sound and prudent management’ 
of the credit organization.
4. Funds’ top managements have to evade serious fiscal risks for SWFs 
which will ensue if the government views their assets as free resources to be 
used ad hoc to cover various fiscal needs.
5. In order to ensure predictability of the SWF, its necessary for government, 
as owner of the fund, to focus on public disclosure and public control issues. This 
work should be more comprehensive and for this, governments have to provide 
to IWG the relevant program for further improvements.  
6. Local CSO have to work out the program of cooperation with SWF in the 
resource rich countries and for this they can cooperate with international NGO’s. 
The main line of this program should be “how to achieve good results of the public 
disclosure policy of the SWF in the country.”
7. International financial institutions, particularly the IMF, should develop 
the indicative assessment mechanism of the SWFs in order to improve good 
governance practice, and after that they must popularize this practice in the world.
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Appendix A
For	each	risk	index	the	points	given	represent	different	quality	levels.	
These	are:
Transparency
5 - No	clearly	identified	investment	criteria;	no	disclosure
4 - No	clearly	identified	investment	criteria;	limited	disclosure
3 - Vaguely	identifiable	investment	criteria;	limited	disclosure
2 - Clearly	identified	investment	criteria;	limited	disclosure
1 - Clearly	identified	investment	criteria;	full	disclosure
Strategic control
5 - Seeks	controlling	stakes	(30%	-plus)	in	strategic	industry	(defense-related)
4 - Substantial	minority	 stakes	 (10%-plus)	 or/plus	 board	 representation	 in	
strategic	sectors
3 - Substantial	stakes	(10%-plus)	plus	board	representation	in	semi-strategic	
sectors	such	as	banks	and	utilities
2 - Substantial	minority	 stakes	 (10%-plus)	without	 board	 representation	 in	
non-strategic	sectors,	no	evidence
1 - Explicitly	limited	to	small	scale	investments	(less	than	10%)
Political relationship
5 - Major	non-democratic	countries,	actively	hostile	to	western-style	market	
economies
4 - Major	non-democratic	countries,	potentially	hostile	to	western-style	market	
economies
3 - Unstable	countries,	potentially	hostile	to	western-style	market	economies
2 - Non-democratic	western-style	market	economy
1 - Western-style	democratic	market	economy
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1. Introduction
Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	(hereafter	SWFs)	are	government-owned	investment	
funds	operating	 in	 private	 financial	markets.	SWFs	are	 commonly	 established	
out	 of	 receipts	 resulting	 from	 commodity	 exports,	 out	 of	 balance	 of	 payments	
surpluses,	 official	 foreign	 currency	 operations,	 the	 proceeds	 of	 privatizations	
and/or	 fiscal	 surpluses.	 Recent	 interest	 in	 the	 SWFs	 has	 failed	 to	 come	 to	 a	
consensus	as	to	how	SWFs	differ	from	other	public	investment	funds	and	how	
they	 should	 be	 defined.	 Indeed	 SWFs	 differ	 in	 ownership,	 underlying	 assets,	
degree	of	dependence,	operational	aspects,	etc.	Of	the	existing	SWFs,	almost	
half	 operate	 as	 separate	 legal	 entities,	 while	 the	 rest	 consist	 of	 a	 dependent	
entity	within	the	Ministry	of	Finance	or	the	Central	Bank	of	the	relevant	country1.	
SWFs	 themselves	 declare	 various	 objectives	 ranging	 from	 fiscal	 stabilization	
or	 general	 savings	 for	 future	generations	 to	 covering	expected	 future	pension	
expenditures.	Despite	certain	explicit	goals	(e.g.	financing	future	pension	payment	
requirements),	SWFs	are	managed	according	to	the	interests	and	the	objectives	
of	the	government	and/or	the	sovereign.	In	this	respect	the	ultimate	beneficiary	of	
a	SWF	is	not	a	specific	individual	but	rather	it	remains	the	government,	the	host	
country’s	citizens	or	the	taxpayer	in	general.	
Differentials	 in	 the	 nature,	 the	 operations	 and	 the	 ownership	 render	 the	
assessment	and	the	comparison	of	the	SWFs	difficult.	 In	this	reality	 it	remains	
relevant	to	identify	the	communalities	among	SWFs	that	could	serve	as	the	basis	
of	SWFs	definition	and	assessment.	Evidence	from	the	existing	SWFs	suggests	
that	governments,	at	 central	or	at	 sub-national	 level,	may	own	 the	SWFs	and	
exercise	control	directly	or	indirectly	upon	them.	In	this	case,	SWFs	can	be	seen	
as	a	meeting	point	of	high	politics	with	high	finance.	 In	 terms	of	 the	available	
liabilities,	a	number	of	SWFs	have	liabilities,	such	as	sterilization	debt	or	some	
deferred	contractual	liability	to	transfer	money	out	of	the	fund	and	into	the	general	
budget	or	a	social	security	system.	However,	in	the	majority	of	the	cases	SWFs	
have	no	non-governmental	or	outside	liabilities.	
Of	the	SWFs	that	do	have	liabilities,	these	are	usually	intra-governmental,	with	
1		See	Ahmadov	et	al	(2009).
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one	branch	of	the	government	owing	money	to	another	branch	of	the	government	
(i.e.	the	fund	may	owe	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	the	Central	Bank	or	the	social	
security	 reserve	 funds).	 SWFs	 have	 no	 external	 creditor,	 hence	 accumulated	
assets	are	not	subject	to	outside	non-governmental	owners’	property	rights.	Hence	
the	existing	fund	liabilities	are	part	of	the	broader	national	balance	sheet.	In	this	
respect	SWFs	can	be	defined	in	more	detail	as	directly	or	indirectly	government-
owned	and	controlled	investment	funds,	with	no	outside	beneficiaries	or	liabilities	
involved	in	asset	 investments	in	the	short	or	 long	term.	The	sovereign	and	the	
citizens	of	the	country	remain	the	ultimate	beneficiaries	of	the	fund’s	operations.	
Following	 immense	 accumulation	 of	 international	 assets,	 policymakers	 in	
countries	with	SWFs	have	set	up	a	number	of	considered	as	“optimal”	operational	
and	 policy	 objectives.	 These	 “optimal”	 objectives	 vary	 between	 the	 existing	
funds.	The	differentials	among	the	SWFs,	which	reflect	these	different	policy	and	
operational	objectives,	the	increasing	number	of	the	SWFs	and	the	accumulating	
assets	held	and	managed	by	 the	SWFs,	have	 triggered	 interest	 in	SWFs	and	
in	 the	establishment	of	a	set	of	common	assessment	criteria	and	benchmarks	
for	SWFs.	 Indicative	are	 the	Truman	(2008)	scoreboard,	 the	Linaburg-Maduell	
Transparency	 Index	 developed	 by	 the	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Fund	 Institute,	 or	
the	 guidelines	 for	SWFs	developed	 by	 the	 IMF	and	 the	OECD.	The	 attempts	
to	establish	benchmarks	and	 to	 rank	SWFs	have	been	 further	 intensified	as	a	
response	to	the	increasing	importance	of	the	SWFs	to	the	international	financial	
markets,	especially	during	the	latest	financial	crisis.	
Several	SWFs	have	obtained	significant	shares	in	prominent	Western	financial	
institutions.	The	acquired	4.9%	stake	of	Citigroup	from	the	Abu	Dhabi	Investment	
Authority	 in	 November	 2007,	 the	 9.9%	 stake	 of	 Morgan	 Stanley	 acquired	 by	
the	China	Investment	Corporation	in	December	2007	or	the	9.8%	stake	of	UBS	
obtained	in	December	2007	by	GIC	Singapore	are	just	a	few	examples	to	name2.	
Over	the	last	years	SWFs	have	worked	as	pivotal	actors	in	providing	liquidity	to	
Western	companies,	which	has	been	very	much	needed	in	the	times	of	the	latest	
financial	crisis.	In	this	respect	SWFs	have	constituted	an	opportunity	significantly	
related	to	the	future	of	capital	markets	(Epstein	and	Rose,	2009).	In	this	reality	
the	 developed	 assessment	 and	 ranking	 attempts	 of	 the	 SWFs	 have	 primarily	
reflected	 the	concerns	 that	 the	 international	financial	 institutions	and	 individual	
recipient	countries	of	SWFs’	investments	have	been	faced	with.	
These	concerns	have	primarily	 regarded	 the	governance	structures	of	 the	
SWFs	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 on	 funds’	 operations.	
Concerns	have	been	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	the	wide	majority	of	the	SWFs	
are	based	in	undemocratic	countries.	This	has	raised	further	questions	on	whether	
political,	 as	 opposed	 to	 economic,	 considerations	 guide	 fund	 operations	 and	
their	activities	in	the	international	financial	system.	To	date,	the	assessment	and	
ranking	attempts	of	the	SWFs	have	been	based	on	the	financial	performance	of	the	
SWFs,	on	their	investment	management	and	on	their	governance,	transparency	
and	 accountability	 standards.	 The	 present	 paper	 focuses	 on	 governance,	
transparency	and	accountability	perspectives.	The	aim	of	 the	present	paper	 is	
to	critically	review	the	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	rankings	and	
benchmarks	developed	for	the	SWFs.	
2		Source:	Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	Institute.
49                                                                                                                                  
The	 recorded	 efforts	 come	 in	 large	 part	 from	 Western	 countries	 and	
independent	 organizations	 and	 mainly	 reflect	 the	 needs	 and	 the	 standards	
required	from	the	international	financial	markets	and	countries	that	are	recipient	
of	the	SWF	investments.	In	light	of	this	reality,	the	assessment	and	the	rankings	
are	based	on	what	is	“necessary”	and	“adequate”	from	the	international	financial	
markets’	perspective	rather	than	from	what	is	“beneficent”	and	“adequate”	for	the	
citizens	of	the	countries	that	remain	the	ultimate	beneficiaries	of	the	operations	
of	the	SWFs.	Moreover,	these	attempts	develop	on	the	assumption	that	what	is	
“good”	and	“working”	for	one	fund	or	country	it	should	be	“good”	or	“working”	for	
other	funds	or	countries	as	well.	Overview	of	these	attempts	further	indicates	that	
the	methodological	considerations	should	be	kept	 in	mind	when	employing	the	
latter	rankings	and	benchmarks.	
The	remainder	of	 the	paper	 is	structured	as	follows.	Section	2	reviews	the	
conceptual	framework	relevant	to	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	
aspects	of	the	SWFs.		This	section	highlights	the	critical	role	of	strong	governance	
and	transparent	and	accountable	operations	of	the	SWFs	for	micro	and	macro	
developments	on	an	ongoing	basis	as	well	as	for	the	performance	of	the	SWFs.	
Section	3	compares	and	discusses	the	existing	governance,	 transparency	and	
accountability	 benchmarks	 and	 ranking	 attempts.	 The	 analysis	 summarized	
discusses	the	main	limitations	in	these	attempts	indicating	their	impact	upon	the	
obtained	 results.	Arguments	 that	 such	 ranking	 attempts	 might	 reflect	 specific	
purposes,	or	that	the	rankings	may	be	constructed	making	specific	considerations	
are	further	developed.	The	last	section	makes	conclusions.	
2. SWFs: 
The role of governance, transparency and accountability
The	debate	and	the	empirical	evidence	on	SWFs,	particularly	on	those	being	
established	out	of	resource	revenues,	remain	controversial	and	inconclusive.	The	
scholarly	literature	on	resource-based	funds	remains	patchy	and	consists	mainly	
of	the	work	by	the	IMF	and	the	World	Bank3.	In	general,	it	is	possible	to	identify	two	
streams	of	arguments.	The	first	debates	that	funds	are	not	necessary.	According	
to	this	point,	if	the	conditions	that	are	required	for	the	successful	functioning	of	
these	funds	exist,	then	resource	revenues	or	fiscal	surpluses	can	be	managed	
without	them	within	the	budgetary	process	(Davis	et	al,	2001).	The	second	stream	
suggests	that	even	if	it	is	impossible	to	create	‘ideal’	conditions,	the	existence	of	
funds	could	prevent	excessive	spending.	The	experience	of	the	successful	funds	
of	Alaska	or	Norway	 is	usually	employed	 in	support	of	 this	argument	(Fasano,	
2000;	 Birdsall	 and	 Subramania,	 2004).	 To	 date,	 indeed,	 there	 are	 not	 many	
examples	of	success.	The	Alaskan	and	Norwegian	funds	are	striking	exceptions.	
Nevertheless,	in	these	cases,	given	the	broader	national	policy	frameworks	
and	 the	 wide	 support	 for	 deferring	 some	wealth	 gains	 for	 future	 generations,	
further	 questions	 have	 regarded	 whether	 separate	 funds	 were	 needed	 in	
these	 countries	 in	 the	 first	 instance.	History	 provides	 us	with	many	 examples	
of	“problematic”	funds,	like	those	of	Nigeria	or	Venezuela,	the	number	of	which	
3		Among	others	see	Petersen	and	Budina	(2003),	Crain	and	Devlin	(2003),	Shabsigh	and	Ilahi	
(2007)	and	Brown	et	al	(2009).
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exceeds	the	successful	cases	(Davis	et	al,	2003;	Davis	et	al,	2003;	Delvin	and	
Lewin,	2002).	With	the	exception	of	Norway,	with	its	strong	government	institutions	
and	 healthy	 democracy,	 the	 experiences	with	 resource-based	 funds	 have	 not	
been	encouraging	(Birdsall	and	Subramania,	2004).	Moreover,	the	examples	of	
the	countries	in	the	Middle	East	demonstrate	limited	success	in	the	functioning	
of	the	funds.	The	reason	for	the	inefficiency	of	the	funds	has	been	attributed	to	
the	lack	of	clear	rules	and	operations,	which	should	be	transparent,	with	stringent	
mechanisms	to	ensure	accountability	and	prevent	resource	misuses	(Davis	et	al,	
2003).	The	operational	side	of	 this	management	could	cause	further	obstacles	
(Barnett	and	Ossowski,	2003).	
Overall	the	experience	of	unsuccessful	funds	like	the	Venezuelan	Investment	
Fund	 or	 the	 Nigerian	 Petroleum	 Trust	 Fund	 has	 indicated	 an	 even	 more	
complicated	problem:	the	quest	for	rigorous	governance,	adequate	transparency	
and	 accountability.	 Governance	 regards	 the	 role	 of	 the	 government,	 of	 the	
governing	 bodies	 and	 of	 the	 managers	 of	 the	 SWFs	 in	 the	 decision-making	
process	 regarding	 the	 flows	 into	 and	 out	 of	 the	 funds,	 the	 investments	made	
and	 the	diversion	of	 the	accumulated	assets	 to	economic	ends.	Transparency	
is	related	to	the	adequate,	 full	and	timely	provision	of	 information	to	the	public	
regarding	the	operations	of	the	funds	as	well	as	with	the	clear	communication	of	
the	role	of	the	funds	to	the	broader	public.	Accountability	regards	the	multilevel	
oversight	of	the	SWFs	and	the	degree	to	which	the	government,	the	governing	
bodies	and	the	fund	managers	are	held	responsible	for	their	decisions.	
Caspian	Revenue	Watch	provides	a	public	debate	on	these	issues	suggesting	
that	 weak	 governance	 along	 poor	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 make	 the	
funds	and	the	respective	countries	less	likely	to	convert	social	expenditures	into	
improved	 income	(Tsalik,	2003).	 In	many	countries	SWFs	are	set	up	 following	
increasing	surpluses	from	exports	of	natural	resources.	The	literature	on	resource-
rich	 economies	 supports	 the	 view	 that	 natural	 wealth	 can	 pose	 problems	 for	
economic	management4.	 In	a	 range	of	cases,	economic	performance	appears	
to	 suffer	 rather	 than	 benefit	 from	 the	 impact	 of	 natural	 resource	 endowments	
(Paldam,	1997;	Gylfason	and	Zoega,	2003).	The	 international	 community	and	
major	 international	 financial	 organizations	 have	 become	 growingly	 concerned	
about	 the	 effectiveness	 with	 which	 natural	 resource	 revenues	 are	 used.	 In	
particular	 they	 are	 concerned	 with	 the	 question	 of	 how	 funds	 can	 contribute	
towards	long-term	economic	and	social	development.	
The	 latter	 is	 a	 subject	 of	 the	 political	 economy	of	 resource-driven	 growth.	
Nevertheless,	 in	 the	 investigation	 of	 this	 relationship,	 it	 is	 also	 acknowledged	
the	crucial	dependency	of	the	fund	establishment	and	operational	outcomes	to	
implemented	 policies,	 in	 particular	 with	 regards	 to	 governance,	 transparency	
and	 accountability.	 SWFs	 out	 of	 natural	 resource	 revenues	 can	 contribute	 to	
economic	growth	by	smoothing	some	of	the	instability	that	may	arise	from	energy	
4		The	literature	to	date	offers	a	growing	amount	of	works	in	support	of	the	concept	that	natural	
resource	endowment	is	an	economic	curse	rather	than	a	blessing	(Auty	and	Mikesell,	1998;	Sachs	
and	Warner,	2001;	Gylfason,	2001;	Auty	and	de	Soysa,	2006).
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price	fluctuations.	In	this	attempt	the	adverse	incentives	that	have	plagued	some	
resource-rich	countries	can	be	avoided	with	the	employment	of	strong	governance	
structures	of	resource	wealth	management	and	with	 the	provision	of	adequate	
transparency	and	accountability	to	the	latter.	
In	this	respect	a	key	question	to	be	addressed	is	whether	funds	are	panacea	for	
the	so	called	“paradox	of	plenty”	or	whether	they	are	effective	only	in	circumstances	
that	are	in	any	case	particularly	benign.	In	this	case	funds	may	serve	as	a	form	of	
“commitment	mechanism,”	thus	substituting	for	other	commitment	mechanisms	
possibly	 resulting	 from	 the	 involvement	 of	 international	 financial	 organizations	
such	as	 the	 IMF	(Kalyuzhnova,	2006).	Nevertheless,	 the	key	 requirements	 for	
success	with	such	funds	appear	to	ultimately	lie	with	governance,	transparency	
and	 accountability	 standards.	 Governance,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	
aspects	 and	 their	 differentials	 depend	 in	 large	 part	 on	 the	 role	 that	 SWFs	
serve	(i.e.	accumulating	funds	so	as	to	stabilize	the	economy,	saving	funds	for	
future	 generations,	 addressing	 future	 payment	 obligations,	 etc)5.	Governance, 
transparency	 and	 accountability	 aspects	 that	 reflect	 political	 economy	 factors	
related	 to	 SWFs,	 such	 as	 institutions	 and	 the	 organizational	 design,	 remain	
important	for	several	reasons.	
A	 first	 area	 where	 governance,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 remain	
important	 is	 the	 microeconomic	 domain.	 This	 regards	 in	 particular	 the	 rising	
concerns	about	rent-seeking	and	corruption.	These	problems	can	be	worsened	
by	 the	 lack	 of	 strong	 governance	 and	 sound	 provision	 of	 transparency	 and	
accountability.	The	principles	where	 clarity	 remains	 of	 primary	 importance	 are	
the	rules	that	ultimately	govern	who	will	benefit	from	redistribution	of	the	nation’s	
wealth	 and	 how	 far	 governmental	 policies	 act	 as	 disguised	 transfers	 in	 this	
regard	(Tullock,	1997).	For	resource-based	SWFs,	 the	role	of	 the	commitment	
mechanisms	 is	 further	 important	 in	 order	 to	 limit	 the	 possibility	 of	 dynamic	
inconsistency	 (Dixit,	 1996)	 or	 of	 conflicting	 interests.	 Overcoming	 distorted	
incentives	 in	 government	 intervention	 could	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 challenge	 in	
achieving	an	optimal	 path	of	 the	public	welfare	 from	 resources	 (Kalyuzhnova,	
2006).	A	special	reference	should	be	made	at	this	point	to	rent-seeking	behavior	
of	corrupt	governments,	namely	 to	 the	aggregate	resources	absorbed	by	rent-
seeking.	 In	 the	case	of	 resource-rich	countries	 these	rents	can	be	quite	 large,	
because	as	a	rule	they	represent	 the	main	sector	of	 the	economic	activities	 in	
these	countries.	Therefore,	the	effect	of	rent-seeking	on	the	organizational	design	
of	the	governmental	programs	is	significant	overall6.	
A	 second	 area	 where	 governance,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	
remain	 important	 regards	 macroeconomic	 developments	 and	 the	 design	 and	
5	 	The	 literature	 to	 date	 offers	 a	 rich	 discussion	 and	explanation	 of	 the	 differentials	 that	 the	
existing	funds	experience	in	their	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	standards.	Moreover,	
a	 significant	 amount	of	work	 looks	 into	 the	 role	 that	 various	parties	 such	as	 the	government,	 the	
managing	board	and	 the	civil	 society	play	 in	 the	governance	of	 the	 funds.	The	discussion	on	 the	
differentials	in	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	and	on	the	role	that	each	party	plays	in	
the	governance	of	the	funds	extends	beyond	the	aim	of	the	present	paper.	For	a	detailed	discussion	
see	among	others	Tsalik	(2003)	and	Bacon	and	Tordo	(2006).
6  Stigler (1975) and Posner (1975) demonstrated that the latter can be particularly observed in the area 
of regulation.
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implementation	 of	 fiscal	 policy	 in	 particular.	 Links	 to	 fiscal	 policy	 emerge	 as	
particularly	 important	 in	 a	 saving	 context	 (Kalyuzhnova,	 2006).	 In	 successful	
cases	funds	should	ensure	significant	public	savings.	For	 instance	 in	 the	case	
of	 SWFs	 being	 funded	 out	 of	 oil	 revenues,	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 fund,	 and	 the	
agreement	on	its	rules,	can	be	seen	as	a	commitment	device.	This	could	further	
help	to	build	a	public	constituency	for	saving	part	of	revenues.	In	cases	where	
the	government	finances	deficits	by	borrowing	from	savings	funds,	then	saving	
fund	assets	are	merely	offset	by	government	debt	(Davis	et	al,	2001).	This	further	
highlights	 the	 critical	 link	 between	 the	 fund	 operations,	 in	 this	 case	 serving	 a	
savings	 role,	and	 the	design	of	 fiscal	policy.	The	key	 issue	 in	 this	case	 is	 the	
strict	discipline	and	ability	of	the	government	to	keep	a	financial	balance	in	the	
accumulation	and	spending	of	the	saving	fund	income.	In	this	respect,	the	large	
accumulation	of	the	fund	assets	could	create	political	unrest.	This	could	derive	
from	increasing	public	demands	for	the	government	to	increase	public	spending	
and	decrease	taxes,	etc.	
These	 considerations	 help	 address	 the	 legitimate	 question	 of	 whether	 a	
concrete	strategy	of	public	saving	for	future	generations	could	not	be	implemented	
without	creating	a	formal	and	separate	fund.	In	financial	terms	this	might	be	the	
case.	Nevertheless,	in	the	case	of	funds	being	funded	out	of	resource	revenues,	
their	presence	can	potentially	play	a	key	role	by	helping	the	promotion	of	public	
understanding	of	the	need	to	save	for	future	generations.	However,	 in	order	to	
meet	this	goal,	the	analysis	needs	to	be	clearly	formulated,	followed	by	a	set	of	
clear	and	transparent	rules.	This	is	the	only	case	when	the	analysis	can	prove	
persuasive	to	political	circles	and	to	the	wider	public.	In	this	respect	governance	
is	the	core	challenge.	
In	 the	 context	 of	 preventing	 corruption,	 conflicting	 interests	 between	 the	
public	 and	 the	 private	 sector	 and	misuse	 of	SWFs’	 assets	 at	macroeconomic	
levels,	the	role	of	strong	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	in	SWFs	
remain	 important.	 The	 presence	 of	 SWFs	 poses	 great	 policy,	 political	 and	
economic	challenges.	Among	others,	these	are	related	to	the	prudent	mobilization	
of	the	revenues,	to	the	fair	allocation	of	the	resources	between	generations,	to	
the	 identification	of	 the	best	 investment	alternatives,	 to	 the	 temptations	 to	use	
the	funds	for	political	as	opposed	to	economic	purposes	and	to	the	favoring	of	
specific	social	or	economic	groups	against	other	groups.	Where	SWF	assets	are	
used	so	as	to	favor	the	ruling	elite,	to	keep	the	inefficient	public	sector	running	
or	 so	 as	 to	 promote	 political	 goals,	 successful	 performance	might	 not	 be	 the	
case.	In	the	presence	of	strong	governance	and	adequate	mechanisms	that	can	
guarantee	 the	 transparent	and	accountable	management	and	operation	of	 the	
funds,	the	latter	temptations	or	distortions	of	SWF	operations	may	be	prevented,	
safeguarding	the	performance	of	the	funds.	
Moreover,	the	tensions	created	between	the	public	and	the	private	sector	as	
a	result	of	 the	SWF	investments	and	asset	allocations	may	be	mitigated	when	
governance	 structures	 are	 robust.	 Governance	 structures	 that	 can	 guarantee	
a	voice	 for	all	and	adequate	 representation	of	different	groups	 in	 the	decision	
making	process	may	prevent	any	tensions	or	any	politically	motivated	investments	
of	the	SWFs.	Moreover,	the	clear	understanding	of	the	governance	structure	of	
the	 funds	regarding	 the	adequate	provision	of	 transparency	and	accountability	
in	 their	operations	may	help	 in	 the	 identification	of	any	political	objectives	 that	
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the	funds	may	serve	along	their	economic	objectives.	This	may	further	help	the	
understanding	of	the	SWFs’	performance	and	the	acceptance	of	SWF	investments	
in	the	domestic	economy	and	in	foreign	countries.
Governance,	 transparency	and	accountability	aspects	remain	 important	 for	
the	welcoming	of	the	SWFs	in	the	international	financial	markets	and	the	recipient	
countries	 of	 SWF	 investments.	Global	 imbalances	 deriving	 from	 large	 current	
account	deficits	in	major	economies,	like	that	of	the	USA,	and	counterbalancing	
large	surpluses	 in	Asian	and	oil-producing	countries,	have	attracted	significant	
attention.	This	has	been	 triggered	by	 the	vast	flow	of	finance	 from	developing	
countries	 to	developed	countries	and	mature	financial	markets.	This	has	been	
welcomed	by	the	organizations	hit	by	the	financial	crisis	and	has	proved	beneficial	
for	market	stability.	Nevertheless,	concerns	have	been	raised	in	major	economies	
and	recipients	of	SWF	investments,	such	as	the	United	States	and	Europe,	about	
the	nature	and	the	possible	political	intentions	of	the	SWFs.
	 In	 the	 current	 global	 financial	 developments	 SWFs	 are	 perceived	 as	
representing	 a	 permanent	 redirection	 in	 investment	 flows	 and	 a	 shift	 in	 the	
dominant	sources	of	financial	capital	 (Ahmadov	et	al,	2009).	With	 these	flows,	
SWFs	 suggest	 a	 redistribution	 of	 financial	 and	 political	 capital	 throughout	 the	
world.	In	this	reality	the	presence	of	a	blurring	line	between	finance	and	politics	
raises	 concerns	 that	 SWFs	will	 be	 used	 illegitimately	 to	 advance	 political,	 as	
opposed	to	commercial,	agendas.	In	many	cases	SWFs	may	even	be	perceived	
as	 a	 source	 of	 state	 financial	 capitalism.	This	 can	 trigger	 further	 concerns	 on	
whether	 the	 introduction	 of	 public	 investors	 into	 private	 markets	 will	 do	 for	
efficiency.	In	this	respect	clear	governance	strictures	and	provision	of	adequate	
transparency	 and	accountability	 regarding	SWFs’	 governance,	 operations	 and	
investments	would	 ease	 the	 concerns	 of	 the	 recipient	 countries	while	 it	 could	
further	facilitate	their	operations	in	the	international	financial	arena.	
Any	assessment	attempt	of	the	SWFs	has	to	address	a	set	of	questions	and	
to	 further	 choose	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 assessment	 employed.	 For	 instance,	
any	assessment	attempts	would	have	to	consider	the	key	objectives	assigned	to	
the	funds	(such	as	stabilization	and/or	saving).	In	addition	the	framework	should	
be	 clarified	 in	 which	 their	 effectiveness	 can	 be	 analyzed.	Moreover,	 the	 core	
criteria	of	success	of	the	funds	should	be	identified	(Kalyuzhnova,	2006).	In	this	
respect	the	crucial	point	is	the	clear	goals	of	the	fund.	For	instance,	the	funds	of	
Norway	or	Alaska	pursue	stabilization	and	perform	saving	functions.	Many	other	
funds	have	the	same	functions	but	have	not	been	successful.	An	alternative	set	
of	criteria	that	have	been	examined	are	fund	management	rules	that	guarantee	
accountability.	
It	 is	 important	 for	every	 fund	 to	clearly	 indicate	who	 is	managing	 the	 fund.	
For	 instance	 the	Norwegian	 fund	 is	managed	by	 the	Norwegian	Central	Bank	
according	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance	guidelines.	The	Alaska	Permanent	Reserve	
Fund	 is	 managed	 by	 the	Alaska	 Permanent	 Fund	 Corporation	 while	 external	
managers	handle	equity,	fixed	income	and	real	estate	portfolios.	The	last	but	not	
least	set	of	criteria	of	success	should	be	connected	with	a	high	level	of	transparency	
of	 fund	 operations.	 Every	 fund	 necessitates	 professional	 management.	 If	 the	
fund	has	 independent	 spending	authority,	 that	 could	undermine	 the	budgetary	
process.	Moreover,	regular	reporting	and	audit	are	quite	important.	In	addition	the	
management	of	the	fund	needs	to	maintain	public	awareness	about	the	existence	
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of	the	fund.	
To	date,	 several	 assessment	attempts	of	 the	SWFs	have	been	developed	
from	 scholars,	 Western	 Financial	 Institutions	 and	 independent	 organizations	
(Truman,	2008;	SWF	Institute,	IMF,	etc).	All	of	these	assessment	attempts	have	
identified	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	as	of	primary	importance	
to	 the	 successful	 performance	 of	 the	 SWFs.	 The	 majority	 of	 them	 offer	 a	
qualitative	approach	 to	 the	assessment	of	 the	SWF,	while	 later	efforts	attempt	
a	 quantitative	 approach	 to	 SWF	 rankings.	 Indicative	 of	 these	 efforts	 are	 the	
Truman	(2008)	scoreboard	and	 the	Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	 Institute	Linaburg-
Maduell	 Transparency	 Index.	 Both	 of	 the	 latter	 attempts	 have	 developed	 a	
classification	system	of	the	existing	funds	assessing	governance,	transparency	
and	accountability	aspects	along	financial	aspects	of	the	SWFs.	
Following	 the	 growing	 international	 demand	 for	 SWFs’	 governance,	
transparency	 and	 accountability	 fostering,	 the	 International	Working	Group	on	
the	SWFs	has	developed	the	“Santiago	Principles”7.	The	principles	have	been	a	
reflection	of	the	increasing	demand	for	clear	governance,	adequate	transparency	
and	accountability,	and	 integration	of	 the	SWFs	with	 the	 international	financial	
markets.	The	purpose	of	the	principles	is	to	identify	a	set	of	generally	accepted	
practices	that	can	reflect	appropriate	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	
arrangements	as	well	 as	 to	promote	SWF	 investments	based	upon	a	prudent	
and	sound	economic	basis.	Acceptance	of	the	principles	will	allow	the	respective	
countries	 and	 funds	 to	 gain	 greater	 understanding	 at	 home	 and	 in	 recipient	
countries	as	well	as	in	the	international	financial	markets.
Overall	clear	governance	structures	and	adequate	provision	of	transparency	
and	 accountability	 of	 SWFs	 can	 play	 a	 determinant	 role	 in	 micro	 and	
macroeconomic	developments	in	the	host	countries.	Moreover	it	can	determine	
the	performance	of	the	funds	while	it	can	facilitate	their	international	welcoming.	
Over	the	last	few	years	several	attempts	have	been	made	to	assess,	evaluate	
and	 rank	 governance,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 aspects	 of	 the	 SWFs.	
These	have	been	developed	along	with	attempts	to	identify	fund	cases	that	could	
serve	as	benchmarks	and	to	establish	a	code	of	generally	accepted	practices	for	
SWFs.	Nevertheless,	the	ranking	results	and	the	proposed	benchmarks	should	
be	treated	carefully.	The	ranking	results	and	the	benchmark	analysis	may	suffer	
from	several	methodological	limitations.	Moreover,	these	attempts	have	reflected	
in	large	part	the	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	standards	required	
as	minimum	by	the	recipient	countries	of	SWF	investments.	In	this	respect	the	
developed	 rankings	and	suggested	benchmarks	and	best	practices	should	be	
treated	carefully	and	their	limitations	should	be	acknowledged	and	addressed.
3. SWFs, governance, transparency and accountability:
Assessing rankings, benchmarks and best practices
SWFs	 vary	 in	 objectives	 and	 size,	 and	 further,	 they	 operate	 in	 countries	
that	differ	 in	terms	of	governmental	structures.	In	this	respect	any	comparative	
assessment	 has	 to	 overcome	 significant	 difficulties.	 However	 the	 extraction	
of	 a	 set	 of	 core	 elements	 that	 remain	 important	 for	 all	 the	 SWFs’	 short	 term	
7		International	Working	Group	on	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	(2008).
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stabilization	purposes	and	long	term	intergenerational	wealth	distribution	can	lead	
to	a	significant	first	step	assessment	and	ranking.	To	date,	several	attempts	have	
been	made	to	assess	the	performance	of	the	SWFs	employing	a	variety	of	sets	
of	funds	and	sets	of	institutional	and	financial	aspects.	Fasano	(2000)	provides	a	
comparative	analysis	of	the	operational	modalities	and	of	the	experience	with	the	
resource-based	funds	suggesting	that	the	funds	of	Norway,	Kuwait,	Chile	and	the	
State	of	Alaska	have	been	successful	institutions	contributing	to	effective	fiscal	
policy.	Eifert	et	al	(2002)	tackle	the	issue	of	resource	wealth	and	successful	funds	
employing	 the	prism	of	political	economy	 for	 the	cases	of	Norway,	Venezuela,	
Mexico,	Saudi	Arabia,	Nigeria,	 Indonesia	 and	Chad,	 concluding	 that	 technical	
solutions	such	as	 the	setting	up	of	 resource-based	 funds	will	 not	work	unless	
supportive	constituencies	are	developed	in	support	of	such	measures.
Similar	attempts	to	offer	a	policy	brief	on	oil	revenue	management	by	oil	funds	
is	made	 by	 the	 Friends	 of	 Earth	 (2002).	With	 a	 reference	 and	 a	 comparative	
analysis	 of	 the	 cases	 of	 Chad,	 Azerbaijan,	 Kazakhstan	 and	 Uganda	 the	
assessment	concludes	 that	 in	 the	absence	of	 real	political	will,	 so	as	 to	allow	
public	 scrutiny	 and	 participation	 in	 resource	 management	 and	 the	 decision-
making	process,	funds	will	fail	to	address	core	issues	of	civic	empowerment	and	
democratic	 development.	 Kalyuzhnova	 (2006),	 comparing	 and	 contrasting	 the	
oil	funds	of	Azerbaijan	and	Kazakhstan,	suggests	that	the	key	requirements	for	
successful	performance	of	 funds	 lie	upon	governance	 issues.	 In	an	attempt	 to	
address	the	problem	of	oil	wealth	management	and	mineral	funds	in	the	Caspian	
region	Tsalik	(2003)	incorporates	the	evidence	from	the	funds	of	Azerbaijan	and	
Kazakhstan	 into	 a	 wider	 set	 of	 oil	 funds.	 In	 a	 comparative	 review	 the	 author	
concludes	 that	 the	 oil	 funds	 of	 Norway,	Alaska	 and	Alberta	 can	 be	 proposed	
as	 successful	 fund	 models.	 Bacon	 and	 Tordo	 (2006)	 attempt	 a	 comparative	
analysis	 and	 classification	 of	 a	 set	 of	 resource-based	 funds	 building	 a	 more	
systematic	method	of	comparison.	The	assessment	is	based	on	a	set	of	funding	
and	 operational	 aspects.	 The	 authors	 suggest	 governance,	 transparency	 and	
accountability	to	be	key	success	factors	that	allowed	certain	funds	to	be	better	
performers	than	others.
Truman	 (2008)	 offers	 a	 first	 systematic	 approach	 of	 fund	 ranking	 and	
quantitative	analysis	of	fund	performance.	The	starting	point	of	this	assessment	
is	the	present	fund	practices,	providing	a	basis	for	the	evaluation	of	the	results	
of	the	IMF-sponsored	dialogue	on	SWFs’	best	practices.	The	main	argument	is	
that	no	fund	should	be	asked	to	implement	guidance	or	practices	that	at	least	one	
other	fund	does	not	implement	or	practice	already.	The	scoreboard	is	constructed	
using	the	sum	of	points	that	each	fund	collects	in	a	series	of	questions,	where	
the	respective	answers	can	be	either	“yes” or “no”	giving	the	relevant	point	(being	
0	or	1,	as	predetermined	for	each	question)	 to	 the	fund	assessed.	The	results	
of	 this	assessment	offer	a	scoreboard	 that	quantifies	 the	degree	of	successful	
performance	for	a	wider	set	of	funds	considering	a	range	of	different	assessment	
elements	(Table	1).	
The	 Truman	 (2008)	 scoreboard	 indicates	 that	 in	 a	 comparative	 analysis,	
pension	funds	are	related	to	better	scores	of	governance,	structure,	transparency,	
accountability	and	behavior.	When	considering	non-pension	funds,	the	SWFs	of	
USA	and	Norway	score	higher	 in	 the	ranking	system	while	 the	Gulf	Countries’	
SWFs	 perform	 relatively	 lower.	 The	 scoreboard	 provides	 and	 indication	 of	
56                                                                                                                                   
standards	 and	 requirements	 that	 SWFs	 can	 fulfill	 without	 providing	 more	
information	 or	 being	more	 exposed	 than	 other	 funds.	 In	 troubled	 times,	 such	
as	 the	 latest	financial	 turmoil,	 the	 indication	of	such	scoreboards	can	highlight	
differentials	 and	 possible	 particularities	 that	 are	 related	 to	 each	 specific	 fund.	
Moreover,	 it	 can	 provide	 information	 and	 fair	 predictability	 of	 the	 nature	 and	
decision-making	process	of	the	respective	funds,	lowering	the	speculative	risk,	
discontent	and	generated	ambiguity	over	the	role	and	the	investment	purposes	
of	 the	 relevant	 funds.	Similarly	 to	earlier	attempts,	Truman	 (2008)	 indicates	 in	
particular	the	importance	of	transparency	and	accountability	of	SWFs,	suggesting	
that	the	latter	remains	a	key	point	in	welcoming	investments	from	SWFs	and	a	
further	important	stabilizing	factor	in	the	international	financial	markets.
Table 1. Truman (2008) scoreboard of SWFs
Country Fund Struc-ture
Gover-
ance
Account-
abil-
ity and 
Transpar-
ency
Behav-
iour Total
Canada	
Canada	Pension	
Plan
100 100 96 83 95
New	Zealand
Superannuation	
Fund
100 100 100 75 95
USA	Alaska
Alaska	Permanent	
Fund
100 80 100 83 94
Canada	
Quebec
Caisse	de	depot	
et	placement	du	
Quebec
100 100 89 83 92
France
Fonds	de	reserve	
pour	les	retraites
100 100 89 83 92
Norway
Government	Pen-
sion	Fund	Global
94 100 100 67 92
USA	Califor-
nia
California	Public	
Employees	Retire-
ment	System
100 100 96 67 92
USA	Wyo-
ming
Permanent	Min-
eral	Trust	Fund
100 90 82 100 91
Japan	
Government	Pen-
sion	Investment	
Fund
100 90 80 83 87
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Ireland
National	Pensions	
Reserve	Fund
100 100 86 58 86
USA	New	
Mexico
Severance	Tax	
Permanent	Fund
100 50 86 100 86
Netherlands
Stichting	Pensio-
enfonds	ABP
100 100 86 50 85
Australia	 Future	Fund 100 80 68 83 80
Timor	Leste
Petroleum	Fund	
for	Timor-Leste
100 40 96 50 80
Azerbaijan
State	Oil	Fund	of	
the	Republic	of	
Azerbaijan
88 60 89 50 77
China
National	Social	
Security	Fund
100 40 82 67 77
Canada	
Alberta
Alberta	Heritage	
Savings	Trust	
Fund
94 60 79 50 74
Chile
Economic and 
Social	Stabiliza-
tion	Fund
94 60 82 17 70
Hong	Kong Exchange	Fund 88 40 79 33 67
Kazakhstan
National	Fund	for	
the	Republic	of	
Kazakhstan
88 60 64 33 64
Botswana Pula	Fund 69 60 54 33 55
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Heritage	and	Sta-
bilization	Fund
100 60 46 0 53
Korea
Korea	Investment	
Corporation
75 60 45 25 51
Russia
Reserve	Fund	and	
National	Welfare	
Fund
72 40 50 33 51
Kuwait
Kuwait	Investment	
Authority
75 80 41 0 48
São Tomé 
and	Príncipe
National	Oil	Ac-
count
100 60 29 17 48
Mexico
Oil	Income	Stabili-
zation	Fund
69 20 43 50 47
Singapore Temasek	Holdings 50 50 61 0 45
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Singapore
Government	of	
Singapore	Invest-
ment	Corporation
63 40 39 17 41
Malaysia
Khazanah	Nasi-
onal
44 50 46 0 38
China
China	Investment	
Corporation
50 50 14 17 29
Kiribati
Revenue	Equal-
ization	Reserve	
Fund
69 60 7 0 29
Algeria
Revenue	Regula-
tion	Fund
56 40 11 17 27
Nigeria
Excess	Crude	Ac-
count
50 30 14 17 26
Iran
Oil	Stabilization	
Fund
50 20 18 0 23
Venezuela
Macroeconomic	
Stabilization	Fund
50 0 18 17 23
Oman
State	General	
Reserve	Fund
50 0 18 0 20
Sudan
Oil	Revenue	Sta-
bilization	Account
56 0 14 0 20
Venezuela
National	Develop-
ment	Fund
38 0 27 0 20
Brunei	Da-
raussalam
Brunei	Investment	
Authority
31 0 25 0 18
UAE	Abu	
Dabi
Mudabala	Devel-
opment	Company
44 10 7 0 15
UAE	Dubai Isthmar	World 38 10 7 0 14
Qatar
Qatar	Investment	
Authority
34 0 2 0 9
UAE	Abu	
Dabi
Abu	Dhabi	Invest-
ment	Authority	and	
Council
25 0 4 8 9
In	an	attempt	to	assess	SWFs’	transparency	and	accountability	provision,	the	
“Linaburg-Maduell	Transparency	 Index”	has	been	developed	by	 the	Sovereign	
Wealth	 Fund	 Institute	 researchers8.	 This	 is	 based	 on	 Norway’s	 SWF,	 widely	
seen	 as	 the	 benchmark	 of	 transparency.	 The	 index	 implements	 10	 “essential	
8		http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/transparencyindex.php
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principles”9.	For	each	principle	assessed	there	are	different	levels	of	depth,	the	
judgment	of	which	is	left	to	the	discretion	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	Institute.	
The	 index	 results	 in	 a	 transparency	 index	 rating	 from	 1	 to	 10	 (Table	 2),	 with	
8	 recommended	 from	 the	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Fund	 Institute	 in	 order	 to	 claim	
adequate	 transparency.	 The	 Linaburg-Maduell	 Transparency	 Index	 identifies	
the	funds	of	Alaska,	Norway	and	New	Zealand	as	high	scorers	by	transparency	
standards.	
Similarly	to	the	findings	of	Truman	(2008),	Gulf	countries’	SWFs	are	found	to	
score	low	in	terms	of	transparency.	The	index	reveals	a	very	interesting	picture	
when	 considering	 the	 funds	 established	 in	 the	Caspian	 region.	 The	 State	Oil	
Fund	of	Azerbaijan	 (SOFAZ),	 although	a	 relatively	 recent	 establishment	when	
compared	to	other	SWFs,	has	managed	to	succeed	in	terms	of	full	transparency	
and	accountability,	scoring	at	similar	levels	to	model	establishments	such	as	that	
of	Norway.	Indeed	the	SWF	of	Azerbaijan	has	been	a	pioneering	establishment	
in	the	region	in	promoting	transparency	standards	and	further	pushing	forward	
regional	standards.	In	this	respect	the	experience	of	Azerbaijan	and	its	respective	
polices	towards	fund	transparency	might	be	useful	to	the	countries	of	the	region.	
Table 2. Linaburg - Maduell Transparency Index10
Country Fund Name Index
Azerbaijan	 State	Oil	Fund 10
Chile	 Social	and	Economic	Stabilization	Fund 10
Ireland	 National	Pensions	Reserve	Fund 10
New	Zealand	 New	Zealand	Superannuation	Fund 10
Norway	 Government	Pension	Fund	–	Global 10
Singapore	 Temasek	Holdings 10
UAE	-	Abu	Dhabi Mubadala	Development	Company 10
US	-	Alaska Alaska	Permanent	Fund 10
Australia	 Australian	Future	Fund 9
Canada	 Alberta’s	Heritage	Fund 9
South	Korea	 Korea	Investment	Corporation 9
US	-	New	Mexico New	Mexico	State	Investment	Office	Trust 9
US	-	Wyoming Permanent	Wyoming	Mineral	Trust	Fund 9
Bahrain	 Mumtalakat	Holding	Company 8
China	-	Hong	Kong
Hong	Kong	Monetary	Authority	Investment	
Portfolio
8
9		The	principles	assessed	and	the	respective	points	given	are	summarized	in	Appendix	A.
10		Assessment	as	of	October	2009.
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China	 China	Investment	Corporation 6
East	Timor	 Timor-Leste	Petroleum	Fund 6
Kazakhstan	 Kazakhstan	National	Fund 6
Kuwait	 Kuwait	Investment	Authority 6
Singapore	
Government	of	Singapore	Investment	Cor-
poration
6
China	 National	Social	Security	Fund 5
Malaysia	 Malaysia	Development	Berhad 5
Qatar	 Qatar	Investment	Authority 5
Russia	 National	Welfare	Fund 5
Trinidad	&	Tobago Heritage	and	Stabilization	Fund 5
China	 China-Africa	Development	Fund 4
Malaysia	 Khazanah	Nasional 4
UAE	-	Dubai Investment	Corporation	of	Dubai 4
Vietnam	 State	Capital	Investment	Corporation 4
Saudi	Arabia	 Public	Investment	Fund 3
UAE	-	Abu	Dhabi Abu	Dhabi	Investment	Authority 3
UAE	-	Ras	Al	
Khaimah
RAK	Investment	Authority 3
China	 SAFE	Investment	Company 2
Libya Libyan	Investment	Authority 2
Saudi	Arabia	 SAMA	Foreign	Holdings 2
UAE	-	Federal Emirates	Investment	Authority 2
Algeria	 Revenue	Regulation	Fund 1
Botswana	 Pula	Fund 1
Brunei	 Brunei	Investment	Agency 1
Iran	 Oil	Stabilization	Fund 1
Kiribati	 Revenue	Equalization	Reserve	Fund 1
Mauritania	 National	Fund	for	Hydrocarbon	Reserves 1
Nigeria	 Excess	Crude	Account 1
Oman	 State	General	Reserve	Fund 1
Venezuela	 FIEM 1
The	 overview	 of	 the	 different	 ranking	 attempts	 reveals	 some	 interesting	
information	with	regards	to	fund	level	performance.	First,	the	fund	of	Norway	is	
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repeatedly	classified	as	a	 “good	performer”	and	employed	as	a	benchmark	of	
governance,	transparency	and	accountability.	The	Norwegian	model	is	suggested	
by	many	as	a	prime	example	to	follow	and	indeed	several	countries	have	employed	
the	Norwegian	model	when	establishing	their	funds	(like	the	fund	of	Kazakhstan).	
The	 Norwegian	 fund	 remains	 by	 far	 the	most	 examined	 and	 best	 performing	
fund,	especially	when	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	aspects	are	
considered.	Nevertheless,	when	 considering	 the	 practices	 that	 the	Norwegian	
fund	has	implemented	and	the	suggestions	to	the	larger	group	of	SWFs	to	follow	
its	example,	the	specific	country	characteristics	of	Norway	should	be	taken	into	
consideration	(Box	1).	In	this	respect	the	employment	of	the	Norwegian	SWF	as	
a	prototype	and	a	 successful	 performer	 should	not	be	exaggerated,	while	 the	
type	specifics	of	the	countries/funds	that	are	called	to	implement	similar	practices	
should	 be	 further	 taken	 into	 account.	 Hence	 the	 scoreboards	 and	 blueprint	
attempts	should	further	consider	the	possible	limitations	of	the	Norwegian	model	
as	a	benchmark	for	other	SWFs.
Furthermore,	several	methodological	limitations	should	be	considered	when	
employing	these	scoreboards.	The	employment	of	the	quantitative	ranking	and	
scoreboard	attempts,	such	as	 the	Truman	 (2008)	scoreboard	or	 the	Linaburg-
Maduell	 Transparency	 Index,	 should	 consider	 the	 subjective	 nature	 of	 the	
indexes	and	the	bias	that	the	latter	can	create.	For	instance,	in	the	SWF	Institute	
Linaburg-Maduell	 Transparency	 Index,	 for	 each	 principle	 assessed	 there	 are	
different	 levels	of	depth,	 the	 judgment	of	which	reflects	the	 judgments	and	the	
discretion	of	 the	Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	Institute.	This	 is	 indicative	of	 the	 lack	
of	objective	qualitative	assessment	that	may	be	present	in	the	existing	rankings	
and	 scoreboards.	This	 can	 be	 further	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	SWFs	are	
often	 required	 to	 assess	 their	 own	 constituents.	 The	 available	 rankings	 and	
benchmarks	 are	 largely	 developed	 based	 on	 the	 available	 public	 information	
on	 the	SWFs.	Nevertheless,	 in	 some	 cases	 these	 facts	 have	 been	 confirmed	
with	the	funds	themselves.	 In	 this	respect	 the	funds	are	called	to	comment	on	
their	own	constituents.	Hence	the	conflict	of	 interests	 that	may	emerge	for	 the	
assessed	SWFs	might	bias	the	provided	information	and	the	derived	estimation	
results,	rankings	and	scoreboards.
Box 1. The “Norwegian Model”11
11		Source:	Tsani	(2009)
Oil	production	in	Norway	started	in	the	early	1970s.	During	the	first	oil	shock,	
production	was	only	32.000	barrels	a	day.	The	experience	with	the	spiking	oil	
prices	stimulated	the	production	that	escalated	to	about	1	million	barrels	a	day	
by	1987	and	3	million	barrels	a	day	by	1996	(Bacon	and	Tordo,	2006).	Norway	
has	a	small	population	and	domestic	demand	for	oil	is	limited,	making	it	one	of	
the	leading	oil	exporters.	Oil	riches	in	Norway	fled	at	a	time	when	the	economy	
was	 well-developed	 (Cappelen	 and	 Mjoset,	 2009).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 scale	
of	 the	discovery	was	 large	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 total	 size	of	 the	economy	and	 it	
has	 continued	 to	 grow	 considerably.	Over	 the	 last	 decade,	 oil	 and	gas	have	
accounted	for	about	17%	of	GDP	and	40%	of	exports.	Since	the	very	beginning	
of	oil	development,	questions	were	raised	in	fear	of	“Dutch	disease”	about	how	
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to	use	the	revenues	without	distorting	the	nature	of	 the	economy	and	society	
(Hannesson,	2001).		Further	concerns	were	raised	with	regards	to	the	long-term	
funding	needs	of	the	increased	pension	requirements	that	the	aging	population	
would	require	(Skancke,	2002).	In	response	to	those	concerns,	in	June	1990	the	
government	established	by	Act	36	of	the	Storting,	the	Norwegian	parliament,	the	
Norwegian	Government	Pension	Fund	(NGPF)	1.	
According	to	the	act,	all	oil-related	revenues	are	paid	into	the	NGPF,	as	are	
any	interests	or	dividends	earned	on	assets	already	held.	The	management	
of	 the	 fund	 has	 been	 entrusted	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	 Finance.	 Since	 1996	 the	
Ministry	 has	 delegated	 responsibility	 for	 management	 to	 the	 Central	 Bank	
(Norges	 Bank).	 Norges	 Bank	 has	 further	 contracted	 external	managers	 for	
part	of	the	portfolio	but	it	has	also	managed	a	large	part	of	the	portfolio	itself.	
From	 the	 very	 beginning,	 all	 the	 investments	 of	 the	 fund	 have	 been	made	
outside	 Norway.	 This	 was	 due	 to	 the	 fear	 of	 distorting	 the	 relatively	 small	
economy	by	the	injection	of	large	sums	of	financing.	The	Ministry	of	Finance	
along	with	the	government	has	further	issued	instructions	to	the	Norges	Bank	
regarding	investments	in	socially	responsible	activities2.	According	to	the	fund	
establishing	 act	 the	 deficit	 on	 the	 government	 non-oil	 budget,	 determined	
by	the	Parliament,	is	paid	out	of	the	fund	while	surpluses	remain	in	the	fund	
(Bacon	and	Tordo,	2006).	In	this	respect	neither	the	income	nor	the	capital	of	
the	 fund	 is	safeguarded,	as	 the	Parliament	could	authorize	a	budget	deficit	
large	enough	to	use	all	current	oil	revenues	and	some	of	the	accumulated	past	
revenues.	This	is	related	to	the	fungibility	of	resources,	as	transfers	into	or	out	
of	the	fund	take	place	according	to	the	non-oil	deficit	of	the	central	government,	
which	itself	is	determined	through	normal	parliamentary	budgetary	processes.	
Debt	in	Norway	is	small	and	a	stable	fraction	of	GDP,	while	the	fund	already	
accounts	for	a	value	of	60%	of	GDP	3.	Hence	its	assets	correspond	approximately	
to	the	net	financial	position	of	the	central	government.	This	enables	a	profound	
provision	of	transparency.	The	assets	of	the	fund	and	their	trajectory	correspond	
to	government	savings,	and	people	are	thus	well	informed	of	the	net	position	
of	 the	government	through	the	fund’s	highly	publicized	annual	reports	(even	
if	they	are	less	well	 informed	on	the	magnitude	of	overall	government	debt).	
When	considering	the	Norwegian	fund	the	distinctive	feature	is	that	the	fund	is,	
de	jure,	part	of	the	general	budget	process.	The	only	explicit	use	of	the	fund	is	
to	support	non-oil	budget	deficits.	Similarly,	the	status	of	the	fund	is	such	that	
at	any	time	the	Parliament	can	withdraw	as	much	as	it	wishes	from	the	fund	to	
support	the	non-oil	budget	deficit.	In	this	respect,	absence	of	no	accumulation	
or	withdrawal	rules	makes	the	fund	very	flexible.	In	practice,	the	fund	has	been	
de	facto	used	largely	as	a	savings	fund,	although	there	have	been	substantial	
year-to-year	variations	in	the	proportion	of	oil	revenues	saved.	
1		The	fund	is	also	known	as	the	Norwegian	Government	Petroleum	Fund.	
2		In	2001,	the	environmental	fund	has	been	established	as	sub-portfolio	held	in	the	NGPF.	
Its	purpose	is	to	hold	equities	based	on	sound	environmental	criteria.	In	2004,	following	the	debate	
on	the	budget	and	the	report	of	the	Committee	on	Ethical	Issues	for	the	Petroleum	Fund	(Graver	
Committee),	 the	Ministry	of	Finance	 issued	new	guidelines	with	 regards	 to	ethical	 investments	
undertaken	by	the	fund.
3		As	of	2006.
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Attempts	such	as	those	of	Truman	(2008)	or	the	SWF	Institute	Transparency	
Index	employ	a	 set	 of	 questions	according	 to	which	 funds	are	 ranked.	 In	 this	
case	a	“yes”	or	“no”	answer	is	enough	so	as	to	grant	or	not	grant	further	points	to	
each	fund.	Nevertheless,	this	approach	does	not	allow	for	the	control	of	quality	
discrepancies	between	the	funds.	For	instance,	funds	will	be	given	extra	points	in	
terms	of	transparency	and	accountability	if	they	operate	a	website.	Nevertheless,	
the	quality	and	the	quantity	of	 the	information	provided	in	the	respective	funds	
are	not	really	assessed.	Hence	funds	that	provide	very	basic	information	on	their	
website	may	be	granted	the	same	points	as	funds	that	operate	a	more	detailed	
and	 more	 frequently	 updated	 website.	 In	 addition	 the	 assessment	 questions	
employed	might	address	overlapping	aspects.	
For	instance,	funds	that	regularly	publish	annual	reports	might	also	publish	
information	on	the	geographical	spread	of	their	investments	or	on	the	performance	
against	the	established	portfolio	benchmarks.	In	contrast,	funds	that	would	choose	
to	be	secretive	in	their	operations	would	choose	to	do	so	in	a	set	of	information	
given	to	the	public.	In	this	case	non-identification	of	the	commonalities	between	
the	questions	employed	and	the	common	variance	might	lead	to	duplication	of	
the	 transparency	and	accountability	 aspects	assessed.	This	 can	duplicate	 the	
points	awarded	in	each	case	and	artificially	inflate	the	quantitative	results.	
The	employment	of	scoreboards	and	benchmarks	should	consider	in	addition	
the	motivation,	the	objectives	and	the	perspective	for	the	construction	of	these	
indexes.	The	quantitative	rankings	and	scoreboards	of	the	SWFs	to	date	reflect	
the	 need	 for	 the	 international	 financial	 markets,	 the	 International	 Financial	
institutions	and	independent	countries	to	understand	the	role	of	SWFs.	This	has	
come	 as	 an	 outcome	 of	 the	 realization	 that	 SWFs	 are	 becoming	 increasingly	
important	participants	in	the	international	financial	system.	In	addition,	recipient	
countries	have	 realized	 the	potential	benefits	of	openness	 towards	 the	SWFs.	
Nevertheless,	the	debate	on	the	role	of	the	SWFs	is	ongoing.	Supporters	consider	
them	long-term	investors	that	have	provided	very-much-needed	capital	injections	
in	times	of	financial	distress	like	the	latest	financial	crisis.	Skeptics	highlight	the	
political	 controversy	 related	 to	SWFs	not	only	 in	 the	 recipient	 countries	but	 in	
many	cases	in	the	host	countries	as	well.		
The	 contrasting	 nature	 of	 what	might	 be	 done	with	 the	 fund,	 and	what	
has	actually	been	done,	illustrates	the	strong	discipline	of	the	Storting.	Such	
structure	 could	 be	 particularly	 vulnerable	 to	 a	 political	 election	 cycle,	 and	
over	longer	periods,	this	may	prove	to	be	an	important	factor	in	the	use	of	the	
fund.	The	discipline	of	Storting	 is	 further	accompanied	by	 the	 limited	role	of	
the	Parliament	and	bodies	outside	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	The	wide	publicity	
given	to	the	performance	and	management	of	the	fund	through	the	widespread	
publication	of	the	reports	can	influence	the	activities	of	the	fund	through	the	
democratic	 process.	 In	 short,	 the	 operation	 and	management	 of	 the	NGPF	
has	been	successful	in	accumulating	funds	for	the	Norwegian	state.	It	remains	
to	 be	 seen	 whether	 the	 aggressive	 saving	 of	 oil	 funds	 and	 sophisticated	
investment	 policies	 followed	 by	 the	 government	 will	 be	 able	 to	 accumulate	
sufficient	funds	to	finance	future	spending	needs	at	a	time	when	oil	production	
will	be	in	decline.
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In	an	attempt	to	address	the	later	debate,	the	IMF,	the	OECD,	the	USA	and	
the	EU	have	been	working	on	the	establishment	of	best	practices	on	the	SWFs12.	
This	has	been	shaped	and	in	its	turn	it	has	been	shaping	the	assessment	attempts	
of	the	SWFs.	The	assessment	attempts	have	been	much	more	concerned	with	
governance,	 transparency	and	accountability	standards	 that	are	needed	 in	 the	
international	financial	markets	rather	than	with	what	would	be	adequate	for	the	
citizens	of	 the	host	countries.	For	 instance,	 in	cases	 like	 that	of	Azerbaijan	or	
Kazakhstan,	the	attempts	of	the	respective	funds	to	improve	their	governance,	
transparency	 and	 accountability	 standards	 employing	 the	 benchmarks	 and	
recommendations	established	by	the	international	initiatives	have	led	to	improved	
rankings	for	the	respective	countries.	The	State	Oil	Fund	of	Azerbaijan	has	been	
actively	working	towards	the	provision	of	higher	standards	of	transparency	and	
accountability	 leading	 to	 significant	 improvements	 in	 the	 respective	 ranking	
attempts	such	as	the	Linaburg-Maduell	transparency	index.	
Nevertheless,	 when	 assessing	 the	 later	 developments,	 it	 should	 be	 kept	
in	mind	that	 full	presidential	discretion	on	the	release	and	the	utilization	of	 the	
accumulated	funds	still	remains	in	place.	Developments	are	similar	in	the	case	of	
Kazakhstan.	In	both	cases	the	presidents	enjoy	significant	power.	In	this	context	
the	respective	funds	have	been	working	towards	greater	provision	of	transparency	
and	accountability;	nevertheless,	little	has	changed	in	their	governance	as	both	
funds	 remain	 governed	 by	 presidential	 decrees.	 Thus	 the	 funds	 emerge	 as	
the	 “king	 (under	 the	 pressure	 of	 the	 IMF)	 binding	 his	 own	 hands	 by	 his	 own	
rules”	 (Heuty	 and	Aristi,	 2009).	 In	 this	 case	 the	 increased	 transparency	 and	
accountability	recorded	over	the	last	years	might	merely	work	as	an	apparatus	
for	public	demonstrations	of	openness	without	essentially	affecting	the	underlying	
power	relationships.	
In	a	similar	way	international	initiatives	such	as	the	Santiago	Principles	have	
been	 aiming	 at	 addressing	 primarily	 concerns	 raised	 by	Western	 countries13.	
The	Santiago	Principles	have	developed	in	an	attempt	to	put	Western	concerns	
at	 ease	over	 the	 lack	of	 accountability	 and	 transparency	of	 the	SWFs.	 In	 this	
respect	they	have	been	developed	with	a	preemptive	purpose	so	as	to	control	
the	possible	adoption	of	protectionist	or	nationalist	policies.	This,	however,	has	
been	attempted	carefully	so	as	to	not	affect	the	free	investment	flows	and	to	not	
discomfort	the	SWFs	that	claim	their	investments	are	based	purely	on	economic	
grounds.	Similarly,	the	principles	make	use	of	the	same	values	that	the	scoring	
and	ranking	attempts	make.
In	 the	 same	 way,	 the	 Santiago	 Principles	 develop	 from	 an	 international	
perspective,	 hence	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 towards	 the	 citizens	 of	
the	 host	 countries	 is	 not	 addressed	 to	 the	 same	 extent.	 The	 effectiveness	 of	
such	initiatives	and	the	degree	to	which	they	can	benefit	the	citizens	of	the	host	
countries	can	be	further	challenged	once	the	voluntary	nature	of	the	commitment	
to	 the	 Principles	 is	 considered.	 Further	 concerns	 would	 emerge	 once	 the	
12		See	The	Times	(2007),	The	Sunday	Times	(2007),	The	Guardian	(2007),	IMF	(2008a;	2008b),	
European	Commission	Communication	(2008),	European	Commission	press	release	(2008)	and	US	
Treasury	Department	press	release	(2008a;	2008b).
13	 	Several	scholars	consider	 the	Santiago	Principles	as	 the	outcome	of	 the	 influence	of	a	
group	of	Western	Countries.	For	a	detailed	discussion	see	Rose	(2008).
65                                                                                                                                  
implementations	and	enforcement	 limitations	present	 in	 the	very	nature	of	 the	
Santiago	 Principles	 are	 taken	 into	 consideration.	 In	 this	 respect,	 views	 range	
from	considering	 the	Santiago	Principles	deficient	 (Rose,	2008)	 to	a	“band-aid	
over	a	gaping	wound”	(Wong,	2009).	
Overall	 governance,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 improvements	 of	 the	
SWFs	 remain	 a	 core	 aspect	 of	 their	 effectiveness	 and	 their	 success.	 This	 is	
related	not	only	 to	 the	 international	welcoming	of	 the	SWFs	but	 to	 the	benefit	
of	 the	 domestic	 economies	 and	 the	 citizens	 of	 the	 respective	 host	 countries.	
The	developed	scoreboards,	 ranking	attempts	and	 the	suggested	sets	of	best	
practices	should	be	considered,	acknowledging	their	methodological	limitations	
and	their	international	perspective.	The	involved	parties	and	policymakers	should	
actively	work	in	improving	these	scoring	attempts	and	indentified	best	practices.	
These	efforts	need	to	address	not	only	international	skepticism	towards	SWFs’	
operations	and	investments;	they	should	further	address	the	concerns	about	to	
SWFs	in	the	host	countries.	The	latter	can	be	addressed	with	the	clear	formulation	
of	the	goals	and	the	operations	of	the	funds	to	the	public.	This	can	enforce	the	
legitimacy	of	the	funds,	allowing	public	scrutiny	and	reducing	rent-seeking	or	of	
political	benefit	actions.	Developments	in	the	assessment	of	the	SWFs	as	well	
as	in	the	identified	best	practices	have	to	be	conducted	enforcing	the	provision	
of	 greater	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 towards	 the	 citizens	 of	 the	 host	
countries.	The	latter	can	significantly	reduce	the	margin	for	misinterpretation	in	
such	initiatives	and	in	the	identified	best	practices.	
4. Conclusion and policy recommendations
The	 experience	 to	 date	 suggests	 that	 strong	 governance	 structures,	
transparency	 and	 accountability	 remain	 key	 factors	 of	 success	 for	 the	SWFs.	
Success	 is	 related	 to	 the	welcoming	of	 the	SWFs	 in	 the	 international	financial	
arena	as	key	players	and	to	the	welcoming	of	their	investments	in	the	recipient	
countries.	In	addition,	success	is	related	to	the	ease	of	controversy	surrounding	
SWFs	 in	 the	 host	 countries.	 Strong	 governance	 and	 adequate	 provision	 of	
transparency	and	accountability	can	foster	success	in	combating	political	misuse,	
rent-seeking	and	corruption	in	SWF	operations.	
For	countries	endowed	with	natural	resources	and	SWFs	established	out	of	
natural	resource	revenues,	this	would	foster	the	control	of	revenue	management	
and	 the	prudent	 intergenerational	and	 intra-generational	allocation	of	 the	finite	
national	wealth.	 In	macroeconomic	 terms,	strong	governance	and	provision	of	
adequate	transparency	and	accountability	would	foster	fiscal	sustainability	of	the	
respective	countries,	further	enforcing	their	international	positioning.	Strong	and	
transparent	governance	can	strengthen	public	constituency	on	the	mobilization	
and	the	use	of	the	SWF	assets.	In	addition,	it	would	facilitate	the	monitoring	of	
the	financial	commitment	of	the	politicians	and	their	consistency	in	maintaining	
a	financial	balance	 in	 the	accumulation	and	spending	of	 the	SWF,	overcoming	
problems	of	political	misuse	of	the	assets	and	subsequent	political	unrest.	
Reflecting	in	large	part	the	needs	of	the	international	financial	markets,	the	
perceptions	of	the	International	Financial	Institutions	and	the	concerns	of	major	
Western	economies,	several	attempts	have	been	made	at	providing	scoreboards	
and	quantitative	rankings	of	the	SWFs.	These	attempts	have	progressed	along	
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the	lines	of	the	development	and	the	establishment	of	a	set	of	generally	accepted	
best	 practices	 as	 suggested	 by	 organizations	 like	 the	OECD,	 by	 International	
Financial	 Institutions	 such	 as	 the	 IMF,	 or	 by	 individual	 countries	 or	 group	 of	
countries	like	the	USA	or	the	EU.	
The	most	 characteristic	of	 such	attempts	 remains	 the	Santiago	Principles.	
Similar	 to	 the	 earlier	 attempts,	 the	 Santiago	 Principles	 reflect	 in	 large	 part	
Western	worries	and	the	need	of	international	financial	markets	for	transparency	
and	accountability	provision	 from	 the	participating	financial	actors	such	as	 the	
SWFs.	Nevertheless,	the	need	for	strong	governance	structures	and	the	provision	
of	 adequate	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 towards	 the	 citizens	 of	 the	 host	
countries	 should	not	 be	disregarded.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	existing	 scoreboards	
address	these	needs	to	a	 limited	degree.	Furthermore,	 the	voluntary	nature	of	
the	commitment	to	international	initiatives	and	the	limited	reference	to	provision	
of	transparency	on	national	levels	leaves	significant	room	for	improvements	on	
national	levels.	
The	 overview	 of	 the	 assessment	 attempts,	 the	 scoreboards	 of	SWFs	 and	
the	 proposed	 fund	 benchmarks	 and	 best	 practices	 developed	 to	 date	 further	
indicate	 the	 necessity	 of	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 their	 particularities	 and	
their	methodological	 limitations.	The	subjective	nature	of	 the	criteria	employed	
and	 the	assessment	provided,	 the	 international	perspective	employed	and	 the	
conflicting	interests	involved	might	hinder	the	estimation	results	and	consequent	
recommendations.	Moreover,	the	adoption	of	specific	fund	cases	as	benchmarks	
might	 not	 be	 applicable	 to	 every	 single	 fund	 and	 country.	 Macroeconomic	
differentials,	 the	 pace	 of	 institutional	 development	 and	 integration,	 and	 fiscal	
needs	might	render	the	“one-size-fits-all”	approach	unrealistic.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	vast	discrepancies	between	different	 funds	and	 their	performance	 indicate	
that	they	cannot	be	studied	in	a	group	or	assessed	against	each	other	unless	a	
set	of	generally	accepted	principles	and	practices	is	put	in	place.	
In	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 latter,	 the	 welcoming	 of	 SWFs	 in	 the	 international	
financial	arena	and	of	their	investments	in	the	recipient	countries	can	be	subject	
to	skepticism.	This	becomes	more	apparent	when	considering	the	injection	of	vast	
amounts	from	the	SWFs	of	countries	 like	China	or	Qatar	 towards	the	Western	
markets	in	times	such	as	the	latest	financial	turmoil.	The	latter	shift	in	the	world	
economic	 balances	has	made	many	 international	 organizations	 and	 individual	
countries	highlight	 the	need	 for	 the	establishment	of	a	generally	accepted	set	
of	 practices	 and	 standards	 of	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 to	 be	 adopted	
by	 the	SWFs.	 In	addition	many	Western	countries	have	clarified	 their	position	
towards	the	investments	made	by	the	SWF	and	their	final	legitimacy	to	protect	
their	national	interests.
In	 this	 respect	 policymakers	 and	 international	 financial	 institutions	 should	
keep	working	on	fostering	the	existing	sets	of	best	practices	and	on	promoting	
the	active	engagement	of	 the	SWFs	and	 the	respective	countries	 to	 the	 latter.	
Nevertheless,	 these	attempts	should	not	disregard	 that	 little	provision	 is	made	
in	 the	 existing	 practices	 for	 the	 fostering	 of	 governance,	 transparency	 and	
accountability	 towards	 the	 citizens	 of	 the	 countries	 that	 remain	 the	 legitimate	
beneficiaries	 of	 the	 fund	 operations	 and	 the	 ultimate	 domestic	 monitoring	
apparatus.		Systematic	monitoring	of	the	SWFs	against	the	set	of	good	practices	
and	 international	 benchmarks	 should	 continue.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 should	
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develop	so	as	to	further	ensure	that	the	citizens	benefit	from	SWFs	operations	
and	 investments	 and	 they	 receive	 full	 transparency	 and	 accountability.	 If	 this	
parameter	 is	 not	 taken	 into	 serious	 consideration	 the	 assessed	 and	 recorded	
levels	 of	 governance	 strengthening	 might	 merely	 monitor	 superficial	 public	
demonstrations	of	 transparency	and	accountability	without	essentially	affecting	
the	underlying	power	relationships.	
In	 order	 to	 strengthen	governance,	 transparency	and	accountability	 of	 the	
SWFs:
1. International initiatives should keep working on the fostering of good 
governance, transparency and accountability practices and on their being 
embraced by a larger group of SWFs.	Experience	with	successful	SWFs	should	
be	used	as	a	starting	point	so	as	 to	derive	a	set	of	governance,	 transparency	
and	accountability	practices	 that	can	 foster	 the	efficiency	and	 the	 international	
welcoming	 of	 the	 SWFs.	 Systematic	 monitoring	 of	 SWFs	 against	 the	 set	 of	
good	 practices	 and	 international	 benchmarks	 should	 continue.	 Nevertheless,	
such	attempts	should	consider	 the	country-fund	specifics	 that	might	make	 the	
replication	of	the	same	model	in	each	case	unrealistic.	In	addition,	the	fact	that	
the	citizens	remain	the	ultimate	beneficiaries	of	the	SWF	operations	and	the	most	
appropriate	domestic	monitoring	apparatus	of	political	misuse	should	be	kept	in	
mind	in	the	latter	efforts.	
2. Employment of the existing SWF rankings and scoreboards should 
acknowledge their international perspective and the methodological 
limitations present. These	might	significantly	affect	the	obtained	rankings	and	
the	subsequent	 recommendations.	 In	 this	area	 the	 international	organizations,	
the	 International	 Financial	 Institutions,	 individual	 countries	 and	SWFs	 have	 to	
further	work	on	improving	the	existing	methodology	employed.	At	the	same	time	
any	 assessment	making	 use	 of	 the	 scoreboards	 and	 rankings	 to	 date	 should	
carefully	consider	whether	the	recorded	improvements	of	changes	represent	real	
changes	in	the	existing	power	relationships.
 3. The ranking attempts and the international initiatives on best practices 
should not disregard the fact that the citizens of the countries remain the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the SWF investments and operations.	Citizens	can	
further	provide	valuable	support	 in	monitoring	 the	politically	motivated	uses	of	
the	SWFs	or	the	political	misuse	of	the	accumulated	assets.	In	this	respect,	any	
assessment	 attempts	 should	 further	 consider	 governance,	 transparency	 and	
accountability	developments	vis-à-vis	the	citizens	of	the	countries.	International	
initiatives	can	be	used	as	 leverage	 in	 fostering	governance,	 transparency	and	
accountability	changes	not	only	 towards	 the	 international	markets	but	 towards	
the	citizens	of	the	countries	as	well.
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Appendix A
Table 3. Principles of the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index
Point 
given Principle
1
Fund	provides	history	including	reason	for	creation,	origins	of	wealth,	and	
government	ownership	structure
1 Fund	provides	up-to-date	independently	audited	annual	reports
1
Fund	provides	ownership	percentage	of	company	holdings,	and	geo-
graphic	locations	of	holdings
1
Fund	provides	total	portfolio	market	value,	returns,	and	management	
compensation
1
Fund	provides	guidelines	in	reference	to	ethical	standards,	investment	
policies,	and	enforcer	of	guidelines
1 Fund	provides	clear	strategies	and	objectives
1
If	applicable,	the	fund	clearly	identifies	subsidiaries	and	contact	informa-
tion
1 If	applicable,	the	fund	identifies	external	managers
1 Fund	manages	its	own	web	site
1
Fund	provides	main	office	location	address	and	contact	information	such	
as	telephone	and	fax
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Introduction
        
Throughout	 the	 former	socialist	camp,	Azerbaijan	was	 the	first	 to	establish	
a	stabilization	 fund	 for	 the	accumulation	of	 income	 from	hydrocarbon	exports,	
and	 in	 late	 1999,	 by	 a	 special	 decree	of	 the	President,	 the	State	Oil	 Fund	of	
Azerbaijan	Republic	(SOFAZ)	was	founded.	Establishment	of	the	Fund	coincided	
with	 the	 period	 when	 in	 public	 opinion,	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 expectations	 of	
incredibly	high	oil	revenues,	there	was	a	sense	of	transformation	of	Azerbaijan	
to	a	second	Kuwait	in	the	near	future.	SOFAZ	was	established	for	collection	and	
effective	management	of	funds	from	the	sale	of	profit	oil	extracted	by	both	local	
and	foreign	companies	as	well	as	for	direction	of	these	funds	to	development	of	
leading	spheres	and	implementation	of	significant	projects.	For	this	period,	as	it	
was	supposed	by	experts,	Azerbaijan	didn’t	turn	into	Kuwait.	However,	the	wide	
experience	in	management	of	oil	and	gas	revenues	which	was	collected	during	
this	period	appears	to	be	a	remarkable	lesson	for	many	resource-rich	countries.
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SOFAZ’s history and governance principles 
The	State	Oil	Fund	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	(SOFAZ)	was	established	in	
accordance	with	the	decree	of	the	President	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	dated	
December	 29,	 1999	 “On	Establishment	 of	 the	State	Oil	 Fund	 of	 the	Republic	
of	Azerbaijan.”	Statutory	Regulations	 of	 the	State	Oil	 Fund	of	 the	Republic	 of	
Azerbaijan	were	approved	by	the	President	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	dated	
December	29,	2000.	The	cornerstone	of	the	philosophy	behind	the	Oil	Fund	was	
to	 ensure	 intergenerational	 equality	 of	 benefit	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 country’s	 oil	
wealth,	whilst	 improving	 the	 economic	well-being	 of	 the	 population	 today	 and	
safeguarding	economic	security	for	future	generations1.	
A	 number	 of	 agreements	 on	 joint	 development	 of	 oil	 and	 gas	 resources	
were	signed	with	foreign	investors	which	have	been	being	realized	since	1994.	
The	issue	on	effective	management	of	revenues	from	implementation	of	 these	
agreements	was	brought	to	the	agenda.	SOFAZ	has	the	purpose	of	formation	of	
such	a	mechanism.	The	Fund’s	activity	is	directed	toward	the	achievement	of	the	
following	objectives:	(i)	preservation	of	macroeconomic	stability,	ensuring	fiscal-tax	
discipline,	decreasing	dependence	on	oil	revenues	and	stimulating	development	
of	 the	 non-oil	 sector;	 (ii)	 taking	 into	 account	 that	 oil	 and	 gas	 are	 deployable	
resources	 ensuring	 intergenerational	 equality	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 country’s	 oil	
wealth	and	to	accumulate	and	preserve	oil	revenues	for	future	generations;	(iii)	
financing	major	national	scale	projects	to	support	socio-economic	progress.	
SOFAZ's	 activities	 in	 the	 field	 of	 assets	 accumulation	 and	 spending	 are	
overseen	by	a	Supervisory	Board.	The	Board	is	to	review	the	Fund's	draft	annual	
budget,	annual	report	and	financial	statements	along	with	auditor's	opinion	and	
provide	its	comments.	Members	of	the	Supervisory	Board	are	appointed	by	the	
President	and	represent	mainly	state	bodies.	In	accordance	with	the	presidential	
decree	dated	November	27,	2008,	seven	new	members	of	the	Supervisory	Board	
were	appointed.	Prime	Minister	Arthur	Rasizade	was	re-elected	Chairman	of	the	
SOFAZ	Supervisory	 Board.	 Civil	 society’s	 participation	 in	 the	management	 of	
SOFAZ	hasn’t	been	implemented	yet.	
SOFAZ’s	daily	management	is	vested	with	the	Executive	Director,	appointed	
by	 and	 accountable	 to	 the	 President.	 SOFAZ’s	 Executive	 Director	 as	 a	 chief	
executive	officer	 is	 vested	with	 the	powers	 to	be	a	 legal	 representative	of	 the	
Fund,	 organize	 and	 conduct	 business	 of	 the	 Fund	 including	 appointment	 and	
dismissal	 of	 employees,	management	 and	 disbursement	 of	 the	 assets	 of	 the	
Fund	 in	 conformity	 with	 the	 rules	 and	 regulations	 approved	 by	 the	 President	
of	Azerbaijan.	The	Executive	Director	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	preparation	of	 the	
annual	budget	of	SOFAZ,	incorporating	an	annual	program	of	the	Fund’s	assets	
utilization,	and	its	submission	for	the	approval	of	the	President	of	Azerbaijan.
Regarding	 “Decree	 of	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Azerbaijan	 on	
establishment	of	the	State	Oil	Fund	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan”	(29.12.1999)	
SOFAZ	 fulfilled	 its	operations	 through	a	special	account	of	 the	National	Bank.	
SOFAZ	 is	 accountable	 and	 responsible	 to	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	
Azerbaijan.	The	Fund	is	an	extra-budgetary	institution.	The	Fund	is	a	legal	entity	
1		http://www.oilfund.az			
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and	must	have	a	settlement	account	and	other	accounts	at	banking	institutions2.	A	
Supervisory	Board	exercises	general	control	over	establishment	and	spending	of	
the	Fund’s	assets.	The main responsibility of the Fund is to ensure collection 
and effective management of foreign currency and other assets that are 
generated from the implementation of agreements signed in the field of 
oil and gas exploration, and development, as well as from the Fund’s own 
activities, in the interest of citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan and their 
future generations. The	 Fund’s	 assets	 form	 on	 the	 account	 of	 the	 following	
sources:	
-	 Revenues	 generated	 from	 implementing	 agreements	 on	 exploration,	
development	 and	 production	 sharing	 for	 oil	 and	 gas	 fields	 in	 the	 territory	 of	
Azerbaijan;	
-	Net	revenues	from	the	sale	of	hydrocarbons	falling	to	the	share	of	Azerbaijan;	
-	Oil	and	gas	agreements’	signature	or	performance	bonuses	paid	by	investors	
to	the	State	Oil	Company	of	the	Azerbaijan	Republic;
-	Acreage	payments;	
-	Dividends	and	profit	participation	revenues	falling	to	the	share	of	Azerbaijan;	
-	Revenues	generated	from	oil	and	gas	passing	over	the	territory	of	Azerbaijan;
-	Revenues	generated	from	the	transfer	of	assets	from	investors	to	the	State	
Oil	Company	or	within	the	framework	of	oil	and	gas	agreements;	
-	 Revenues	 generated	 from	 the	 placement,	 management,	 sale	 or	 other	
utilization	of	 the	Fund’s	assets	and	revenues	from	asset	revaluation	and	other	
related	revenues;	
-	Grant	and	other	free	aid,	and	other	revenues	and	receipts	 in	accordance	
with	the	legislation.	
The	Fund’s	assets	under	management	are	placed	in	investment-grade	rated	
banks	and	instruments.	The	Supervisory	Board	of	the	Fund	determines	rules	for	
accounting	and	reporting	the	use	of	the	Fund’s	assets.	Utilization	of	the	Fund’s	
assets	is	carried	out	in	accordance	with	main	directions	to	be	approved	each	year	
through	Presidential	Resolutions.	The	Fund’s	assets	may	be	used	for	solving	the	
most	important	nationwide	problems,	and	for	construction	and	reconstruction	of	
strategically	 significant	 infrastructure	 facilities	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 country’s	
socio-economic	progress.
For	decreasing	the	risks	in	the	management	of	the	Oil	Fund’s	foreign	currency	
assets,	 their	 limits	 shall	 be	 defined	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 following	 principles3:	
defining	credit	 risk,	 i.e.	maximum	 limit	of	 the	amount	 invested	 in	one	financial	
institution	and	asset	and	 the	minimum	sufficient	credit	 rating;	defining	 liquidity	
risk,	i.e.	maximum	maturity	of	the	investment	portfolio	and	minimum	liquidity	limit	
for	standards	periods;	and	defining	market	risk	(currency	risk	and	 interest	rate	
risk)	as	well	as	each	currency	included	in	the	investment	portfolio	and	maximum	
weight	of	the	investment	assets	dominated	in	these	currencies,	and	maturity	of	
the	investment	portfolio.	
2		“Regulations	(Statute)	on	the	State	Oil	Fund	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan”	approved	by	the	
Decree	of	the	President	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	№	434	dated	December	29,	2000.
3		“Rules	on	holding,	placement	and	management	of	 foreign	currency	assets	of	 the	State	Oil	
Fund	 of	 the	Republic	 of	Azerbaijan”	 approved	 by	 the	Decree	 of	 the	President	 of	 the	Republic	 of	
Azerbaijan	№	511	dated	June	19,	2001
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The	Oil	Fund's	budget	is	an	annual	financial	program	prepared	in	compliance	
with	the	legislation	of	Azerbaijan	to	ensure	the	implementation	of	the	Oil	Fund's	
objectives	and	functions	and	reflects	the	Oil	Fund's	revenues	and	expenditures.	The	
preparation	and	execution	of	the	Oil	Fund's	budget	shall	be	based	on	the	principle	
of	the	implementation	of	a	coherent	macroeconomic	policy	in	Azerbaijan	and	the	
consolidation	 of	 revenues	 and	 expenditures	 of	 the	 consolidated	 government.	
Effecting	of	any	expenditure	on	Oil	Fund’s	assets	extraneous	from	the	Oil	Fund’s	
budget	 by	 the	Oil	 Fund	 is	 inadmissible.	 Expenditures	 that	 can	 arise	 from	 the	
Oil	Fund’s	assets’	 revaluation	 in	 the	Oil	Fund’s	 reported	currency	 (Azerbaijani	
manat)	as	well	as	expenditures	in	connection	with	payment	of	lawfully	determined	
taxes	and	any	other	obligatory	payments	are	not	intended	in	the	budget	of	the	Oil	
Fund	and	are	in	fact	reflected	as	extra-budgetary	expenditures	in	the	balance	of	
the	Oil	Fund.	Budget	expenditures	of	the	Oil	Fund	as	well	as	financing	lawfully	
determined	taxes	and	any	other	extra-budgetary	obligatory	payments	are	effected	
on	the	Oil	Fund’s	assets	in	the	national	currency	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	
and	foreign	currency.	Financing	the	Oil	Fund’s	expenditures	and	payments	in	the	
national	currency	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	is	provided	in	compliance	with	the	
legislation	of	Azerbaijan	by	conversion	of	the	Oil	Fund’s	foreign	currency	assets	
to	the	national	currency	of	Azerbaijan4.
A	long-term	strategy	on	management	of	oil	and	gas	revenues,	which	covers	
the	 period	 2005-2025,	 establishes	 the	 principles	 for	 the	 use	 of	 oil	 and	 gas	
revenues	 and	medium-term	 expenditures	 policy	 for	 this	 period5.	 This	 strategy	
ensures	the	management	of	the	revenues	acquired	from	sale	of	natural	gas	and	
oil	in	conformity	with	the	sources	described	below,	accrued	in	the	State	Oil	Fund	
of	the	Azerbaijan	Republic,	and	in	the	state	budget.	The	principles	for	long-term	
use	of	oil	and	gas	revenues	are	as	follows:	when	forecasting	the	amount	of	long-
term	expenditures	 from	oil	 and	gas	 revenues,	 the	 ‘constant	 real	expenditures’	
principle	 shall	 be	 used	 as	 a	 basis	 and	 annual	 limits	 shall	 be	 set	 for	 these	
expenditures	that	are	to	be	made	within	the	period	covered	by	the	strategy;	when	
incomes	from	oil	and	gas	revenues	peak,	at	least	25	percent	of	them	is	saved;	the	
regulations	adopted	for	spending	oil	and	gas	revenues	shall	remain	unchanged	
during	the	effective	period	of	the	long-term	strategy	on	management	of	oil	and	
gas	revenues	and	the	expenditure	limits	projected	on	the	basis	of	the	constant	
real	expenditures	principle	is	observed;	the	volume	of	medium-term	expenditures	
shall	be	determined	based	on	the	non-oil	deficit	(the	difference	between	revenues	
and	 expenditures	 of	 the	 consolidated	 budget	 of	 the	 country,	 excluding	 the	 oil	
sector)	and	taking	account	of	the	long-term	expenditure	limit.	Sharp	year-to-year	
fluctuations	 in	expenditures	are	undesirable	and	 the	non-oil	deficit	may	not	be	
abruptly	changed;	 investment	expenditures	shall	be	made	 in	 the	 framework	of	
the	medium-term	State	Investment	Program	that	is	drafted	annually;	meeting	the	
current	high	demand	of	Azerbaijan	for	investment	will	result	in	larger	expenditures	
during	the	initial	period	and	create	conditions	for	the	development	of	the	non-oil	
4		“Rules	on	the	preparation	and	execution	of	the	annual	program	of	revenues	and	expenditures	
(budget)	of	the	State	Oil	Fund	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan”	approved	by	the	Decree	of	the	President	
of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	№	579	dated	September	12,	2001
5			“Long-term	strategy	on	the	management	of	oil	and	gas	revenues”	approved	by	the	Decree	of	the 
President	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	№	128	dated	September	27,	2004
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sector	and	 the	gradual	 reduction	 in	 the	dependence	on	oil	and	gas	 revenues.	
The	development	of	the	non-oil	sector	based	on	the	use	of	long-term	oil	and	gas	
revenues	will	 help	 in	 reducing	 the	 country’s	 need	 for	 external	 borrowing.	The	
strategy	on	use	of	oil	and	gas	revenues	includes	the	following	objectives,	while	
aiming	at	retaining	macroeconomic	stability:	
-	developing	the	non-oil	sector,	regions,	SMEs;	
-	 large-scale	 development	 of	 infrastructure;	 fulfillment	 of	 poverty	 reduction	
measures	and	the	solution	of	other	social	problems;	
-	stimulating	the	improvement	of	the	intellectual,	material,	and	technical	base	
of	the	economy;	development	of	“human	capital;”
-	consolidating	the	defense	capabilities	of	the	country;	
-	executing	projects	relating	to	reconstruction	activities	in	liberated	territories	
and	the	return	of	internally	displaced	persons	to	their	native	lands.
SOFAZ’s	activities	are	regulated	by	regulations.	But	there	are	critics	by	EITI	
NGO	Coalition	 that	 the	main	 regulatory	document	 should	be	 law.	Azerbaijani 
civil society groups have already prepared a draft law on SOFAZ.	Regarding	
that	draft	law:	
“administration	expenses	of	the	Fund	shall	not	be	more	than	5%	of	its	annual	
revenue.	It	 is	impossible	to	substantiate	the	5%,	as	the	international	standards	
contain	the	limit	of	5%	as	an	exceptional	case.	In	my	opinion,	we	may	preserve	
10%	and	not	write	any	other	figures	here.	The	Fund	shall	be	accountable	and	
responsible	to	the	Milli	Mejlis	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan.	The	liquid	funds	of	the	
Fund	will	be	preserved	in	the	highly	rated	and	internationally	recognized	banks	
determined	by	 the	Supervision	Board	with	 the	assets	expressed	mainly	 in	US	
dollars,	Euro,	British	pound	sterling	and	Japanese	yen	and	in	other	currencies	
not	exceeding	10%.	The	assets	preserved	with	any	banks	may	not	exceed	20%	
of	the	Fund’s	liquid	funds.	30%	of	the	Fund’s	annual	revenues	shall	be	allotted	
for	collection	purposes	within	each	fiscal	year.	The	Funds	collection	assignment	
assets	are	preserved	for	needs	of	the	next	generations,	and	excluding	provisions	
contained	in	this	law,	it	cannot	be	used	for	other	goals.	By	release	of	the	occupied	
Azerbaijani	lands,	approximately	50%	of	the	Fund’s	stocking	assignment	assets	
may	be	used	for	the	purpose	of	financing	of	actions	related	to	the	reorganization	
of	 these	 territories	 and	 returning	 of	 refugees	 to	 their	 homeland.	 The	 Fund’s	
stocking	 assignment	 assets	may	 be	 sued	 if	 the	 net	 revenues	 generated	 from	
sale	of	hydrocarbons	falling	to	the	share	of	the	Azerbaijan	Republic	are	less	than	
those	generated	from	placement	and	management	of	the	Fund’s	assets.
The	Fund’s	Investment	portfolio	is	placed	based	on	the	following	principles:	
the	weight	of	one	direction	in	the	investment	portfolio	may	not	exceed	50%;	the	
share	of	one	continent	in	the	investment	portfolio	may	not	be	more	than	50%;	the	
share	of	investments	in	the	investment	portfolio	may	not	be	more	than	50%.	The	
Fund’s	investments	are	implemented	based	on	the	following	criterion:	the	ethical	
principles	 prepared	 by	 the	Supervision	 Board	 are	 applied	 to	 the	 investments;	
the	state	authorities	without	a	strategic	plan	may	not	be	allotted	any	funds;	the	
share	 in	 the	 inter-country	 investments	 by	 small	 and	 average	 enterprises	may	
not	 exceed	30%.	Fund	assets	may	be	assigned	 to	 finance	projects	 aiming	at	
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development	of	the	non-oil	sector	of	the	economy,	as	well	as	small	and	medium-
sized	entrepreneurship based	on	preserving	the	macroeconomic	stability.	The	list	
of	financed	projects	is	determined	by	the	Fund’s	Supervisory	Board	according	to	
the	proposals	of	the	related	executive	authority.	Approximately	1%	of	the	revenues	
generated	by	the	Fund	within	a	year	 is	 to	be	directed	towards	financing	of	 the	
social	 investment	 programs.	 The	 financing	within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 social	
investment	programs	is	assigned	to	the	civil	community	institutions	based	on	the	
competitions	carried	out	according	 to	 the	 rules	determined	by	 the	Supervisory	
Board.	 The	 expenditure	 of	 assets	 allotted	 for	 projects’	 implementation	 will	 be	
under	 control	 of	 the	 Supervisory	 Board.	 The amount transferred from the 
Fund’s assets to the budget each year shall not exceed 20% of the Fund’s 
annual revenue.
The	Supervisory	Board	of	the	Fund	can	include	9	members.	3	members	of	the	
Supervisory	Board	from	the	corresponding	executive	authorities	are	appointed	by	
the	President	of	the	Azerbaijan	Republic.	6	members	of	the	Supervisory	Board	
from	the	candidates	of	the	field	trade	union	organizations	acting	in	the	oil	and	gas	
industry,	NGOs	specializing	in	the	corresponding	fields	and	scientific	institutions	
are	selected	by	the	Milli	Mejlis	of	the	Azerbaijan	Republic.	The	Executive	Director	
shall	be	appointed	for	3	years.	The	same	person	shall	not	have	the	right	to	be	the	
Executive	Director	twice.	The	activity	of	the	Fund	is	audited	by	the	Audit	Chamber	
of	 the	 Azerbaijan	 Republic	 and	 the	 independent	 foreign	 auditor.	 Information	
regarding	the	Fund’s	activity	including	the	Fund’s	profits,	assets,	other	information	
concerning	the	placing	and	use	of	these	funds	may	not	pertain	to	the	range	of	
information	with	restricted	access”.
SOFAZ’s asset and revenue management 
SOFAZ’s	assets	are	managed	in	accordance	with	the	“Rules	for	accumulation,	
investment	and	management	of	assets	of	the	State	Oil	Fund	of	the	Republic	of	
Azerbaijan”	(Investment	Guidelines)	approved	by	a	presidential	decree	of	June	
19,	2001.	According	to	these	Rules	the	purpose	of	management	of	the	Oil	Fund’s	
foreign	currency	assets	is	to	hold	foreign	currency	assets	of	the	Oil	Fund	securely	
and	 to	 generate	 revenues	 by	 effective	management.	 Outside	 the	Republic	 of	
Azerbaijan,	the	current	accounts	of	the	Oil	Fund	should	be	opened	with	banks	
rated	 by	 reputable	 international	 rating	 agencies	 such	 as	 Standard	 &	 Poor’s,	
Moody’s	and	Fitch	with	a	long-term	credit	rating	not	lower	than:	“AA-”	as	defined	
by	 Standard	 &	 Poor’s	 or	 Fitch,	 or	 “Aa3”	 as	 defined	 by	 Moody’s.	 The	 Fund’s	
counterparts	in	international	financial	markets	might	be	institutions	with	long	term	
credit	ratings	not	less	than	BBB	(by	Standard	and	Poor’s),	BBB	(by	Fitch)	or		Baa	
(by	Moody’s).	The	maximum	weight	of	one	financial	institution	or	one	investment	
in	the	investment	portfolio	of	the	Fund	is	set	at	15%	of	the	total	amount	of	the	
investment	portfolio	(exceptions	are	central	banks,	custodian	banks	and	external	
managers).	50%	of	the	total	amount	of	the	investment	portfolio	of	the	Fund	is	to	
be	invested	in	assets	denominated	in	US	Dollars,	and	40%	in	assets	denominated	
in	Euro,	5%	in	assets	denominated	in	GBP,	whereas	5%	of	the	total	amount	of	the	
investment	portfolio	of	the	Fund	is	to	be	invested	in	assets	denominated	either	in	
currencies	of	countries	with	long-term	country	ratings	(sovereign	debt)	not	less	
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than	the	credit	ratings	A	(Standard	&	Poor’s,	Fitch)	or	A2	(Moody’s);	in	US	Dollars	
or	in	US	Dollars,	Euro	and	GBP	based	on	their	respective	weight6.
Source: State Oil Fund, author calculations
According	to	investment	policy,	up	to	60%	of	the	Fund's	investment	portfolio	
can	be	managed	by	external	managers.	The	assets	given	to	an	external	manager	
cannot	 exceed	 15%	 of	 the	 total	 amount	 of	 the	 investment	 portfolio.	 SOFAZ's	
investment	portfolio	should	not	be	invested	in	currency	arbitrage,	swaps,	forwards	
and	 futures	 (except	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 hedging	 or	 optimizing	 the	 currency	
composition	 of	 the	 investment	 portfolio	 and	 structure	 of	 the	SOFAZ’s	 assets),	
precious	metals	and	stones,	or	real	estate.
The	main	 projects	 are	 financed	 by	 SOFAZ	 include:	 a)	 “State	 Program	 on	
education	of	Azerbaijani	youth	abroad	in	the	years	2007-2015”;	b)	“Baku-Tbilisi-
Kars	New	Railway”	Project;	c)	constructing	a	water	pipeline	from	Oguz-Gabala	
region	to	Baku	city;	d)	reconstruction	of	the	Samur-Absheron	irrigation	system;	e)	
Formation	of	the	statutory	capital	of	Azerbaijan	Investment	Company;	f)	Settlement	
of	the	problems	of	refugees	and	internally	displaced	persons	who	were	forced	to	
flee	their	native	lands	as	a	result	of	Armenian	invasion	on	the	Nagorno	Karabakh	
region	of	Azerbaijan;	g)	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan	Main	Export	Pipeline.
As	 a	 result	 of	 three	 quarters	 of	 2010,	 the	SOFAZ	 continued	 the	 policy	 of	
placing	the	investment	portfolio	in	the	short-term	instruments,	and	the	share	of	
funds	invested	for	up	to	five	years	makes	up	94.85	percent	of	the	assets.	In	total,	
6		http://www.oilfund.az 
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the	 investment	portfolio	of	SOFAZ	accounts	for	99.82	percent	($21.681	billion)	
of	the	total	assets.	As	of	October	1	2010,	38.02	percent	of	the	portfolio	has	been	
placed	in	securities	for	a	period	exceeding	one	year,	25.93	percent	-	from	one	to	
three	years,	30.99	percent	-	from	three	to	five	years	and	4.97	percent,	including	
0.1	percent	of	income	in	assets	-	more	than	five	years.	Currently,	43.59	percent	
of	the	Fund's	investment	portfolio	has	been	placed	in	securities	rated	AAA,	21.74	
percent	 -	AA,	 27.55	 percent	 -	A,	 7.09	 percent	 -	 BBB,	 0.04	 percent	 accounts	
for	other.	SOFAZ's	assets	have	been	placed	partly	 in	securities	and	monetary	
market	 instruments	 (deposits,	 bank	accounts).	Only	0.1	percent	of	 the	Fund's	
portfolio	has	been	placed	in	shares.	Currently,	34.08	percent	has	been	placed	in	
the	bonds	of	agencies	and	international	organizations,	13.35	percent	-	sovereign	
debt	securities,	3.54	percent	 -	deposits	and	monetary	market	 instruments	and	
4.08	percent	-	bank	accounts.	Geographic	placement	of	the	assets	of	the	Oil	Fund	
is	as	follows:	73.66	percent	placed	in	European	countries,	10.82	percent	-	North	
America,	8.04	percent	-	in	international	financial	institutions,	4.31	percent	-	Asia	
and	others.	As	of	Oct.	1,	2010,	SOFAZ's	assets	increased	45.8	percent	compared	
with	the	beginning	of	this	year	($14,900.4	billion),	amounting	to	$21,720.8	million.	
SOFAZ’s relations with the state budget
The	revenues	of	the	State	Oil	Fund	of	Azerbaijan	Republic	(SOFAZ)	made	up	
8,176.7	million	AZN	and	its	expenses	5,294.5	million	AZN	in	2009.	The	incomes	
of	the	Fund	were	fulfilled	by	97.8%	and	expenses	by	99.5%.	The	greatest	part	
of	 the	Fund’s	 income	 (93.4%)	was	provided	by	 the	profit	 table	sale	of	oil	 and	
gas.	 It’s	probably	 impossible	to	evaluate	the	economic-budget	model	of	recent	
years	without	 the	SOFAZ	 /	 state	 budget	 relationship.	The	 transfers	 of	 the	Oil	
Fund	 to	 the	budget	as	of	2003	gave	a	start	 to	 this	 relationship.	The	growth	of	
these	transfers	year	by	year	and	its	budget	share	of	almost	50%	at	the	present	
considerably	 improve	 this	 relationship.	 Such	 a	 situation	 itself	 causes	 certain	
anxiety.	Hence,	the	growth	strengthens	the	dependence	of	the	budget	upon	the	
oil	fund	and	weakens	its	motivation	for	tax	collections.	The	share	of	transfers	in	
budget	 incomes	exceeded	40%	(AZN	4915	million)	during	 the	crisis	year.	The	
transfers	are	going	to	comprise	half	of	budget	incomes	that	will	be	reduced	next	
year.	The	 increase	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 transfers	 directs	 the	 attention	 to	 SOFAZ	
and	 necessitates	 the	 acceptance	 of	 fiscal	 policy	 guidelines	 based	 on	 serious	
principles	 for	 the	 fund-budget	 relations.	The	current	estimations	show	 that	 the	
most	suitable	figure	for	Azerbaijan	in	this	regard	is	30%	of	SOFAZ	assets7.
The	approved	budget	incomes	of	SOFAZ	have	been	approved	as	5,963,126.7	
thousand	AZN	and	expenses	as	5,428,431.2	thousand	AZN.	As	is	seen	the	Fund	
is	going	to	spend	almost	all	of	its	revenues	(91%)	during	the	current	year	which	
is	happening	for	the	first	time	in	the	history	of	its	activity.	It	should	be	mentioned	
that	the	greatest	part	of	this	amount	(90.5%)	belongs	to	state	budget	transfers.	
The	 concern	 related	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 dependence	 upon	 oil	 factor	 is	
already	quite	obvious	in	2010.	Thus it’s clear that the tendency of the Oil Fund 
to become the main donor of the state budget is growing and reaching a level 
7		Dr.	İngilab	Ahmadov,	Kanan	Aslanli,	Shahriyar	Ahmadov.	“Global	economic	crisis	and	state	
budget:	The	case	of	Azerbaijan”,	National	Budget	Group,	Baku	2010
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that can become dangerous for the continuous development perspectives of the 
economy. When	reviewing	the	dynamics	of	the	link	between	the	state	budget	and	
SOFAZ,	things	become	fairly	clear.	
Share of SOFAZ transfers in budget incomes
Source: National Budget Group
If	the	amount	of	Oil	Fund	transfers	to	the	state	budget	was	100	million	AZN	
in	2003,	 the	figure	went	up	 to	130	million	 in	2004,	 to	150	million	 in	2005,	585	
million	in	2006,	another	585	million	in	2007,	1.1	million	in	2008	and	4.9	billion	in	
2009	and	finally	4.915	billion	in	2010.	However,	the	point	of	concern	is	not	only	
the	 increased	 amount	 of	 transfers,	 but	 also	 the	 Fund’s	 decision	 to	 spend	 the	
greatest	portion	of	its	budget	in	2010.	It	should	be	mentioned	that	the	Presidential	
decree	of	September	27,	2004	on	“Long-term	Strategy	for	the	Utilization	of	Oil	
and	Gas	revenues”	specifically	notes	that	at	least	25%	of	oil	and	gas	revenues	
shall	 be	 accumulated	 for	 the	 coming	 generations	 during	 the	 peak	 periods.	
Without	a	doubt,	the	lack	of	precise	standardization	mechanisms	in	the	above-
mentioned	 strategy	makes	 it	more	 complicated	 to	 legally	 evaluate	 how	much	
the	management	of	Oil	Fund	resources	 in	2010	complies	with	 the	Presidential	
decree.	And	 namely	 this	 fact	 makes	 it	 necessary	 to	 accept	 a	 perfect	 law	 on	
SOFAZ.	Such	a	 law	would	also	eliminate	 the	problem	of	 the	missing	 limitation	
mechanism.	 It’s	worthwhile	 to	mention	 that	 the	EITI	NGO	coalition	 functioning	
in	Azerbaijan	 has	 carried	 out	 continuous	 activities	 in	 this	 field	 and	 developed	
the	project	of	 the	Law	on	“Oil	Fund.”	Despite	all	 this,	 the	decision	of	 the	Fund	
to	spend	the	greatest	portion	of	 its	resources	obtained	during	 the	crisis	period	
indicates	to	 its	 tendency	to	solve	the	problem	of	 the	shortage	of	means	of	 the	
state	treasury	through	an	easier	way	under	an	unfavorable	economic	condition.	
When	taking	a	look	at	the	dynamics	of	SOFAZ	profitability	and	budget	transfers	
we	 come	up	with	 some	curious	outcomes.	Though	not	 observed	 in	 2007,	 the	
increase	of	budget	transfers	against	the	decrease	of	tension	in	2008	and	2009	
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is	the	problem	of	alarming	fiscal	tension.	Though	profitability	went	down	in	2008	
and	2009	compared	to	2007,	the	549%	increase	in	transfers	is	proof	of	our	point.	
The	increase	of	SOFAZ	payments	in	budget	incomes	especially	during	the	crisis	
year	denoted	that	the	global	crisis	did	not	bypass	Azerbaijan	and	the	government	
was	obliged	to	rely	on	the	resources	accumulated	in	the	oil	fund	and	treat	them	
as	 an	 income	 source.	The	 year	 of	 2010,	which	 is	 still	 impacted	 by	 the	 crisis,	
witnesses	the	continuation	of	the	alarming	tendency	both	in	the	state	budget	and	
oil	 fund	budget.	Now	the	fund	will	be	providing	50%	of	budget	 incomes.	Along	
with	this,	no	growth	is	expected	in	the	profitability	of	the	oil	fund	itself.
Budget	revenues	of	the	State	Oil	Fund	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	(SOFAZ)	
for	the	period	of	January	to	December	2009	reached	8,176.7	billion	manat,	while	
budget	 expenditures	 constituted	 5,294.5	 billion	manat.	 2009	 budget	 revenues	
and	expenditures	of	the	Fund	were	executed	accordingly:	97.8	percent	and	99.5	
percent.	Revenue	of	7,870.8	billion	manat	was	received	from	implementation	of	
oil	and	gas	agreements,	including	7,702.6	billion	manat	from	the	sale	of	profit	oil	
and	gas,	156.8	million	manat	from	Azerbaijan's	State	participation	share	in	the	
Heydar	Aliyev	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan	(BTC)	Main	Export	Pipeline,	8.9	million	manat	
as	transit	payments,	1.1	million	manat	as	acreage	payments,	0.8	million	manat	as	
bonus	payments	and	0.6	million	manat	from	sale	of	assets	received	from	foreign	
companies.	The	revenues	 from	managing	assets	of	 the	Fund	 for	 the	reporting	
period	amounted	to	305.9	million	manat.	The	Fund's	extra-budgetary	revenues	
related	to	the	revaluation	of	foreign	exchange	totaled	97.6	million	manat.	As	per	
the	2009	budget	of	the	Fund,	4,915.0	billion	manat	were	transferred	to	the	state	
budget.	The	expenditures	in	the	amount	of	89.9	million	manat	were	directed	to	
financing	of	improvement	of	social	condition	of	refugees	and	internally	displaced	
persons,	 130.0	million	manat	 and	 120.0	million	manat	were	 accordingly	 used	
for	 financing	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 Samur-Absheron	 irrigation	 system	 and	
financing	 construction	 of	 the	 Oghuz-Gabala-Baku	 water	 supply	 system.	 22.1	
million	manat	were	directed	to	financing	Baku-Tbilisi-Kars	railway	and	7.9	million	
manat	 to	 financing	 «The	 state	 program	on	 the	 education	 of	Azerbaijani	 youth	
abroad	 in	 the	 years	 2007-2015.»	 The	 Fund's	 administrative	 and	 operational	
expenses	 in	 this	 period	 were	 9.6	million	manat.	 The	 transfer	 from	 SOFAZ	 to	
the	2011	State	Budget	was	increased	to	9,203,200.0	thousand	manat	from	the	
previous	6,480,000.0	thousand	manat	in	July	201118.
18		http://www.oilfund.az
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Table 1. Dynamics of transfers from SOFAZ to state budget
Years
SOFAZ’s transfers to 
state budget (million 
AZN)
Growth 
dynamics
Share in 
state bud-
get
Share in SO-
FAZ’s expendi-
tures
2003 100 -- 8.2% 41%
2004 130 30.0% 8.6% 77%
2005 150 15.4% 7.2% 70%
2006 585 290.0% 15.6% 59.6%
2007 585 0.0% 9.7% 55.1%
2008 1100 88.0% 35.3% 88.5%
2009 4915 346.8% 40.4% 92.8%
2010 5915 20.3% 51.4% 90.5%
2011 9203 9.6% 58% 93%
Source: National Budget Group, author calculations
Since	the	establishment	of	SOFAZ,	its	revenues	amounted	to	$40	billion,	$20	
billion	of	which	has	been	spent.	Half	of	SOFAZ’s	revenues	were	maintained	for	
future	generations	in	accordance	with	SOFAZ’s	total	strategy.	SOFAZ’s	income	
from	bonuses	hit	0.8	million	manat,	from	dividends	on	the	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan	oil	
pipeline	-	156.8	million,	from	transit	payments	--	8.9	million	manat	in	2009.	About	
25	percent	of	revenues	in	the	oil	fund	must	be	kept	in	accordance	with	the	strategy	
of	a	long-term	oil	revenue	management,	approved	by	the	president	in	2004.	But	
so	far	the	fund	has	more	than	50	percent	of	revenue.	The	increase	in	transfers	to	
the	state	budget	from	the	oil	fund,	determined	at	the	amount	of	6.48	billion	manat	
in	2011,	is	associated	with	a	reduction	of	impact	of	rising	oil	prices	on	the	state	
budget.	Regardless	of	changes	in	oil	prices	and	foreign	exchange	rate,	we	must	
provide	the	state	budget	with	transfers	to	the	amount	of	6.48	billion	manat.	It	will	
ensure	the	stability	of	the	country’s	fiscal	policy	and	reaffirm	SOFAZ’s	role	as	a	
buffer.	The	oil	price	was	set	at	$60	per	barrel,	and	the	rate	of	dollar	for	the	next	
year	at	0.8	manat	to	form	the	budget	forecasts	for	2011.
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Source: National Budget Group, author calculations
If	the	oil	prices	and	expenses	of	the	Fund	remain	at	current	levels,	the	State	Oil	
Fund	can	accumulate	up	to	$50	billion.	Over	the	past	three	years,	the	resources	
of	SOFAZ	have	 increased	10	 times.	So	 far,	Azerbaijan	has	gained	about	 $40	
billion	from	oil	 revenues,	and	half	of	 these	funds	-	about	$20	billion	-	 is	stored	
in	the	SOFAZ.	Given	the	fact	that	in	the	next	15	years,	oil	revenues	amount	to	
about	$200	billion,	then	if	SOFAZ	will	save	half	of	these	revenues,	the	country	
will	have	revenues	of	$100	billion.	Due	to	increased	revenues	from	management	
of	Fund’s	assets,	 in	 the	 future,	 the	 level	 of	 transfers	 to	 the	public	 budget	 can	
remain	at	current	levels	due	to	revenues	from	asset	management.	SOFAZ	has	
received	 $1	 billion	 from	 the	 asset	 management	 up	 to	 now.	 With	 a	 minimum	
profitability	on	assets	placed	at	5	percent,	after	15	years	we	can	reach	the	level	
of	$6	billion	income	from	asset	management	per	year.	If	we	continue	to	adhere	
to	 these	principles	and	criteria,	after	 some	 time	 the	government	of	Azerbaijan	
will	be	able	to	keep	a	constant	level	of	transfers	at	the	expense	of	revenues	only	
from	the	management	at	current	levels.	SOFAZ	expects	its	revenues	to	exceed	
forecasts.	The	State	Oil	Fund	revenues	for	this	year	were	approved	at	5.96	billion	
manat,	and	expenditure	at	5.43	billion	manat;	that	is,	90	percent	of	revenues	is	
actually	planned	to	cover	expenditure.	A	very	conservative	approach	was	taken	
in	preparing	budget	forecasts.	The	budget	of	the	Fund	was	made	by	calculating	
the	price	of	oil	at	$45	per	barrel.	However,	since	the	beginning	of	 the	year,	oil	
prices	range	between	$70-80	per	barrel,	and	this	confirms	the	fact	that	90	percent	
of	additional	revenues	will	be	kept.	The	average	price	for	Azerbaijani	oil	in	2009	
was	$56	dollars	per	barrel,	while	in	2008	it	totaled	$70	per	barrel.		As	a	result	of	
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2009,	State	Oil	Fund	expenditures	amounted	to	5.29	billion	manat	compared	to	
4.29	billion	manat	 in	2008.	 In	2007	this	figure	amounted	to	1.06	billion	manat,	
and	in	2006	-	981.4	million	manat.	During	2001-2009,	the	transfers	from	SOFAZ	
to	the	public	budget	amounted	to	10.26	billion	manat.	The	government	has	plans	
to	 diversify	 funds	 in	 subsequent	 years	 in	 riskier	 assets,	 but	 one	 of	 the	 most	
important	 investments	 is	 education.	The	 fund	 is	 financing	 a	 special	 education	
program	allowing	Azerbaijani	citizens	to	receive	an	education	in	the	world’s	best	
universities.	 
SOFAZ’s durability in global turmoil
The	 global	 financial	 crisis	 affected	 the	 activity	 of	 SOFAZ	 only	 in	 view	
of	 its	 income	 cut.	 The	 State	Oil	 Fund	 does	 not	 face	 any	 difficulty	 due	 to	 the	
global	 financial	 crisis.	 SOFAZ	 held	 a	 conservative	 and	 protective	 position	 by	
foreknowing	the	crisis.	Therefore,	the	crisis	only	affected	the	fund's	 income.	At	
present	many	countries'	funds	have	lost	billions.	There	are	funds	which	devalued	
by	 30	 percent,	 but	 SOFAZ	 completed	 2008	 with	 income	 worth	 $300	 million.	
Therefore,	 there	will	not	be	any	problems	with	financing	projects	and	 it	will	be	
implemented	as	part	of	 the	budget.	The	SOFAZ	 funds	were	deposited	 in	high	
qualitative	securities.	These	 include	securities	of	 the	government,	 international	
organizations,	World	Bank,	Asian	Development	Bank,	and	European	Bank	 for	
Reconstruction	and	Development,	and	these	securities	can	be	sold	at	a	high	price	
at	any	time.	Due	to	SOFAZ’s	position,	 if	 the	necessity	arises	today,	Azerbaijan	
can	exchange	$10	billion	deposited	in	securities	into	money.
International	rating	agency	Standard	&	Poor's	says	in	its	outlook	«How	does	
Azerbaijan	react	to	the	world	economic	crisis?»	that	if	prices	for	oil	increase	and	
expenditures	do	not	exceed	the	oil	price	level	stipulated	in	the	state	budget,	then	
by	the	end	of	2009	the	volume	of	finances	in	State	Oil	Fund	of	Azerbaijan	will	grow	
up	to	$11.5-12	bln	versus	$11.2	bln	in	December	2008.	As	for	April	1,	2009,	this	
figure	decreased	to	$10.9	bln	compared	to	$11.2	bln	in	December	2008.	«In	this	
case	the	positive	balance	of	the	Azerbaijan	state	sector	in	2009	can	increase	up	
to	32.3	percent	of	GDP,»	the	outlook	says.	The	agency	claims	that	“the	Fund	is	a	
kind	of	buffer	allowing	solution	of	problems	appearing	in	the	country's	budget	and	
giving	the	government	a	possibility	to	follow	a	counter-cycling	policy.”	The	report	
also	says,	«the	Fund's	finances	are	invested	in	the	non-oil	sector	and	can	promote	
economy	diversification	and	reduce	its	dependence	on	the	oil	and	gas	industry.»	
Analysts	of	Standard&Poor’s	believe	SOFAZ	can	promote	reduction	of	inflation	
caused	by	 a	 large	 flow	of	 hard	 currency	 as	 a	way	of	 investing	 «superfluous»	
money	outside	of	Azerbaijan.
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Source: National Budget Group, author calculations
Even	if	the	financial	crisis	has	affected	the	profitability	of	SOFAZ,	3.79	percent	
is	not	a	bad	figure	in	such	circumstances.	SOFAZ	has	proven	that	it	has	come	
out	of	 the	global	financial	crisis	without	 losses.	The	financial	crisis	 is	over	and	
an	economic	crisis	is	starting.	SOFAZ	will	not	provide	a	mandate	to	new	foreign	
managers	to	handle	its	funds.	On	the	contrary,	consultations	are	already	underway	
with	the	current	management,	who	will	be	told	to	be	more	responsible	about	their	
obligations.	They	will	 be	 offered	 to	 diversify	 their	 portfolio	with	more	 lucrative	
financial	instruments.	Due	to	the	global	financial	process,	the	yield	from	SOFAZ	
funds	managed	by	foreigners	aside	from	the	WB	Treasury	was	close	to	zero	last	
year.	The	 foreign	managers	department	 runs	about	 $20	million,	 excluding	 the	
WB	Treasury's	 funds.	 	The	 few	 foreign	asset	management	companies	SOFAZ	
engaged	 included	Clariden	Leu	and	Deutsche	Asset	Management.	Earlier,	 the	
Fund	had	made	plans	 to	expand	 the	 list	 of	external	managers	 to	an	 increase	
in	 the	 fund's	 stock	 portfolio.	 The	 head	 of	 SOFAZ	 said	 the	 fund's	 investment	
policies	will	be	 reviewed,	and	SOFAZ	funds	will	be	diversified	with	more	 long-
term	instruments,	including	shares.	
Because	of	 the	uncertain	situation	 in	global	financial	markets,	SOFAZ	has	
refused	to	invest	its	resources	in	highly	profitable	and	risky	financial	instruments,	
particularly	in	shares,	in	2010.	Today	an	uncertain	economic	situation	still	covers	
the	world,	 so	we	expect	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	 situation	 in	world	markets	 to	
diversify	our	 investment	portfolio.	Earlier	 the	World	Bank	offered	Azerbaijan	 to	
reconsider	its	investment	policy	and	invest	into	more	risky	financial	instruments.	
Such	 long-term	 investments	 for	 a	 period	 of	 10-20	 years	 have	always	 justified	
themselves,	as	the	return	on	them	is	higher	than	on	bonds.	In	a	short	period	of	
time	the	situation	is	usually	resolved	and	the	stock	management	revenues	rise	
a	number	of	 times.	Before	 transition	 to	such	an	 investment	policy,	 the	country	
must	be	ready	for	any	changes	in	stock	prices.	So	far	SOFAZ	has	been	pursuing	
a	conservative	investment	policy,	because	a	platform	for	management	of	funds	
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was	being	formed	during	that	period.	However,	it	is	high	time	to	invest	in	more	
sophisticated	financial	instruments.	They	will	give	more	revenues	to	the	country.	
SOFAZ	announced	its	plans	to	expand	the	stock	portfolio,	but	 they	have	been	
postponed	due	to	the	global	processes.	This	decision	was	correct,	as	evidenced	
by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 crisis	 has	 had	 no	 impact	 on	 SOFAZ	 revenues,	 though	
stock	prices	fell	by	nearly	50	percent.	When	the	crisis	slows	down,	SOFAZ	will	
reconsider	its	investment	policy	before	the	end	of	2009	or	beginning	of	2010	and	
will	invest	funds	in	securities	of	the	companies	which	decreased	their	stock	prices	
but	are	not	close	to	bankruptcy.
The	 volatility	 of	 the	 dollar	 and	 the	 euro	 since	early	 2010	has	affected	 the	
amount	of	assets	of	SOFAZ.	The	income	and	assets	continue	to	increase.	The	
fund's	assets	amounted	to	$14.9	billion	in	early	2010.	Now	their	volume	exceeds	
$16	billion.	Despite	the	increase	in	assets,	SOFAZ	has	no	plans	to	expand	the	
list	of	 foreign	managers.	Petroleum	Fund	cooperates	with	 the	program	RAMP	
(Reserve	Assets	 Management	 Program).	 Currently,	 the	World	 Bank	 Treasury	
Management	has	$114	million.	RAMP	has	been	 in	operation	 for	more	 than	40	
years.	SOFAZ	assets	as	of	January	1,	2010	increased	32.8	percent	compared	to	
early	2009.	They	hit	11	966.5	million	manat	(14	900.4	million).	SOFAZ's	assets	at	
the	moment	of	its	creation	in	1999	amounted	to	$271	million.	
SOFAZ,	together	with	the	International	Finance	Corporation	(IFC),	the	Dutch	
PGGM,	the	Korea	Investment	Corporation	and	the	Saudi	Arabian	Foundation,	will	
invest	 in	the	newly-created	African,	Latin	American	and	Caribbean	Fund	under	
the	auspices	of	the	IFC.	The	new	fund	is	expected	to	accumulate	$1	billion	and	
these	 funds	will	be	managed	by	an	 IFC	asset	management	company.	This,	 in	
turn,	will	 create	 conditions	 to	 improve	 the	 capacity	of	 developing	 countries	by	
investing	in	investor	equities	such	as	sovereign	and	pension	funds	with	the	IFC.	
Under	the	first	tranche,	the	fund	will	manage	$600	million,	of	which	$100	million	
will	be	provided	by	SOFAZ.	These	investments	are	an	important	step	in	building	
the	fund's	long-term	strategy	to	improve	and	protect	the	wealth	of	the	state.	In	
2009,	the	crisis	year,	due	to	a	sharp	reduction	in	oil	prices	in	the	world	market,	
the	 Fund	 accumulated	 14	 billion	 900	million	 dollars	 of	 income,	 instead	 of	 the	
expected	approximately	$18	billion	in	assets.
SOFAZ’s transparency and accountability
SOFAZ	 represents	 Azerbaijan	 in	 the	 Extractive	 Industries	 Transparency	
Initiative	(EITI).		Thus,	the	country	has	the	opportunity	to	become	the	first	full	EITI	
member.	Additionally,	one	of	the	priorities	for	SOFAZ	is	to	assist	other	countries	
in	 the	 EITI.	 Kazakhstan,	 Yemen,	 Mongolia,	 Nigeria	 and	 other	 countries	 have	
applied	to	Azerbaijan	in	this	connection.	EITI	unites	26	members.	Azerbaijan	has	
an	opportunity	 to	 further	 improve	the	extractive	 industry	accountability	system.	
The	 multi-stakeholders	 group	 (consisting	 of	 SOFAZ	 and	 foreign	 companies)	
and	 the	NGO	Coalition	 have	 held	meetings	 to	 discuss	 possible	 changes	 and	
improvements	in	EITI.	EITI	includes	all	extractive	industries.	Accountability	covers	
not	only	the	oil-and-gas	industry,	but	also	all	types	of	extractive	industries.	In	line	
with	queue	principles,	companies	involved	in	extractive	industries	will	pay	for	the	
audit.	Deloitte	developed	the	10th	EITI	report	on	2008	outcomes.	Deloitte	held	
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audits	for	2003,	2004,	2005	and	the	first	half	of	2006;	AGN	Mak	Azerbaijan	LTD	
(part	of	Accountants	Global	Network)	developed	a	report	on	the	first	half	of	2005.	
Moore	Stephens	designed	reports	for	2006	and	2007	and	the	first	half	of	2008.	
Ernst	&	Young	Holdings	(CIS)	B.V.	was	appointed	as	the	auditor	of	the	Fund's	
financial	statements	for	2010,	2011,	and	2012	by	the	president	of	Azerbaijan.	
As	 an	 independent	 auditing	 and	 financial	 control	 body,	 The	 Chamber	 of	
Accounts	must	inform	the	society	about	the	results	of	the	budgetary	expenditure	
checkups	 in	 accordance	 with	 Clause	 6.0.3	 of	 the	 national	 law	 on	 the	 Main	
Principles	of	Information.	It	has	to	take	into	account	that	SOFAZ	is	Azerbaijan’s	
largest	financial	institution	managing	public	funds9.	
International	tools	have	also	been	developed	to	measure	accountability	and	
transparency	of	sovereign	wealth	 funds,	 including	SOFAZ.	One	of	 them	 is	 the	
Linaburg-Maduell	 Transparency	 Index	which	was	 developed	 at	 the	 Sovereign	
Wealth	 Fund	 Institute	 by	 Carl	 Linaburg	 and	 Michael	 Maduell.	 The	 Linaburg-
Maduell	 transparency	 index	 is	 a	 method	 of	 rating	 transparency	 in	 respect	 to	
sovereign	wealth	 funds.	Pertaining	 to	government-owned	 investment	 vehicles,	
where	there	have	been	concerns	of	unethical	agendas,	calls	have	been	made	to	
the	larger	“opaque”	or	non-transparent	funds	to	show	their	intentions.	As	of	March	
2008,	 the	Government	 Pension	 Fund-Global	 of	 Norway	 ranks	 second	 among	
the	largest	sovereign	wealth	funds	with	approximately	US$	380	billion;	this	fund	
also	ranks	among	the	highest	in	transparency.	Norway	currently	leads	the	way	in	
reducing	the	need	for	a	code	of	conduct,	possibly	to	the	benefit	of	all	sovereign	
investors.	This	index	of	rating	transparency	was	developed	around	this	fund,	as	
it	is	known	to	be	the	pinnacle	of	clear	investment	intentions.	
Source: http://www.swfinstitute.org 
9  http://www.turan.az/Default_en.asp 
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This	index	is	based	on	ten	essential	principles	that	depict	sovereign	wealth	
fund	transparency	to	the	public.	The	following	principles	each	add	one	point	of	
transparency	to	the	index	rating.	The	index	is	an	ongoing	project	of	the	Sovereign	
Wealth	Fund	Institute.	The	minimum	rating	a	fund	can	receive	is	a	1;	however,	the	
Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	Institute	recommends	a	minimum	rating	of	8	in	order	to	
claim	adequate	transparency.	Transparency	ratings	may	change	as	funds	release	
additional	 information.	 There	 are	 different	 levels	 of	 depth	 in	 regards	 to	 each	
principle;	 judgment	of	 these	principles	 is	 left	 to	 the	discretion	of	 the	Sovereign	
Wealth	Fund	Institute.	Principles	of	the	Linaburg	-Maduell	Transparency	Index	are	
the	following:	the	fund	provides	history	including	the	reason	for	creation,	origins	
of	 wealth,	 and	 government	 ownership	 structure;	 the	 fund	 provides	 up-to-date	
independently	audited	annual	reports;	the	fund	provides	ownership	percentage	of	
company	holdings,	and	geographic	locations	of	holdings;	the	fund	provides	total	
portfolio	market	value,	 returns,	and	management	compensation;	 fund	provides	
guidelines	 in	 reference	 to	 ethical	 standards,	 investment	 policies,	 and	enforcer	
of	 guidelines;	 fund	 provides	 clear	 strategies	 and	 objectives;	 if	 applicable,	 the	
fund	clearly	identifies	subsidiaries	and	contact	information;	if	applicable,	the	fund	
identifies	external	managers;	the	fund	manages	its	own	web	site;	the	fund	provides	
a	main	office	location	address	and	contact	information	such	as	telephone	and	fax.	
As	you	see	below,	Azerbaijan,	Kazakhstan	and	Russia	obtained	different	scores	
pertaining	 to	 the	 Linaburg-Maduell	 transparency	 index.	The	 respective	 scores	
are	9	for	Azerbaijan,	5	for	Russia,	and	2	for	Kazakhstan.	Of	course,	this	is	a	result	
of	 the	willingness	 of	 countries	 (governments)	 to	 disclose	 information	 about	 (i)	
scale	of	the	fund,	(ii)	learning	and	harmonization	with	transparency	tools,	and	(iii)	
cooperation	with	suitable	 regional	and	global	organizations	and	 initiatives	 (like	
EITI).	The	second	point	means	that	it	is	more	complicated	for	Russia	to	disclose	
financial	 reports	of	 the	National	Welfare	Fund,	which	accumulated	$162.5	bln,	
than	Azerbaijan’s	State	Oil	Fund	with	$21	bln.
SOFAZ and civil society sector
The	experience	of	interaction	between	the	Fund	and	civil	sector	has	a	unique	
sense.	A	well-known	EITI	 initiative	 is	 a	main	 factor	 here.	 Because	 of	 EITI,	 in	
the	last	7	years	SOFAZ	gained	valuable	experience	of	cooperation	with	the	civil	
sector	 of	Azerbaijan,	 which	 ultimately	 improved	 the	 image	 of	 the	 Fund	 in	 the	
eyes	of	both	the	local	community	and	the	world	community.	It	should	be	noted	
that	of	more	than	30	countries	involved	in	EITI,	perhaps	only	in	Azerbaijan	the	
Foundation	acts	as	a	stakeholder.	As	a	rule,	 in	other	countries,	 this	function	 is	
performed	by	the	relevant	ministry	in	the	mining	sector.	In	this	sense,	Foundation	
attachment	to	public	operation	can	be	estimated	as	a	very	wise	and	far-sighted	
decision.	The	Fund,	as	a	newly	established	agency,	without	having	 the	ballast	
of	 the	Soviet	past	and	numbed	bureaucracy,	can	quite	comfortably	fit	 into	 the	
EITI	rules	and	procedures.		In	its	turn,	EITI	has	brought	and	continues	to	bring	a	
much-needed	positive	reputation	score	to	the	Fund.	
In	Azerbaijan,	as	a	former	Soviet	country	which	gained	national	independence	
only	19	years	ago,	there	is	still	a	sense	of	discomfort	about	establishing	an	active	
dialogue	between	the	authorities	and	civil	sector.	In	some	spheres	civil	society	
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activity	 is	evaluated	as	harmful.	Lack	of	effective	 interaction	of	authorities	with	
the	non-government	sector,	many	public	officials’	misunderstanding	of	NGOs	in	
the	current	conditions,	and	finally	the	weak	capacity	of	the	knowledge	and	skills	
of	the	civil	sector--	in	a	sense,	the	politicization	of	NGOs--	are	the	main	obstacles	
in	the	creation	of	a	regime	of	full	and	effective	dialogue.	Against	this	background,	
the	positive	fact	is	unusually	active	work	of	the	government	in	EITI,	the	essence	
of	which	involves	the	work	of	 its	three	supporters	 in	a	single	multilateral	group	
(government,	business	and	civil	sector).		In	2004,	a	state	government	panel	on	
EITI	was	established	by	a	special	decision	of	the	Cabinet	of	Ministers	and	the	Fund	
was	determined	by	a	responsible	government	agency.	We	can’t	say	that	during	
this	period	the	process	of	the	Fund’s	partnerships	with	NGOs	(in	Azerbaijan	this	
NGO	coalition	plays	role	of	«increasing	transparency	in	the	extractive	sector»)	
has	 developed	 smoothly.	 There	were	many	 discussions	 about	 EITI	 prospects	
and	 the	nature	of	 interaction	on	ensuring	 transparency	 in	 the	extractive	sector	
between	 government	 and	 NGOs.	 Even	 today	 parties	 still	 have	 a	 number	 of	
disagreements	regarding	information	detailing	EI	companies’	payments,	as	well	
as	 the	 role	 of	NGOs	 in	 this	 issue.На	латинице	NGOs	 still	 have	 a	 number	 of	
complaints	and	dissatisfactions	related	to	the	government	and	particularly	with	
EI	companies’	work.	But	 the	fact	remains	that	EITI	 is	one	of	 the	few	platforms	
where	active	interaction	between	government	and	NGOs	has	concrete	positive	
results.	The	Fund,	thanks	to	EITI,	has	already	managed	to	recruit	and	gradually	
increase	the	potential	for	successful	interaction	with	the	civilian	sector,	which	has	
a	positive	effect	in	general	for	all	its	activities	in	terms	of	working	with	the	public.	
But	along	with	this,	there	is	an	exigency	for	mutual	cooperation	of	the	Fund	with	
the	civil	sector	in	organization	of	monitoring	of	investment	projects	in	the	domestic	
economy	financed	by	the	Fund.	There	are	many	gaps	and	even	legislative	cases	
in	this	area.	For	example,	the	civil	sector	still	doesn’t	have	a	clear	answer	to	the	
question	of	which	authority	is	responsible	for	efficient	and	transparent	spending	
of	funds	for	Oguz-Gabala-Baku	water	supply	system	and	other	similar	projects.	
According	 to	 the	Order	 dated	 February	 24,	 2006,	№	 42	 “Azersu”	 Joint	 Stock	
Company	 was	 entrusted	 with	 construction,	 management	 and	 implementation	
of	customer’s	functions	for	“Oguz-Gabala-Baku”	WSS	project	by	the	Cabinet	of	
Ministers	of	Azerbaijan	Republic.	In	January	01,	2010	SOFAZ	appropriated	funds	
totaling	547.4	million	manat	and	an	additional	200	million	this	year	for	financing	
the	 project.	 Repeated	 requests	 to	 the	 Fund	 about	 enabling	monitoring	 of	 this	
expensive	project	yield	no	positive	results.	The	standard	answer	of	management	
is	that	the	Fund	is	not	responsible	for	the	target	and	the	transparent	use	of	funds	
in	these	projects,	so	it	is	better	to	appeal	to	public	operators,	in	this	case	the	state	
water	company	Azersu.	Obviously,	this	answer	can’t	suit	an	NGO.	It	is	also	clear	
that	 the	promotion	of	NGOs	 in	monitoring	 is	 in	 the	 interests	of	 the	Fund	also,	
which	is	high	in	the	ratings	of	good	and	transparent	governance	and	tries	to	hold	
this	position.
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Conclusion
The	 management	 approach	 envisions	 the	 full	 or	 partial	 reserve	 of	 the	
revenues	when	exploitation	levels	of	natural	resources	are	on	the	upswing	and	
when	the	raw	materials	command	high	prices.	The	approach	also	stipulates	the	
use	of	the	reserved	monies	in	periods	of	reduced	production	or	a	fall	in	prices,	
that	 is,	 pre-distribution	 of	 budget	 resources	 over	 time.	 This	 kind	 of	 revenue	
management	is	useful	for	moderating	state	expenditures	and	ensuring	long-range	
macro-economic	 stability.	 In	 the	 most	 concise	 form,	 the	 functions	 of	 SOFAZ,	
without	 exception,	may	 be	 ranked	 as	 follows:	 accumulating	 income	 for	 future	
generations;	ensuring	macro-economic	and	financial	stability;	ensuring	 liquidity	
of	the	state;	raising	transparency	of	state	expenditures;	more	accurately	reflecting	
the	base	level	of	the	budget	deficit;	fighting	corruption;	and	protecting	the	monies	
from	politicians.	Thus,	with	 respect	 to	 the	 importance	of	 the	mission	of	 the	oil	
funds,	it	must	be	mentioned	that	many	of	them	continue	to	suffer	from	ineffective	
management	 and	especially	 from	 the	obsolete	macroeconomic	 instruments	 in	
the	hands	of	the	government.
The	 efficiency	 gap	 in	 the	 management	 of	 oil	 money	 in	 Azerbaijan	 is	
enormous.	Improvements	need	to	be	made	in	the	oil	money	accumulation,	saving	
and	 spending	 processes	 so	 that	 this	 short-term	 national	 resource	 can	 better	
serve	the	long-term	development	needs	of	the	nation.	The	necessary	changes	
include	redefining	and	streamlining	 the	Oil	Fund	 in	parallel	with	 improvements	
in	 budgetary	 and	 public	 investment	 work.	 Sustainable	 long-term	 development	
needs	to	be	a	major	focus	and	the	only	criterion	for	the	use	of	oil	money,	as	with	
any	public	resource.	The	short-term	availability	of	this	resource,	however,	makes	
the	issue	more	subtle	and	brings	additional	concerns.	The	need	for	sustainable	
long-term	development	makes	the	macroeconomic	concerns	a	priority.	This	is	to	
say	that	the	nation’s	strategy	for	the	use	of	oil	money	needs	to	focus	on	the	long-
term	growth	of	GDP,	fiscal	stability	and	independence,	and	monetary	concerns	in	
order	to	avoid	inflation,	account	for	the	capacity	of	the	public	sector	and	prevent	
the	creation	of	an	environment	conducive	to	corruption.	The	strategy	must	clearly	
delineate	the	share	and	dynamics	of	national	consumption,	public	investments,	
government	expenditures	and	 trade	with	other	countries	with	 the	hydrocarbon	
resources	deducted	and	oil	money	added	to	the	national	assets.	A	good	strategy	
will	measure	and	use	the	oil	money	not	for	separate	consumption	expenditures	or	
investment	projects,	but	in	line	with	all	public	spending,	while	accumulating	and	
saving	that	oil	money	separately.	
Macroeconomic	development	strategies	flow	into	the	financial	strategy	of	the	
Oil	Fund	as	an	institution	that	accumulates	and	saves	money.	Once	the	extent	of	
the	application	of	oil	money	is	determined	to	reflect	the	nation’s	the	most	pressing	
long-term	 interests,	 then	 strategies	 for	 portfolio	 investments,	 transfers	 to	 the	
state	budget	and	public	investment	projects	must	be	adopted	and	implemented.	
The	Fund	 is	not	directly	 responsible	 for	ensuring	economic	growth,	supporting	
macroeconomic	equilibrium,	or	deficit	of	public	finances.	In	this	sense,	the	scope	
and	range	of	action,	mutual	liabilities	between	government	agencies,	and	finally,	
fear	of	 the	 fund’s	 failure	of	 the	plan	 is	much	smaller	 than,	 for	example,	 in	 the	
Finance	Ministry.	
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The	 improvements	 regarding	 the	 development	 of	 the	 institutional	 and	
legal	 framework	 will	 address	 and	 make	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 proposed	
financial	 strategy	 for	 the	Oil	 Fund	 possible.	This	will	 include	 the	 development	
of	instructions,	guidelines	and	standards	for	portfolio	investments	as	well	as	the	
rules	and	standards	 for	 transfers	 from	 the	Fund	 to	 the	state	budget	and	other	
domestic	 public	 and	 private	 uses.	 The	 recommended	 institutional	 and	 legal	
improvements	are,	on	the	other	hand,	based	on	the	existing	situation	and	current	
practices,	and	have	political	 feasibility	 implications	 for	 the	suggested	changes,	
which	 are	more	 extensively	 discussed	 in	 the	 analysis	 section	 of	 this	 paper.	A	
strategy	is	 important	for	creating	the	rules	for	the	effective	management	of	the	
Fund.	Additionally,	it	is	important	to	take	into	consideration	all	impacted	monetary	
and	fiscal	factors	during	allocations,	as	well	as	transfers	from	funds.	There	is	a	
simple	 reason	why	natural	 resource	 revenue	 funds	don’t	 usually	 contribute	 to	
better	 fiscal	 policy	 in	 those	 countries	 which	 are	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 oil-gas	
exports.	The	reason	 is	 that	 the	economic	considerations	 that	are	usually	used	
to	motivate	funds	support	only	a	certain	optimal	fiscal	policy,	and	are	silent	on	
what	is	the	right	institutional	framework	for	implementing	that	policy.	However,	the	
political	economy	of	power	rivalry	can	create	incentives	for	rapid	overspending	
of	natural	 resource	 revenues	 relative	 to	 the	 ideal	 levels	of	expenditure	of	any	
given	government.	These	adverse	effects	are	strongest	when	political	divisions	
are	 deep,	 when	 institutions	 and	 policies	 are	 otherwise	 weak,	 where	 political	
and	economical	power	are	concentrated,	where	 transparency	 is	comparatively	
limited,	and	where	there	are	risks	of	rapid	changes	of	government.	The	first	item	
to	consider	is	how	much	of	the	oil	money	to	save,	i.e.	accrue	in	the	Fund,	and	
how	much	 to	 consume,	 i.e.	 allocate	 for	 state	 budget	 expansion.	This	 is	 not	 a	
consume or invest question,	however,	because	the	elements	of	the	state	budget	
may	also	suggest	investments	in	the	future.	Instead,	it	is	a	question	of	how	much	
money	from	the	current	economy	needs	to	be	taken	and	saved	in	the	Fund.	This	
requires	an	analysis	of	where	that	money	will	provide	the	best	long-term	benefit	for	
society.	Regarding	suitable	calculations	(taking	into	consideration	budget	income	
and	SOFAZ	 active’s	 forecasting),	 empirical	 evidence	 and	 expert	 opinions,	 we	
presume	that	transfers	from	SOFAZ	to	the	state	budget	in	Azerbaijan	shouldn’t	
exceed	30%	of	the	total	SOFAZ	assets	regarding	its	own	budget	receipts.	
The	 status	 of	 Oil	 Fund	 of	 Azerbaijan	 is	 off-budget	 organization,	 such	 as	
the	State	Social	Protection	Fund.		In	this	sense,	the	reflection	of	the	budget	of	
SOFAZ,	 its	discussion	and	approval	by	parliament,	 along	with	 the	Foundation	
for	Social	Protection’s	annual	budget	 in	overview	of	 the	country,	 is	completely	
logical.	But	at	the	same	time,	SOFAZ	is	a	special	government	organization	that	
does	not	fit	 into	the	traditional	structure	of	public	administration	of	 the	country.
Прослушать	Peculiarities	of	the	operation	and	management	of	this	structure	are	
explained	by	the	following	circumstances.		На	латиницеRegulations	of	the	Fund	
clearly	predetermined	sources	of	income,	which	are	all	payments	from	the	oil	and	
gas	sector	of	the	country,	except	the	taxes	that	accumulated	in	the	state	budget.	
Thus,	 the	Fund	does	not	work	with	 taxpayers	 in	 their	 traditional	 form,	but	only	
accumulates	the	non-tax	part	of	payments,	the	main	one	of	which	is	the	profit	of	
oil,	part	of	the	tax	payments	which	fall	to	the	share	of	the	PSA	contracts.		Indirectly,	
this	fact	means	that	the	Fund	is	not	responsible	for	the	improper	accumulation	
of	 taxes.	As	noted	by	 the	government,	 reduction	of	 income	of	 the	Fund	was	a	
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result	of	economic	downtown	in	the	world	market,	expressed	by	a	sharp	drop	in	
oil	prices.	
In	the	country,	the	Fund	has	only	a	narrowly	delineated	range	of	partners	on	
the	state	management	system	which	it	contacts	by	financial	flows.	In	the	annual	
budget	 of	 the	Fund	 approved	 by	 the	Parliament,	 as	 a	 rule	 the	 lion's	 share	 of	
expenses	is	intended	to	be	transferred	to	the	state	budget,	which	consequently	
makes	 the	Ministry	of	Finance	 its	main	financial	partner.	The	Fund	works	only	
with	selected	government	agencies	and	in	this	sense	it	is	not	fully	incorporated	
into	the	domestic	state	control	system	like	other	state	agencies.	However,	there	
remains	a	huge	responsibility	for	the	Fund	to	ensure	the	effective	management	of	
the	Fund's	assets,	which,	incidentally,	is	related	to	its	activities	abroad.	This	factor	
underlines	 the	 importance	 of	 focusing	 primarily	 on	 the	 global	 financial	market	
situation.	 Simultaneously,	 this	 same	 factor	 underlines	 some	 of	 the	 concerns	
regarding	the	Fund's	management	of	the	increasing	funds	spent	in	the	domestic	
economy.	After	all,	it	is	obvious	that	for	effective	management	of	Fund	assets,	i.e.,	
greater	profitability,	SOFAZ	is	interested	in	minimizing	the	expenditure	of	funds	
within	the	country,	in	order	to	operate	with	a	large	amount	in	foreign	investment	
markets.	
93                                                                                                                                  
Recommendations 
1.	 SOFAZ’s	activities	should	be	regulated	with	law	status	regulatory	acts;
2.	 Government	should	create	opportunity	 for	civil	society	organizations	 to	
take	part	in	SOFAZ’s	Board;
3.	 Fiscal	rules	regulating	transfers	from	SOFAZ	to	the	state	budget	should	
stipulate	conditions	and	limitations	for	such	transfers;
4.	 The	Chamber	of	Accounts	should	be	entrusted	with	obligations	to	audit	
SOFAZ’s	accounts;
5.	 SOFAZ	 has	 to	 frame	 new	 strategy	 encompassing	 long-term	 asset	
management	and	indices	issues;
6.	 The	 Government	 should	 link	 SOFAZ’s	 asset	 management	 policy	 with	
general	fiscal	and	macroeconomic	policy.	
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Addendum 1. SOFAZ (Azerbaijan) compliance with Santiago principles
Principles In Azerbaijan 
GAPP	1.	Principle 
The	legal	framework	for	the	SWF	should	
be	sound	and	support	its	effective	opera-
tion	and	the	achievement	of	its	stated	
objective(s).	
GAPP	1.1	Subprinciple	The	legal	frame-
work	for	the	SWF	should	ensure	the	legal	
soundness	of	the	SWF	and	its	transac-
tions.	
GAPP	1.2	Subprinciple	The	key	features	
of	the	SWF's	legal	basis	and	structure,	as	
well	as	the	legal	relationship	between	the	
SWF	and	the	other	state	bodies,	should	
be	publicly	disclosed.	
Applicable
The	requirements	of	both	sub-principles	
have	been	fulfilled.	Public	awareness	on	
both	the	legal	base	and	the	structure	has	
been	provided	through	SOFAZ	web	site.	
Also	“Information	Policy”	including	the	
detailed	response	to	surveys	on	these	
issues	was	accepted	in	April	2007.	
GAPP	2.	Principle 
The	policy	purpose	of	the	SWF	should	be	
clearly	defined	and	publicly	disclosed.
Applicable
Indeed	there	are	arguments	about	the	
degree	to	which	the	Oil	Fund	is	reach-
ing	the	goals	set	(especially,	the	goal	of	
equal	distribution	of	oil	revenues	among	
generations).	However,	the	goals	have	
been	clearly	declared	and	are	not	hidden	
from	the	public.	
GAPP	3.	Principle 
Where	the	SWF's	activities	have	sig-
nificant	direct	domestic	macroeconomic	
implications,	those	activities	should	be	
closely	coordinated	with	the	domestic	
fiscal	and	monetary	authorities,	so	as	to	
ensure	consistency	with	the	overall	mac-
roeconomic	policies.
Not	applicable	
Given	the	increase	of	the	budget	trans-
fers	despite	the	decline	of	profitability	rate	
of	SOFAZ	assets	management	there	is	
need	to	review	the	coordination	of	fiscal	
and	macroeconomic	policies.	
GAPP	4.	Principle	There	should	be	clear	
and	publicly	disclosed	policies,	rules,	
procedures,	or	arrangements	in	relation	to	
the	SWF's	general	approach	to	funding,	
withdrawal,	and	spending	operations.	
Applicable
There	are	certain	concerns	in	this	field.	
The	condition	of	the	assets	in	the	banks	
that	SOFAZ	is	in	partnership	with	and	
the	non-accountability	of	the	investment	
projects	of	the	Fund	give	more	ground	to	
state	this.
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GAPP	5.	Principle 
The	relevant	statistical	data	pertaining	to	
the	SWF	should	be	reported	on	a	timely	
basis	to	the	owner,	or	as	otherwise	re-
quired,	for	inclusion	where	appropriate	in	
macroeconomic	data	sets.	
Applicable	
SOFAZ	provides	this	through	its	quarterly	
reports	and	web	site.	
GAPP	6.	Principle 
The	governance	framework	for	the	SWF	
should	be	sound	and	establish	a	clear	and	
effective	division	of	roles	and	responsibili-
ties	in	order	to	facilitate	accountability	and	
operational	independence	in	the	manage-
ment	of	the	SWF	to	pursue	its	objectives.	
Not	applicable
Though	the	management	system	of	
SOFAZ	is	sufficiently	effective	for	this	
principle,	the	fact	that	the	Supervisory	
Board	includes	no	civil	society	represen-
tative	causes	concern.	
GAPP	7.	Principle 
The	owner	should	set	the	objectives	of	
the	SWF,	appoint	the	members	of	its	
governing	body(ies)	in	accordance	with	
clearly	defined	procedures,	and	exercise	
oversight	over	the	SWF's	operations.	
SOFAZ’s	management	is	vested	with	
the	Executive	Director,	appointed	by	
and	accountable	to	the	President	of	the	
Republic	of	Azerbaijan.	SOFAZ’s	Execu-
tive	Director	as	a	chief	executive	officer	
is	vested	with	the	powers	to	be	a	legal	
representative	of	the	Fund,	organize	and	
conduct	business	of	the	Fund	including	
appointment	and	dismissal	of	employ-
ees,	management	and	disbursement	of	
the	assets	of	the	Fund	in	conformity	with	
the	rules	and	regulations	approved	by	
the	President	of	Azerbaijan.	http://www.
oilfund.az/en/content/4
GAPP	8.	Principle 
The	governing	body(ies)	should	act	in	
the	best	interests	of	the	SWF,	and	have	
a	clear	mandate	and	adequate	authority	
and	competency	to	carry	out	its	functions.	
Not	applicable
There	is	a	need	to	accept	a	law	on	Oil	
Funds	in	order	to	fulfill	this	principle.	
GAPP	9.	Principle 
The	operational	management	of	the	SWF	
should	implement	the	SWF’s	strategies	
in	an	independent	manner	and	in	accor-
dance	with	clearly	defined	responsibilities.	
Not	applicable
Particularly	the	fact	that	limitation	of	SO-
FAZ	transfers	to	the	budget	has	not	been	
determined	makes	it	impossible	for	its	
activities	to	fully	comply	with	its	strategy.
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GAPP	10.	Principle 
The	accountability	framework	for	the	
SWF's	operations	should	be	clearly	
defined	in	the	relevant	legislation,	charter,	
other	constitutive	documents,	or	manage-
ment	agreement
Not	applicable
There	is	a	need	for	an	improved	law	on	
Oil	Funds.	
GAPP	11.	Principle 
An	annual	report	and	accompany-
ing	financial	statements	on	the	SWF's	
operations	and	performance	should	be	
prepared	in	a	timely	fashion	and	in	ac-
cordance	with	recognized	international	
or	national	accounting	standards	in	a	
consistent	manner.	
Applicable
SOFAZ	reports	are	being	prepared	on	
time.	SOFAZ	also	prepares	its	financial	
reports	in	accordance	with	International	
Financial	Reporting	Standards	(IFRS).	
GAPP	12.	Principle 
The	SWF's	operations	and	financial	state-
ments	should	be	audited	annually	in	ac-
cordance	with	recognized	international	or	
national	auditing	standards	in	a	consistent	
manner.	
Applicable
SOFAZ	reports	are	audited	by	big	four	
international	audit	companies.	The	most	
recent	annual	report	was	audited	by	
Deloitte.	
GAPP	13.	Principle 
Professional	and	ethical	standards	should	
be	clearly	defined	and	made	known	to	
the	members	of	the	SWF's	governing	
body(ies),	management,	and	staff.
Not	applicable
SOFAZ	has	no	professional	and	ethical	
code	determined.	
GAPP	14.	Principle 
Dealing	with	third	parties	for	the	purpose	
of	the	SWF's	operational	management	
should	be	based	on	economic	and	finan-
cial	grounds,	and	follow	clear	rules	and	
procedures.
Not	applicable
GAPP	15.	Principle 
SWF	operations	and	activities	in	host	
countries	should	be	conducted	in	compli-
ance	with	all	applicable	regulatory	and	
disclosure	requirements	of	the	countries	
in	which	they	operate.	
Applicable
Certainly	SOFAZ	meets	all	the	agreed	re-
quirements	in	areas	where	it	implements	
its	investment	projects.	
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GAPP	16.	Principle 
The	governance	framework	and	objec-
tives,	as	well	as	the	manner	in	which	
the	SWF's	management	is	operationally	
independent	from	the	owner,	should	be	
publicly	disclosed.	
Applicable	
GAPP	17.	Principle 
Relevant	financial	information	regarding	
the	SWF	should	be	publicly	disclosed	to	
demonstrate	its	economic	and	financial	
orientation,	so	as	to	contribute	to	stabil-
ity	in	international	financial	markets	and	
enhance	trust	in	recipient	countries.	
Applicable	
SOFAZ	discloses	relevant	statistical	data	
in	this	regard.	It’s	due	to	this	fact	that	
Azerbaijan	was	among	the	top	5	on	Lina-
burg-Maduell	index	declared	in	the	fourth	
quarter	of	2009.	http://www.swfinstitute.
org/research/transparencyindex.php
GAPP	18.	Principle 
The	SWF's	investment	policy	should	
be	clear	and	consistent	with	its	defined	
objectives,	risk	tolerance,	and	investment	
strategy,	as	set	by	the	owner	or	the	gov-
erning	body(ies),	and	be	based	on	sound	
portfolio	management	principles.	
GAPP	18.1	Subprinciple	The	investment	
policy	should	guide	the	SWF's	financial	
risk	exposures	and	the	possible	use	of	
leverage.	
GAPP	18.2	Subprinciple	The	invest-
ment	policy	should	address	the	extent	to	
which	internal	and/or	external	investment	
managers	are	used,	the	range	of	their	ac-
tivities	and	authority,	and	the	process	by	
which	they	are	selected	and	their	perfor-
mance	monitored.	
GAPP	18.3	Subprinciple	A	description	of	
the	investment	policy	of	the	SWF	should	
be	publicly	disclosed.	
Applicable
SOFAZ	investment	policy	follows	these	
principles.	
GAPP	19.	Principle 
The	SWF's	investment	decisions	should	
aim	to	maximize	risk-adjusted	financial	
returns	in	a	manner	consistent	with	its	in-
vestment	policy,	and	based	on	economic	
and	financial	grounds
Applicable
SOFAZ	follows	a	very	careful	policy.	The	
fact	that	its	profitability,	though	small,	was	
noticeable	even	during	the	crisis	can	be	
explained	by	this	policy.
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GAPP	20.	Principle 
The	SWF	should	not	seek	or	take	advan-
tage	of	privileged	information	or	inappro-
priate	influence	by	the	broader	govern-
ment	in	competing	with	private	entities.
Applicable
GAPP	21.	Principle 
SWFs	view	shareholder	ownership	rights	
as	a	fundamental	element	of	their	equity	
investments'	value.	If	an	SWF	chooses	
to	exercise	its	ownership	rights,	it	should	
do	so	in	a	manner	that	is	consistent	with	
its	investment	policy	and	protects	the	
financial	value	of	its	investments.	The	
SWF	should	publicly	disclose	its	general	
approach	to	voting	securities	of	listed	enti-
ties,	including	the	key	factors	guiding	its	
exercise	of	ownership	rights.	
Applicable
These	principles	are	followed	during	SO-
FAZ	activities	and	its	investment	policy.	
GAPP	22.	Principle 
The	SWF	should	have	a	framework	that	
identifies,	assesses,	and	manages	the	
risks	of	its	operations.	
GAPP	22.1	Subprinciple	The	risk	man-
agement	framework	should	include	
reliable	information	and	timely	report-
ing	systems,	which	should	enable	the	
adequate	monitoring	and	management	of	
relevant	risks	within	acceptable	param-
eters	and	levels,	control	and	incentive	
mechanisms,	codes	of	conduct,	business	
continuity	planning,	and	an	independent	
audit	function.	
GAPP	22.2	Subprinciple	The	general	
approach	to	the	SWF’s	risk	management	
framework	should	be	publicly	disclosed.
Applicable
This	issue	at	SOFAZ	is	dealt	with	by	
the	Risk	Management	Department	that	
is	included	into	the	Asset	Management	
Group.	State	Oil	Fund	of	Azerbaijan	
Republic	(SOFAZ)	signed	an	agreement	
with	RiskMetrics	Solutions	Inc.	that	was	
the	winner	of	the	tender	on	software	for	
risk	assessment	system	conducted	in	
accordance	with	the	requirements	of	the	
Law	of	Azerbaijan	Republic	on	“State	
Procurements”	on	January	29,	2010.	
The	value	of	the	contract	on	risk	as-
sessment	system	is	USD	160	thousand	
annually.	The	duration	of	the	contract	is	
5	years.	The	system	is	considered	to	be	
implemented	within	6	months.	
	http://www.oilfund.az/az/news/267	
As	is	seen,	the	information	taken	from	
the	official	SOFAZ	website	confirms	that	
information	on	risk	assessment	and	man-
agement	is	disclosed	to	the	public	without	
any	problems.	
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GAPP	23.	Principle 
The	assets	and	investment	performance	
(absolute	and	relative	to	benchmarks,	if	
any)	of	the	SWF	should	be	measured	and	
reported	to	the	owner	according	to	clearly	
defined	principles	or	standards.
Applicable
SOFAZ	has	been	both	preparing	its	
reports	and	assessing	its	asset	and	
investment	activities	in	accordance	with	
International	Financial	Reporting	Stan-
dards.
GAPP	24.	Principle 
A	process	of	regular	review	of	the	
implementation	of	the	GAPP	should	be	
engaged	in	by	or	on	behalf	of	the	SWF.	
Not	applicable
No	such	opinion	in	this	regard	has	been	
stated	by	SOFAZ.
Addenda 2. Santiago Compliance Index
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Executive summary
Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	(SWF)	have	different	titles,	goals	and	rules,	but	they	
share	 the	underlying	objective	of	helping	governments	deal	with	 the	problems	
created	by	large	and	variable	revenues	from	energy	(or	other	commodity	related)	
sectors.	 In	 Kazakhstan,	 such	 a	 fund	 (the	 National	 Fund	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	
Kazakhstan	 (NFRK))	was	established	 in	2000,	when	 the	oil	prices	were	 rising	
and	an	economic	recovery	was	on	a	map	for	the	Kazakhstani	economy.	This	fund	
operates	as	both	a	stabilisation and a savings fund.	
The	 first	 test	 for	 the	NFRK	was	 the	 2007-2009	 financial	 crisis,	 where	 the	
NFRK	“saved”	the	economy	and	guaranteed	its	speedy	recovery.	It	is	important	
to	emphasize	the	proactive	stance	of	the	government	to	protect	some	key	sectors	
of	 the	 economy	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 implications	 to	 the	 local	 economy.	 The	
consequences	of	the	crisis	will	clearly	result	 in	changes	in	 investment	portfolio	
strategy	as	well	as	in	the	general	rules	and	principles	of	functioning	of	the	fund,	
although	 the	 full	 implications	 remain	 to	 be	 seen.	The	NFRK	has	not	 escaped	
the	effects	of	 the	global	downturn,	and	although	its	 total	assets	fall	as	a	result	
of	the	drop	in	value	in	its	investment,	it	is	likely	that	the	fund	will	remain	a	vitally	
important	source	of	capital	 in	the	international	financial	markets,	and	will	make	
important	investments	across	all	the	different	asset	classes	in	the	future.	
There	is	a	certain	concern	that	the	NFRK	is	not,	at	the	present	time,	a	part	of	
the	Santiago	principles	initiative	for	SWF.		It	is	of	paramount	importance	that	the	
government	of	Kazakhstan	produce	some	substitute	governance	guidelines	 to	
Santiago	principles	for	the	NFRK,	especially	with	regards	to	the	fund’s	investment	
strategy	in	the	years	ahead.
The	financial	crisis	has	shifted	the	emphasis	in	the	policy	of	the	NFRK	from	
issues	of	performance	at	the	firm	level	to	the	portfolio	strategy	and	the	investment	
horizon	of	NFRK.	 	 It	 is	understandable	 that	 the	consequence	of	 the	crisis	 is	a	
more	active	involvement	of	the	Kazakhstani	government	in	the	governance	of	the	
NFRK,	which	will	be	reflected	in	a	more	sensitive	attitude	to	the	social	needs	of	
the	Kazakhstani	citizens.		
The	challenge	ahead	for	the	Kazakhstani	economy	is	clear:	to	ensure	that	the	
economic	progress	initiated	by	the	seed	capital	of	hydrocarbon	development	prior	
to	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	proves	stable	and	sustained.	The	government	of	
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Kazakhstan	has	discussed	the	need	to	have	a	long-term	vision	and	determination	
in	 pursuing	 their	 policies	 of	 management	 of	 the	 oil	 revenues,	 which	 should	
contribute	to	the	sustainable	development.	
One	important	lesson	is	that	its	emphasis	on	liquid	external	savings	helped	
moderate	 the	domestic	boom	and	also	allowed	a	wholly	credible	 insurance	or	
collateral	role	during	the	crisis.	A	second	is	that	there	was	then	scope	–	at	least	
for	 a	 period	 –	 to	 use	 resources	 in	 the	 fund	 to	 help	 repair	 the	 damage	 to	 the	
domestic	 economy.	Time	will	 tell	 how	 efficient	 these	 latter	 involvements	 have	
been,	 and	also	how	 to	 restore	 the	 former	 insurance	 role	 by	building	up	 liquid	
foreign	assets	in	the	future.
But	under	all	options	for	its	investment	strategy,	the	case	made	in	this	paper	
is	the	core	importance	in	Kazakhstan	of	continuing	to	enhance	governance	and	
transparency	of	the	sovereign	wealth	fund	in	order	to	maximize	the	chances	of	
success.	Inevitably	this	limits	government	discretion	in	disposing	of	the	mineral	
wealth	of	the	nation.	It	is,	however,	essential	to	build	public	support	for	the	funds,	
and	 to	 leverage	 their	 economic	 impact	 through	 a	 strong	 influence	 on	market	
expectations.	
There	are	overall	recommendations	which	we	draw	from	the	analysis:
First	of	all,	 it	 is	crucial	that	in	the	future	the	government	will	be	determined	
to	 achieve	 the	 non-resource	 fiscal	 balance	 with	 the	 robust	 programme	 of	
diversification.	
Secondly,	it	would	be	beneficial	if	the	Kazakhstani	government	could	establish	
a	system	of	particular	indicators	for	the	non-resource	deficit	in	order	to	monitor	as	
well	as	to	reduce	resource	dependency.
Third,	the	fact	that	domestic	investment	for	economic	diversification	provides	
more	stability	and	economic	 resilience	should	be	 taken	 into	account	when	 the	
Kazakhstani	 government	 is	 designing	 the	 investment	 portfolio	 strategy	 of	 the	
NFRK	for	the	near	future.
Fourth,	although	Kazakhstan	did	not	accept	(no	one	from	the	officials	in	the	
Kazakhstani	 government	 was	 invited	 to	 Santiago)	 the	 Santiago	 Principles,	 a	
transparent	and	accountable	governance	structure	of	 the	NFRK	is	required	for	
the	future	success	of	the	policies	conducted	by	the	fund.		
Fifth,	well	managed	oil	wealth	would	be	central	 in	financing	these	reforms,	
and	at	the	same	time	it	would	be	important	not	to	misuse	the	NFRK	in	strategically	
oriented	investment	rather	than	commercial	investment.	
Sixth,	 in	 its	 investment	 strategy	 the	 NFRK	 has	 to	 arrive	 over	 time	 at	 a	
diversification	in	its	asset	allocation	which	would	correspond	to	the	longer	term	
needs	and	welfare	of	Kazakhstani	citizens.	
Finally,	at	the	present	time	Kazakhstan	already	has	a	history	in	designing	an	
effective	framework	for	managing	its	hydrocarbon	wealth;	however,	improvement	
in	the	petroleum	taxation	regime	would	be	required	as	an	additional	instrument	
in	managing	the	oil	and	gas	revenues,	namely	neutrality,	capture	of	rent,	stability	
and	 timing	 of	 revenue,	 progressivity	 and	 adaptability,	 administrative	 simplicity	
and	 enforceability	 as	 well	 as	 international	 competitiveness.	 The	 Kazakhstani	
government	needs	to	reassess	its	risk	preferences	and	its	willingness	to	share	
them	with	the	investors	in	the	oil	and	gas	sector	after	the	recent	crisis.	
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1. Context and importance of the problem1
Oil	revenues	offer	important	opportunities	to	enhance	economic	development.	
But	 they	 are	 also	 volatile,	 unpredictable,	 and	 ultimately	 exhaustible;	 and	 they	
can	thus	greatly	complicate	economic	management.	In	Kazakhstan,	the	starting	
assumption	must	be	that	resource	endowment	is	potentially	a	“blessing”	that	can	
help	overcome	transition	disruptions.	But	the	lesson	of	experience	elsewhere	is	
that	realizing	this	promise	–	and	avoiding	the	risk	of	natural	resources	becoming	a	
“curse”	–	is	crucially	dependent	on	policies,	including	a	commitment	to	enhanced	
policy	transparency.	
The	 recent	 literature	 on	 resource-rich	 economies	 supports	 the	 view	 that	
oil	and	gas	revenues	can	pose	problems	 for	policy-makers,	and	highlights	 the	
possibility	that	natural	resource	endowment	can	be	an	economic	curse	rather	than	
a	blessing	(Auty,	1998,	2006,	Gylfason,	2001;	Kalyuzhnova	2008,	Kalyuzhnova	
et.	el.,	2006,	Sachs	et	el.,	2000,	etc).	In	a	range	of	cases,	economic	performance	
has	 indeed	 appeared	 to	 suffer	 rather	 than	 benefit	 from	 the	 impact	 of	 natural	
resource	endowment	(Gylfason	and	Zoega,	2003;	Paldam,	1997).	
As	a	consequence,	the	international	community,	including	notable	international	
financial	institutions,	has	become	increasingly	concerned	about	the	effectiveness	
with	which	natural	resource	revenues	are	used,	and	in	particular	how	they	can	
help	foster	economic	and	social	development	in	the	long	run.	This	latter	concern	
is	part	of	a	wider	topic:	the	political	economy	of	resource-driven	growth.	
The	governments	of	 resource-rich	countries	 face	 the	challenge	of	devising	
policies	 that	can	effectively	channel	 “income	transfers	 to	governments	and	the	
inflow	of	foreign	exchange	from	foreign	investments.”	(Kalyuzhnova,	2002:	79).
To	 tackle	 this	 challenge,	many	 oil-producing	 countries	 are	 setting	 up	 national	
oil	funds.	Such	funds	have	become	fashionable	in	the	wake	of	recent	high	and	
volatile	oil	prices,	and	with	new	discoveries	of	hydrocarbon	deposits.	
Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	(SWF)	have	different	titles,	goals	and	rules,	but	they	
share	 the	underlying	objective	of	helping	governments	deal	with	 the	problems	
created	by	large	and	variable	revenues	from	energy	(or	other	commodity	related)	
sectors.	 In	 Kazakhstan,	 such	 a	 fund	 (the	 National	 Fund	 for	 the	 Republic	 of	
Kazakhstan	 (NFRK))	was	established	 in	2000,	when	 the	oil	prices	were	 rising	
and	an	economic	recovery	was	on	the	map	for	the	Kazakhstani	economy.	This	
fund	operates	as	both	a	stabilisation and a savings fund.	
In	light	of	emerging	experience	(especially	since	2007)	with	such	funds,	there	
is	a	need	to	explore	under	what	circumstances	they	can	become	part	of	a	policy	
solution	–	rather	than	ending	up	as	a	part	of	the	problem.	The	core	question	is	
whether	the	NFRK,	generically,	is	panacea	for	the	so	called	“paradox	of	plenty;”	
whether	its	effectiveness	depends	on	specific	operating	conditions	and	rules;	or	
whether,	more	pessimistically,	 it	delivers	results	only	 in	national	circumstances	
that	are	in	any	case	particularly	benign.	
1		Some	of	the	parts	of	this	paper	are	based	on	a	revised	version	of	Chapter	2	by	Y.	Kalyuzhnova,	
“Economics	of	the	Caspian	Oil	and	Gas	Wealth:	Companies.	Governments.	Policies.”	2008.	Palgrave	
Macmillan,	reproduced	with	permission	of	Palgrave	Macmillan.
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In	 this	 context,	NFRK	 identifies	as	a	 tool	 that	may	help	 in	addressing	 two	
specific	problems	associated	with	oil	revenues--the	unpredictability	and	volatility	
of	world	market	prices,	and	the	concern	to	save	part	of	the	revenues	for	future	
generations—“The	 Permanent	 Income	 Hypothesis”	 (PIH).	 In	 this	 context,	 this	
fund	may	 serve	 as	 a	 form	 of	 “commitment	 mechanism,”	 thus	 substituting	 for	
the	 IMF	commitment	mechanism.	A	 further	 problem	could	 in	 principle	 also	be	
mitigated	by	oil	funds:	“Dutch	Disease.”
The	 first	 test	 for	 the	NFRK	was	 the	 2007-2009	 financial	 crisis,	 where	 the	
NFRK	“saved”	the	economy	and	guaranteed	its	speedy	recovery.	It	is	important	
to	emphasize	the	proactive	stance	of	the	government	to	protect	some	key	sectors	
of	the	economy	on	the	basis	of	their	implications	to	the	local	economy.	
The	consequences	of	the	crisis	will	clearly	result	in	some	changes	in	invest-
ment	portfolio	strategy	as	well	as	in	the	general	rules	and	principles	of	functioning	
of	the	fund,	although	the	full	implications	remain	to	be	seen.	The	NFRK	has	not	
escaped	the	effects	of	the	global	downturn,	and	although	its	total	assets	fall	as	a	
result	of	the	drop	in	value	in	its	investment,	it	is	likely	that	the	fund	will	remain	a	
vitally	important	source	of	capital	in	the	international	financial	markets,	and	will	
make	important	investments	across	all	the	different	asset	classes	in	the	future.	
Some	priorities	 in	 this	regard	are	discussed	below,	 including	the	trade-offs	be-
tween	greater	domestic	involvement	in	the	short	run	and	the	requirements	of	a	
resumed	“insurance”	role	in	the	face	of	future	shocks.	
Whatever	investment	choices	are	made,	however,	the	issue	of	transparency	
is	crucial	for	any	SWF,	both	domestically	and	because	the	funds	have	been	re-
ceiving	increased	scrutiny	due	to	their	growing	presence	in	global	financial	mar-
kets.	In	this	respect	there	is	a	certain	concern	that	the	NFRK	is	not,	at	the	present	
time,	a	part	of	 the	Santiago	principles	 initiative	for	SWF	along	with	other	 large	
SWF	like	other	world’s	largest	funds	of	Libya,	Brunei,	Malaysia,	Hong	Kong,	etc.	
It	 is	of	paramount	 importance	 that	 the	government	of	Kazakhstan	will	produce	
some	substitute	governance	guidelines	to	Santiago	principles	for	the	NFRK,	es-
pecially	with	regards	to	the	fund’s	investment	strategy	in	the	years	ahead.	
2. Critique of policy option(s)
In	Kazakhstan,	the	oil	fund	(the	National	Fund	of	the	Republic	of	Kazakhstan	
(NFRK))	 was	 established	 in	 August	 2000.	 Legal	 aspects	 were	 defined	 by	
Presidential	Decree	N402	of	23	August.	The	NFRK	is	managed	by	the	National	
Bank	of	Kazakhstan	and	is	overseen	by	a	governing	board	chaired	by	the	President	
of	Kazakhstan,	Prezident	Nazarbayev,	and	including	the	prime	minister,	the	heads	
of	the	two	chambers	of	parliament,	the	National	Bank	chairman	and	the	finance	
minister.	Information	on	the	fund's	revenues,	expenditure,	and	the	audit	result	is	
published	in	the	local	press.	The	fund	is	subject	to	an	annual	independent	audit.	
The	 NFRK	 invests	 in	 liquid	 foreign	 equities,	 and	 will	 be	 capitalized	 by	
corporate	 income	 taxes,	 VAT,	 royalties,	 bonuses,	 and	 Kazakhstan’s	 revenues	
from	 production	 sharing	 agreements.	 Initially,	 the	 Fund	 had	 a	 long-term	
investment	 function-saving	portfolio	 (75%)	and	a	smaller	stabilisation	 function-
saving	 portfolio	 (25%),	 and	 later	 these	 figures	were	 altered	 to	 80%	 and	 20%	
respectively.
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2.1 Economic context 
The	rules	governing	the	accumulation	and	use	of	resources	in	oil	funds	differ	
widely.	The	differing	features	of	the	funds	must	be	understood,	in	part,	in	light	of	
the	economic	situation	of	each	country,	which	 results	 in	varying	priorities.	 It	 is	
useful	to	analyse	the	rules	governing	the	NFRK.
First,	 the	Kazakhstani	government	and	 the	 international	agencies	consider	
the	estimated	 life	of	 the	hydrocarbon	deposits	as	a	decisive	argument	 for	and	
against	placing	 the	 funds’	 investment	portfolio	abroad,	whence	 income	will	 be	
accrued	on	the	PIH.	Originally,	given	the	scale	and	pace	of	exhaustion	of	reserves	
in	Kazakhstan,	 the	 IMF	had	originally	assumed	 the	year	2045.	 	However,	 this	
projection	did	not	take	account	of	then-unproven	reserves.	Recent	exploration	in	
Kazakhstan	has	led	to	the	discovery	of	the	Kashagan	field	in	the	Caspian	Sea.	
This	alone	is	believed	to	hold	nearly	40	bln	bbl	of	oil	reserves.	Estimates	of	how	
long	the	country	will	remain	a	significant	oil	producer	need	to	take	into	account	
anticipated	 future	 discoveries	 set	 against	 future	 rates	 of	 production.	 These	
production	rates	are	based	on	extraction	and	transport	costs	at	the	contemporary	
and	projected	world	price.	Kazakhstan’s	proven	reserves	may	well	amount	to	18	
bln	bbl	(including	Kashagan’s	proven	reserves).	
Second,	investment	ratios	in	the	Kazakhstani	economy	have	been	high,	and	
external	financing	has	been	drawn	on	to	differing	degrees	in	achieving	this.	Prior	
2007	financial	crisis	Kazakhstan,	exhibits	a	high	share	of	capital	formation	in	GDP	
(27%),	which	 is	well	above	 that	of	other	 transition	economies.	That	Kazakhstan	
has	drawn	heavily	from	abroad	for	its	capital	finance	may	be	implied,	in	part,	by	
its	high	ratio	of	external	debt	to	GDP	–	in	2004	68.9%,	which	of	course	triggered	
Kazakhstan’s	 exposure	 during	 the	 2007-2009	 credit	 crisis.	 	 At	 that	 time,	 the	
moratorium	on	disbursements	from	the	”oil	fund”	was	in	force,	hence	the	Kazakhstani	
government	was	not	achieving	its	high	investment	rate	through	the	use	of	its	fund.	
2.2 Mapping goals to national priorities
This	economic	context	 in	Kazakhstan	helps	one	to	understand	the	specific	
design	 of	 the	 oil	 fund.	 The	 NFRK	 is	 designed	 to	 save	 resources	 for	 future	
generations	and	avoid	undue	pressure	on	the	domestic	economy	-	and	layered	
on	this	is	a	stabilization	function.	President	Nazarbayev	made	clear	at	the	outset	
that	 resources	 would	 not	 be	 spent	 on	 covering	 current	 expenses,	 but	 would	
accumulate	 in	 the	NFRK	for	 future	generations,	as	well	as	for	 the	contingency	
of	 economic	 recession.	 Stabilization	 by	 the	 NFRK	 is	 achieved	 by	 means	 of	
“reference	prices”	for	gas,	oil,	and	four	metals	(chrome,	zinc,	lead	and	copper).	
The	nine	largest	oil	companies	and	three	from	the	metals	sector	are	subject	to	
transfers	based	on	the	reference	price.	When	the	targets	are	exceeded,	surplus	
tax	payments	are	transferred	to	the	NFRK.	On	the	other	hand,	if	market	prices	
are	below	the	reference	prices,	the	Fund	provides	revenue	to	the	government.	
The	stabilization	portfolio	must	constitute	at	least	20%	of	NFRK	assets.	
Prior	to	2007,	with	the	Kazakhstan	budget	in	a	strong	position,	and	oil	prices	
rising	in	the	recent	past,	this	strategy	proved	entirely	workable.	During	the	first	
five	years	of	its	existence	the	NFRK	has	accumulated	extra	payments	made	to	
the	republic’s	budget	 from	major	companies	operating	 in	 the	raw	materials	(oil	
and	gas)	sector.	In	2003	the	fund	began	accumulating	proceeds	from	the	sale	of	
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state	property.	In	2008,	the	fund’s	reserves	exceeded	US$	27.4	bln.	(see	Figure	
1).	 However,	 since	 2009,	 according	 to	 the	 National	 Bank	 of	 Kazakhstan	 the	
assets	in	NFRK	have	fallen	to	US$	26	bln.	Kazakhstan	has	been	drawing	heavily	
on	 its	 rainy-day	 fund	as	 it	 attempts	 to	 stabilize	 its	 economy.	Overall,	 in	 2009,	
profitability	of	both	portfolios	was	7.31%	(where	stabilisation	and	saving	portfolios	
were	1.24%	and	10.19%	respectively).		(See	Figure	2)
Figure 1. NFRK, 2000-2009, US$ mln 
Source: NFRK annual reports.
Throughout	 the	 years	 since	 the	 NFRK’s	 conception	 we	 could	 observe	 a	
steady	increase	in	its	market	value	(see	Figure	2). 
Figure 2. NFRK: The Main Indicators, Mln.KZ Tenge
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The	differing	 roles	and	objectives	of	national	governments	are	 reflected	 in	
the	 investment	 strategy	 of	 their	 wealth	 funds.	 In	 Kazakhstan,	 the	 investment	
strategy	of	the	NFRK	was	based,	from	its	conception,	on	the	rules	governing	the	
foreign	exchange	reserves	of	 the	National	Bank	of	Kazakhstan:	eligible	assets	
were	low-risk	interest-bearing	securities	(AA-	grade	or	better).	According	to	the	
FitchRatings	agency	 “the	NFRK	offers	a	good	degree	of	fiscal	and	balance	of	
payments	support,	but	as	its	assets	are	still	not	especially	large,	this	support	is	
finite.	Assets	should	 rise	more	 rapidly	during	 the	coming	years,	 in	part	 related	
to	the	timing	of	additional	oil	production,	although	the	authorities	might	wish	to	
revisit	the	question	of	the	trigger	price	to	ensure	regular	and	reliable	inflows	into	
the	Fund.”	(FitchRatings,	2003:	12).	Of	course,	a	prudent	strategy	of	 investing	
resources	 in	 high	 quality	 external	 assets	 could	 be	 compatible	 with	 a	 more	
diversified	portfolio	approach	in	the	future.2	Until	2008	Kazakhstan	has	been	very	
cautious	on	this	front	and	has	been	praised	by	IMF	(see	IMF,	2004:	73)	Prior	to	
the	2007-2009	crisis	the	Kazakhstani	government	combined	a	quite	conservative	
fiscal	policy	with	rapid	financial	development	and	expansion	of	its	monetary	base.	
The	 large	 reserves	 were	 saved	 abroad	 and	 private	 banks’	 credit	 growth	 was	
tremendous,	resulting	in	significant	asset	bubbles3.
To	summarize,	examining	the	recent	operations	of	the	NFRK:
It	was	planned	that	the	NFRK	would	not	be	touched	for	the	first	five	years	of	
its	existence.
In	terms	of	investment	targets	the	NFRK	invested	only	abroad.	
To	the	extent	that	sovereign	wealth	funds	serve	a	useful	purpose,	this	is	at	
once	a	more	modest	and	more	ambitious	one.	Modest,	because	a	realistic	goal	
is	to	achieve	some	degree	of	pragmatically-based	smoothing	and	inter-temporal	
redistribution,	with	no	pretence	of	optimality.	Ambitious,	because	their	value	can	
lie	 in	 reinforcing	 the	 transparency,	 implementation,	and	credibility	of	 key	fiscal	
rules	–	thus	addressing	at	the	source	a	number	of	the	institutional	weaknesses	
that	may	lie	behind	the	poor	performance	of	many	resource-rich	economies.
As	Glennester	 and	Yongseokh	 showed	 (2003),	 transparency	 is	 correlated	
to	improvements	in	investment	and	growth	performance.	Kazakhstan	is	already	
known	as	a	country	with	a	low	level	of	transparency	and	opportunities	for	fraud	
and	corruption	(see	Transparency	International’s	Corruption	Perception	Index).	
Without	doubt,	the	country	needs	to	improve	its	disclosure	of	negative	practices. 
Kazakhstan	did	not	accept	the	Santiago	principles	(for	the	principles’	description	
please	see	Appendix	2)	which	provided	the	further	platform	for	the	transparency	
development	for	the	SWF.	The	main	limitation	of	the	Santiago	principles	is	that	
2		It	 is	 important	to	note	that	already	at	 the	present	stage	the	management	of	 the	fund	could	
envisage	a	 longer-term	 investment	horizon	and	a	broader	diversification.	Although	 investments	 in	
equity	instruments	involve	a	higher	risk	of	exposure	to	short	term	fluctuations	in	market	value	compared	
to	bonds,	historically	they	have	provided	a	better	average	return.	Whether	risk-adjusted	returns	are	
higher	depends	on	the	adjustment	made	for	risk	and	the	investor’s	risk-aversion.	Generally	only	the	
richest	countries	(e.g.	Kuwait)	invest	any	more	than	a	very	small	proportion	of	their	assets	in	equities.
3		Later,	when	the	crisis	affected	all	areas	of	the	Kazakhstani	economy	the	government	did	not	
have	a	choice	as	it	bailed	out	the	banking	sector	by	depleting	NFRK	assets.			
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disclosure	requirements	are	limited,	“...a	further	enhancement	of	the	Principles	
and	the	surrounding	governance	framework	will	be	mandatory	in	order	to	alleviate	
protectionist	 pressure	 in	 recipient	 countries	once	financial	 crisis	 is	overcome”.	
(Beck,	Fidora,	2009:364)		Table	1	shows	that	around	50%	of	the	richest	SWF	do	
not	recognise	these	principles	as	their	rules	of	life.	It	 is	possible	to	debate	and	
discuss	the	immaturity	of	the	governments	involved,	but	there	is	still	a	long	way	to	
go	by	the	international	community	in	order	to	convince	the	governments	of	some	
resource	rich	countries	that	the	higher	level	of	transparency	is	desirable	for	the	
successful	management	of	the	hydrocarbon	revenue.		
However,	the	circumstances	of	Kazakhstan’s	failure	to	attend	the	meeting	in	
Santiago	are	unclear	and	there	remains	some	ambiguity	about	whether	Kazakhstan	
has	rejected	the	Santiago	principles	as	such.	Three	senior	governmental	officials	
related	to	the	NFRK	from	the	Ministry	of	Economy,	Ministry	of	Finance	and	also	
National	 Bank	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Kazakhstan	 were	 asked	 by	 the	 author	 why	
Kazakhstan	did	not	participate	 in	 the	Santiago	2008	meetings	as	well	as	why	
Kazakhstan	 does	 not	 recognise	 the	 Santiago	 principles	 and	 the	 answer	 was	
unanimous:	“Never	heard	about	the	Santiago	principles.	Kazakhstan	was	never	
invited	to	join	the	Santiago	meeting.”	(Interviews	were	conducted	in	May	2010).	
Moreover,	the	senior	representative	of	Soros	Foundation	in	Kazakhstan	also	was	
not	aware	of	 the	existence	of	 the	Santiago	principles.	 In	addition,	a	number	of	
the	Kazakhstani	analysts	who	are	studying	the	NFRK	were	also	confused	when	
asked	about	the	Santiago	principles	and	Kazakhstan’s	perception	of	them.	The	
conclusion	is	very	straightforward;	the	international	working	group	of	sovereign	
wealth	funds	(IWG)	should	make	contact	with	the	NFRK	and	establish	a	dialogue	
on	Santiago	principles	and	the	NFRK’s	involvement	into	this	process.
What	is	true	for	the	economy	at	large	is	true	for	the	resources	concentrated	
in	 the	 SWF.	 Transparency	 in	 the	management	 of	 oil	 revenues	 is	 essential	 to	
prevent	 a	 few	 interest	 groups	 from	 appropriating	 oil	 resources	 by	 allowing	 a	
democratic	debate	and	avoiding	corruption	and	waste	of	public	resources.	Part	
of	 this	 initiative	 is	 to	 increase	 transparency	with	 respect	 to	 revenues	by	 those	
host	country	governments.	Resource	revenue	transparency	has	been	advocated	
by	 international	financial	 institutions,	 including	 the	 IMF	 (2004).	The	concept	of	
transparency	 is	 expected	 to	 focus	 initially	 on	 the	 transparency	 of	 the	 general	
government,	but	because	of	the	special	needs	of	transition	economies	it	should	
be	extended	also	to	relevant	stakeholders	(including	companies	investing	in	the	
sector	and	financial	and	strategic	investors	supporting	lending).
Five	 dimensions	 of	 transparency	 deserve	 particular	 attention	 in	 this	
connection:	 a	 clear	 definition	 of	 goals;	 rules-based	 operations;	 the	 public	
availability	of	information;	and	the	adequacy	of	internal	accounting	and	auditing	
of	the	funds;	and	arrangements	for	the	appointment	of	officials	and	managers.	
Experience	in	Kazakhstan	is	considered	briefly	below	in	light	of	these	priorities,	
illustrating	that	transparency	is	a	significant	issue	for	the	fund.	
In	the	next	two	to	three	years	the	management	of	the	NFRK	would	need	to	
re-assess	the	asset	class	level	for	the	fund.	It	would	be	of	paramount	importance	
to	identify	a	long-term	portfolio	strategy	and	the	investment	horizon	of	NFRK.	
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2.3 Definition of goals
In	Kazakhstan	 the	main	objective	 for	 the	management	of	NFRK	 is	defined	
to	be	the	 investment	of	capital	 in	such	a	way	that	 the	 international	purchasing	
power	of	the	Fund	is	maximized,	taking	into	account	an	acceptable	level	of	risk.	
“Following	also	IMF	guidelines,	the	investment	portfolio	of	the	‘oil	funds’	is	best	
placed	abroad.	In	sum,	both	domestic	electorate	and	the	international	community	
should	have	confidence	that	the	funds	are	well-managed,	transparent,	and	used	
for	the	purposes	set	out	by	law.”	(Kalyuzhnova	et.	al.,	2005:	16).	
2.4 Rules-based operations
As	to	whether	the	funds	are	rules-based,	in	a	mechanical	sense	this	is	broadly	
satisfied.	In	Kazakhstan,	much	of	the	legislation	and	administrative	infrastructure	
was	borrowed	from	Norway’s	oil	fund.	However,	the	closer	implementation	of	the	
Norway’s	model	based	on	a	non-oil	deficit	target	rule	could	be	a	way	to	enhance	
the	 transparency	 of	 the	 NFRK.	 Broader	 recommendations	 for	 Kazakhstan	 to	
increase	its	degree	of	transparency	include	consolidation	of	the	treasury	reports	
and	better	integration	of	all	fiscal	costs	and	risks	associated	with	extra	budgeting	
operations	(including	NFRK	itself).
In	2006,	in	order	to	establish	a	long-term	strategy	for	the	use	and	accumulation	
of	oil	revenues,	the	rules	governing	the	NFRK	were	redesigned	(see	Appendix	
1).	Under	the	current	system,	fiscal	payments	from	identified	companies	in	the	
natural	resources	sector	are	subject	to	transfer	to	the	NFRK.		In	2004	the	number	
of	companies	was	reduced	and	the	transfer	of	their	fiscal	payments	is	calculated	
on	the	basis	of	a	reference	oil	price.	However,	the	main	criticism	of	the	original	
reference	price	 (US$19/bbl),	which	was	established	a	 long	 time	before	 the	oil	
boom,	is	that	this	does	not	reflect	the	true	situation.4	The	original	rules	for	placing	
resources	in	the	NFRK	allowed	the	government	to	deplete	the	balance	if	prices	
were	to	fall	significantly	below	the	reference	price.	The	practical	difficulty	here	was	
that	the	rules	were	not	applied	vigorously,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	definitions	of	oil	
income	and	oil	enterprises	could	be	interpreted	differently	and	easily	changed,	
depending	on	the	intention	to	save	less	or	more	than	the	rule	currently	commits	
the	government	to.	
Overall,	 even	 if	 at	 first	 sight	 the	 rules	 look	 quite	 straightforward,	 practice	
has	demonstrated	that	the	reality	was	a	complex	one	with	all	the	computations,	
etc.	So,	inflow	rules	include:	saving:	10%	of	baseline	budget	oil	revenues	from	
identified	companies	(for	the	list	see	Makhmutova,	2008);	stabilization:	oil	revenue	
above	the	baseline	price;	ad hoc	privatization	and	bonus	receipts.	Outflow	rules	
are	clearly	stated	that	transfers	to	state	and	local	budgets	are	allowed	only	after	
the	approval	by	 the	president	of	 the	country.	The	Kazakhstani	authorities	 fully	
integrated	the	NFRK	with	the	budget.	All	central	government	oil	revenue	accrues	
to	the	NFRK,	from	2007	onwards,	and	flows	into	the	fund	via	the	budget.	Prior	to	
the	crisis	it	was	an	agreement	that	some	funds	will	be	released	back	to	the	budget	
to	finance	development	spending.	There	was	the	intention	to	set	clear	limits	on	
how	much	can	be	spent	in	any	one	year.	In	addition,	ceilings	were	set	for	three-
4		At	the	present	time	this	price	is	around	US$80.
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year	periods.	These	changes	aim	to	strike	a	balance	between	meeting	current	
development	needs	and	providing	a	savings	cushion	for	future	generations.	The	
NFRK	used	 to	 include	 “excess”	 revenues	not	only	 from	 the	oil	sector	but	also	
from	other	sectors	such	as	metals.	As	of	mid-2006,	all	 taxes	collected	from	oil	
companies	accrue	to	the	fund.	
Four	more	general	considerations	are	also	relevant:
It	can	be	argued	that	the	principles	of	operation	should	be	formally	enshrined	
in	legislation	to	guarantee	reliable	functioning	of	the	oil	fund	over	the	long	term.	
Legitimacy	and	permanence	would	be	 improved	by	having	 the	 formation	of	oil	
funds	come	from	national	parliaments,	rather	than	presidential	decrees,	and	this	
is	true	in	Kazakhstan	as	in	other	cases.
Issues	of	implementation	matter.	The	relevant	question	in	each	case	is	not	just	
the	principles	agreed	upon	at	the	outset,	but	also	the	question	of	how	transparent	
the	implementation	is	likely	to	be.5
It	was	a	fear	that	as	a	consequence	of	the	2007-2009	crisis,	the	NFRK	may	
tend	to	 invest	domestically	when	domestic	equity	prices	are	rising,	and	on	the	
contrary,	to	go	abroad	if	foreign	prices	are	attractive,	although	with	caution,	but	
the	Kazakhstani	authorities	took	a	different	view,	that	basic	trade-off	needs	to	be	
faced	and	that	a	true	insurance	role	will	require	adequate	stock	of	external	and	
liquid	assets.		
Since	 the	 crisis	 began	 in	 2007	 the	 political	 establishment	 has	 been	more	
involved	in	governance	of	the	NFRK.	
2.5 Public availability of information
In	terms	of	public	availability	of	information,	in	the	first	years	of	establishment	
of	the	NFRK	the	population	in	Kazakhstan	was	largely	unaware	of	its	existence.6 
But	 they	should	have	a	primary	voice	 in	 their	country’s	development	since	the	
citizens	of	Kazakhstan	will	face	the	economic,	environmental,	human	rights,	and	
social	impacts	of	hydrocarbon	development.	By	involving	them	in	the	process	the	
problem	of	corporate	and	governmental	accountability	could	be	partially	solved.	
The	Kazakhstani	citizens	have	to	know	how	much	income	was	taken	from	the	
fund,	on	what	grounds,	and	how	that	money	was	spent.	
The	question	of	awareness	about	the	existence	of	the	oil	fund	in	Kazakhstan	
comes	 from	 the	2006	and	2010	Survey	of	Households	 commissioned	by	The	
Centre	for	Euro-Asian	Studies	(UK)	and	carried	out	by	the	Agency	of	the	Republic	
of	Kazakhstan	on	Statistics	(ARKS)	on	640	households	across	all	 the	regions,	
5  In	April	2003,	Kazakh	National	Bank	Chairman	Marchenko	endorsed	President	Nazarbaev’s	
decision	to	divert	over	US$1	bln	from		a	secret	account	into		the	NFRK,	telling	journalists	that	“this	was	
the	right	decision	from	the	economic	point	of	view,”	although	it	may	have	been	flawed	from	a	political	
or	legal	perspective.	(Reuters	and	Interfax-Kazakhstan,	2003).	The	Kazakhstani	officials	claim	that	
almost	US$880	mln	of	the	US$1	bln	deposited	five	years	ago	in	Swiss	bank	accounts	was	used	to	
pay	off	pension	arrears	and	support	the	national	budget.	Mr.	Marchenko	refused	to	reveal	how	much	
money	the	government	still	has	in	foreign	bank	accounts	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	a	state	secret.
6		Author’s	interviews	with	a	number	of	citizens	of	Kazakhstan		in	2002-2003.
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designed	to	be	nationally	representative.7 
The	 survey	 also	 included	 questions	 relating	 to	 individual	 well-being8. The 
questions	related	to	life	satisfaction	as	well	as	the	impact	that	the	reforms	have	
had	on	 individual	 perceptions	of	well-being	which	allows	a	 clear	 picture	 to	be	
drawn	and	links	between	individual	well-being	and	existence	of	oil	funds.
From	the	question Do you know about the existence of the National Fund of 
Republic of Kazakhstan?	We	learned	that	45%	of	the	Kazakhstani	population	do	
not	have	any	idea	about	NFRK;	however,	in	the	2010	survey	this	figure	declined	
to	 30%.	 In	 2010	 through	 the	 regional	 analysis	we	 found	 out	 that	 the	majority	
of	unawareness	is	concentrated	in	the	regions	of	Mangistau	(54%),	Karaganda	
(48%),	 and	 Akmolinskaya	 (43%).	 In	 contrast,	 Southern	 Kazakhstan	 has	 the	
highest	awareness	among	all	regions,	where	only	1%	of	the	population	do	not	
know	about	NFRK.	
In	analysing	the	educational	level	of	the	population	which	is	not	aware	of	the	
existence	of	 the	NFRK,	we	 found	 that	 the	 largest	percentage	(60%)	of	people	
with	primary	education	are	not	aware	of	the	existence	of	the	NFRK,	although	this	
result	is	based	on	the	interviews	of	a	small	group	of	respondents.	
Overall	 we	 found	 a	 pattern	 of	 increasing	 awareness	 of	 the	 existence	 of	
the	NFRK	with	the	level	of	education	(e.g.	three	quarters	of	people	with	higher	
education	knew	about	the	existence	of	NFRK,	or	based	on	a	small	number	even	
86%	with	postgraduate	education).
The	respondents	who	were	aware	of	the	existence	of	the	NFRK	were	asked	
To what extent does the National Fund of Republic of Kazakhstan influence your 
standard level of living?	Overall	a	very	small	percentage	of	people	think	that	the	
NFRK	has	a	significant	impact	on	their	well-being	(17%	in	2010,	which	is	slightly	
higher	compared	with	the	survey	of	2006	where	the	respective	figure	was	13.8%).	
The	striking	fact	from	the	2010	survey	was	that	almost	two-thirds	of	respondents	
either	did	not	know	or	gave	a	non-valid	answer	to	this	question.
More	people	with	a	higher	education	thought	that	the	NFRK	has	a	positive	
effect	on	the	standards	of	living	(19.2%).	Similarly,	more	also	think	that	there	is	no	
influence	(28.5%).	In	general,	those	with	the	lowest	levels	of	education	were	also	
least	inclined	to	give	a	valid	answer.	In	terms	of	regions,	Atyrauskaya	and	Kzyl-
Orda	regions	thought	the	NFRK	had	a	positive	influence	on	standards	of	living	
(40.7%	and	69.4%,	 respectively).	Respondents	 in	Kustanai	 region	and	Astana	
city	were	most	inclined	to	think	the	NFRK	had	no	impact	on	standards	of	living	
(40.6%	and	37.5%,	respectively).	
In	a	broader	context	of	assessing	the	oil	wealth	of	the	country,	the	respondents	
were	 asked	 where,	 from	 their	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 oil	 money	 should	 be	 spent9.	
From	 the	 6	 possible	 answers	 (health	 care,	 economy,	 oil	 and	 gas,	 agriculture,	
welfare,	and	population)	which	could	be	chosen	as	single	as	well	as	multiple,	
the	most	 popular	 answers	were	 in	 2010	 “health	 care”	 (48.2%),	 “social	 sector”	
7		For	the	methodology	of	the	survey	please	see	Chapter	1	in	Kalyuzhnova	(2008).
8		It	includes	information	on	income,	expenditures,	the	nature	and	quality	of	housing,	and	other	
household	 characteristics	 such	 as	 number	 and	 age	 of	 household	 members,	 labour	 force	 status,	
educational	attainment,	health	status,	etc.,	across	all	the	regions	of	Kazakhstan.	
9		The	actual	question	in	the	survey	was:	From	your	point	of	view		what	for	oil	money	should	be	
distributed?
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(38.6%),	“economy”	(32.9%)	and	“population”	(11.7%).	This	proved	the	point	that	
the	population	 thinks	about	 the	present	day	and	perceives	 the	oil	wealth	as	a	
blessing	of	today	rather	than	tomorrow.	In	particular,	an	interesting	fact	is	that	the	
answer	“oil	and	gas	sector”	received	the	support	of	only	4.9%	of	the	population.	
In	 the	Akmolinskaya	 region,	 respondents	wanted	 to	put	oil	money	 into	 the	
economy	 (37.5%	 in	 2006	 and	 45.3%	 in	 2010)	 from	 the	 total	 of	 respondents’	
answers	for	the	region).	The	populations	of	Kustanai	region	(40.6%	from	the	total	
of	respondents’	answers	for	the	region)	as	well	as	Eastern	Kazakhstan	(30%	in	
2006	and	45.7%	in	2010	from	the	total	respondents’	answers	for	the	region)	had	
the	same	opinion	as	respondents	in	the	Akmolinskaya	region.	With	regard	to	health	
care,	the	population	of	Almatinskaya,	Kostanai	and	Karagandinskaya,	SKO,	and	
Astana	regions	(53.5%,	60.4%,	59.6%,	68.2%,	62.5%	of	the	total	respondents’	
answers	 for	 the	 region)	 strongly	 supported	 this	 option.	The	 respondents	 from	
the	 Mangistau	 region	 in	 particular	 wanted	 to	 distribute	 oil	 money	 among	 the	
population	 (57.5%;	 37.5%	 in	 2010	 from	 the	 total	 respondents’	 answers	 of	 the	
region).	 The	 respondents	 from	 the	 agricultural	 regions	 of	 Kustaniskaya	 and	
Almatiskaya	(45.8%	and	45.6%)	Kyzyl-Orda	and	Southern	Kazakhstan	strongly	
supported	the	investment	of	oil	money	into	agriculture,	with	25%,	19.4%,	44.1%	
23.3%	in	2010	of	respondents,	respectively,	favouring	this.		
The	investment	in	“welfare	social	sector”	was	supported	in	Karagandinskaya,	
Astana	and	Almatiskaya	and	SKO	(53.7%,	54.2%,	48.2%	and	47%	respectively).	
This	should	perhaps	not	be	surprising	since	two	-thirds	of	respondents	are	not	
satisfied	 with	 the	 provision	 of	 unemployment	 benefits.	 Similarly,	 70%	 are	 not	
satisfied	with	the	functioning	of	the	health	sector.		
“Unfinished	 higher	 education”	 as	 well	 as	 “higher	 education”	 groups	 of	
respondents	 would	 like	 to	 invest	 the	 assets	 from	 the	 NFRK	 into	 the	 social	
sector	(50%	and	41.9%,	respectively).	Based	on	very	small	numbers	some	60%	
of	 respondents	with	 “primary	 education”	 only	would	 like	 to	 invest	 the	NFRK’s	
money	 in	 the	social	sector.	With	 respects	 to	health	care,	 there	 is	 in	general	a	
high	consensus	with	regards	to	investing	in	this	sector	(all	are	above	50%).		The	
“postgraduates”	group	 is	most	supportive	of	 investing	 the	assets	of	 the	NFRK	
into	the	“oil	and	gas	sector”	(14.3%).	The	investment	into	agriculture	is	relatively	
uniformly	supported	across	the	educational	groups	(approximately	a	quarter).	
2.6 Accounting and auditing
In	terms	of	adaptation	of	best	practices	in	accounting	and	auditing,	the	NFRK	
reports	quarterly	to	the	press	on	the	total	amounts	of	assets,	 inflows	received,	
expenditures,	and	interest	earned	by	the	funds.	The	fund	has	its	own	web	site.	
These	 visible	 attributes	 of	 transparency	 are	 the	main	 arguments	 used	 by	 the	
management	of	the	fund	in	the	debates	about	transparency.
Since	 its	 inception,	external	audits	of	 the	NFRK	have	been	conducted	 (by 
Ernst	 &Young),	 and	 the	most	 recent	 one	 is	 currently	 underway.	Although	 the	
NFRK	has	a	website,	it	only	gives	information	on	the	total	National	Fund	assets,	
broken	down	by	portfolio.	Commentators	have	criticized	this	point	and	claim	that	
it	demonstrates	a	lack	of	transparency.	
An	 annual	 audit	 of	 the	 fund	 is	 prima	 facie	 evidence	 of	 transparency,	 but	
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it	 is	only	 the	 tip	of	 the	 iceberg	as	 regards	high	standards	of	governance.	 It	 is	
encouraging	 that	 in	 Kazakhstan	 increasing	 emphasis	 is	 being	 laid	 at	 present	
on	the	transparency	and	efficiency	of	 investment	processes	 in	 the	fund.	Close	
attention	 should	 be	 paid	 to	 compliance	 with	 the	 rules	 under	 which	 the	 fund	
was	set	up	and	to	diversification	of	investment	projects	within	the	areas	of	fund	
operations.
2.7 Appointment of officials and managers
Analysis	 of	 the	 NFRK	 highlights	 some	 structural	 weaknesses.	 The	 fund	
has	been	characterised	as	representative	and	participatory.	The	rule	is	that	the	
President	approves	all	the	members	of	the	board	and	all	of	them	are	government	
officials.	This	 strong	control	 by	 the	executive	branch	has	enabled	uses	of	 the	
fund	that	are	contrary	to	its	purposes.	The	official	explanation	for	this	is	that	the	
maturity	 of	 the	 society	 is	 quite	 rudimentary	 and	 by	 allowing	 other	 people	 (for	
example	the	parliament)	to	decide	the	strategy	for	using	the	oil	fund,	control	over	
the	oil	wealth	could	be	 lost.	 If	 transparency	of	 the	oil	 fund	 is	 to	be	established	
in	a	credible	manner,	 the	structure	of	 the	 fund	management	needs	 to	become	
more	representative	and	less	dominated	by	the	government.	Only	through	such	
a	structure	can	the	high	level	of	political	influence	be	overcome.	
By	2003	Kazakhstan	saved	63%	of	its	oil-windfall	in	the	NFRK,	which	by	all	
standards	 demonstrates	 a	 remarkably	 prudent	 fiscal	 stance	 and	 gives	 rise	 to	
hope	for	cautious	optimism	for	the	future.	However,	with	the	onset	of	the	global	
crisis,	circumstances	changed	dramatically,	and	with	them	the	operations	of	the	
NFRK.	
2.8 NFRK and recent financial crisis
The	importance	of	the	NFRK	for	the	Kazakhstani	economy	has	been	raised	
considerably	since	the	recent	global	financial	crisis	hit	the	country.	“The	financial	
crisis	has	served	as	a	’stress	test‘	on	the	sturdiness	of	fiscal	instruments	in	the	face	
of	economic	shocks,	and	their	relevance	to	economic	diversification	in	resource	
dependent	economies”	(Heuty	and	Aristi,	2009).	By	2008	NFRK	became	one	of	
the	world’s	largest	sovereign	wealth	funds	alongside	the	oil-producing	countries	
of	 the	Middle	East	 and	Russia	 (see	Table	 1).	 Initially	when	 the	 crisis	 started,	
the	Kazakhstani	government	was	reluctant	to	use	the	assets	of	the	NFRK,	but	
since	the	crisis	was	becoming	deeper	and	deeper	the	government	of	Kazakhstan	
“opened”	 the	NFRK	and	 took	 the	$10	bln	 (9.5%	per	 cent	of	GDP)	which	was	
used	for	stabilization	of	the	financial	system,	support	of	the	housing	programme,	
SMEs	 and	 industrial	 innovation	 development	 (anti-crisis	 plan)	 (see	 Table	 2).	
Thus,	 already	by	 the	end	of	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 2009	 the	assets	 of	 the	NFRK	
decreased	by	20%	and	were	around	$	22	bln.	Unfortunately	for	Kazakhstan	the	
banking	system	was	fairly	open	to	global	financial	markets	with	weak	regulation.	
The	anti-crisis	plan	was	combined	with	the	efforts	of	 the	government,	National	
Bank	of	Kazakhstan	and	Financial	Security	Authority,	with	Samruk-Kazyna	acting	
as	the	main	body	for	crisis	relief.	Overall,	the	NFRK	has	distributed	US$10	bln,	
of	which	US$9	bln	were	provided	to	Samruk-Kazyna	in	the	form	of	debt	(US$	5	
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bln)	and	a	capital	injection	(US$	4	bln).	KazAgro	National	Holding	received	the	
remaining	US$	1	bln	for	the	support	of	the	agricultural	sector.	It	is	likely	that	the	
Kazakhstani	government	could	be	exposed	to	some	contingent	liabilities	from	the	
anti-crisis	programme	through	Samruk-Kazyna	(IMF,	2009:	8).	
The	NFRK	incurred	losses	on	its	investments	in	the	economic	and	financial	
downturn,	with	the	equity	portfolio	among	those	hit.	There	are	no	data	available	
on	 the	NFRK	yet,	but	by	 the	author’s	estimations,	 the	equity	portfolio	held	by	
NFRK	may	have	lost	approximately	US$1	mln	since	2008,	reducing	the	overall	
portfolio	by	around	0.64%.			There	are	clearly	a	number	of	factors	posing	potential	
risk	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 NFRK	 in	 the	 near	 future,	 namely:	 commodity	 price	
fluctuations,	 changes	 to	global	 capital	 flows	along	with	potential	 protectionism	
in	the	NFRK	recipient	countries,	and	exchange	rate	movements.	It	is	interesting	
to	note	that	Kazakhstan	has	leveraged	more	funds	to	its	NFRK	than	its	foreign	
currency	exchange	reserves,	which	reflects	more	a	aggressive	policy	to	receive	
higher	 returns.	By	 the	end	of	2009,	 total	assets	were	around	$26.2	bln.	What	
are	the	growth	prospects	for	the	NFRK?	Based	on	the	data	from	the	Ministry	of	
Economy	in	2009-2012	the	receipts	 to	 the	NFRK	are	expected	to	be	$9.3	bln;	
$10.7	bln;	$11.2	bln,	 respectively,	which	 reveals	 that	 the	NFRK	will	be	still	an	
important	player	 in	 the	years	ahead	both	domestically	and	 in	 the	 international	
financial	market.	
The	 financial	 crisis	 has	 shifted	 the	 emphasis	 in	 the	 policy	 of	 the	 NFRK	
(whether	the	management	of	the	fund	likes	it	or	not)	from	issues	of	performance	
at	the	firm	level	to	the	portfolio	strategy	and	the	investment	horizon	of	NFRK.		In	
the	short	term,	the	impact	has	been	to	reconsider	the	investment	strategy,	which	
will	 remain	an	external	one	rather	 than	being	oriented	 towards	more	domestic	
involvement	(as	was	initially	thought	by	some	analysts	and	observers).	Over	time	
the	external	insurance	role	will	doubtless	need	to	be	rebuilt	also,	to	guard	against	
the	 impact	of	 future	 shocks.	 It	 is	understandable	 that	 the	consequence	of	 the	
crisis	is	(and	will	be	for	the	next	several	years)	a	more	active	involvement	of	the	
Kazakhstani	government	in	the	governance	of	the	NFRK,	which	might	be	reflected	
in	a	more	sensitive	attitude	to	the	social	needs	of	the	Kazakhstani	citizens.		In	
other	words,	the	government	could	be	in	the	position	to	accept	investments	not	
with	higher	social	returns,	but	low	private	ones	(investments	in	the	industries	with	
lower	economic	performance).	Overall,	at	the	present	time	the	investment	policy	
of	the	NFRK	is	based	on	Rules	on	Investment	Operations	of	the	NFRK	(Ruling	
of	National	Bank	of	the	Republic	of	Kazakhstan,	N65,	26	July	2006);	however,	it	
was	indicated	by	one	of	the	National	Bank	senior	officials	that	it	is	more	likely	that	
the	NFRK	investment	strategy	will	be	more	closely	focusing	on	the	Asian	market	
(including	Australia).	
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Table 1.  The world’s largest SWF
Sovereign Wealth Fund Country Assets in USD bn
Accepted 
Santiago 
Principles
Oil-Exporters 1240-2220
Abu	Dhabi	Investment	Authority UAE	(Abu	Dhabi) 400-800 Yes
Government	Pension	Fund-	
Global
Norway 373 Yes	(observer)
SAMA Saudi	Arabia 300 Yes	(observer)
Kuwait	Investment	Authority Kuwait 213 Yes
Investment	Corporation	of	Dubai	 UAE	(Dubai) 20-80 Yes
Qatar	Investment	Authority Qatar	 20-60 Yes
Libya	Investment	Authority Libya 20-60 No
Brunei	Investment	Agency Brunei 												10-50 No
Future	Generations	Fund Russia ~24 Yes
Government	Pension	Fund-	
Norway
Norway ~20 Yes
National	Fund	 Kazakhstan ~22 No
Khazanah	Nasional	Berhad Malaysia ~18 No
East Asia ~585
China	Investment	Corporation	 China ~200 Yes
Government	Investment	Com-
pany
Singapore ~130 Yes
Exchange	Fund	Investment	
Portfolio
Hong	Kong ~112 No
Temasek	Holdings	 Singapore	 ~108 Yes
Korea	Investment	Corporation Korea ~20 No
National	Stabilisation	Fund	 Taiwan ~15 No
Others ~138
Government	Future	Fund	 Australia	 ~49 Yes
Alaska	Permanent	Fund US ~38 No
Permanent	University	Fund	 US ~20 No
New	Mexico	State	Investment	 US ~16 No
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Alberta	Heritage	Savings	Trust	
Fund
Canada ~15 Yes
Total 1963-2943
Source: The classification is taken from R. Beck and M. Fidora, “The Impact 
of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets”, Review of European 
Economic Policy (2008).
“The	banking	crises	in	Kazakhstan,	Kuwait,	Qatar,	Nigeria	and	Russia	raise	
questions	 about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 stabilization	 mechanisms	 in	 resource	
rich	 countries,	 and	 calls	 for	 a	 fresh	 look	 at	 domestic	 investment	 to	 finance	
economic	 diversification	 and	 development	 strategy	 of	 resource	 rich	 countries”	
(Heuty	and	Aristi,	 2009:23).	Did	 the	NFRK	 fulfill	 its	 purpose	 in	 the	2007-2009	
crisis?	Today	we	could	say	that	 the	NFRK	worked	for	Kazakhstan,	despite	the	
fact	 that	 institutional	 quality	was	 not	 as	 high.	This	 reflected	 in	 part	 the	 strong	
leadership	of	 the	president	 of	 the	 country	 in	 favor	of	 prudent	policies	and	 the	
limited	involvement	of	the	public.	Another	factor	which	made	the	use	of	the	NFRK	
a	relative	success	is	that	Kazakhstan	is	an	upper-middle–income	economy;	this	
level	 of	 development	helped	 the	 country	 to	overcome	 the	 crisis	 in	 a	 relatively	
short	period	of	time,	although	at	the	same	time	the	loose	monetary	policy	led	to	a	
financial	bubble	which	exaggerated	the	consequences	of	the	crisis	and	ultimately	
the	country	needed	the	massive	 injection	 into	economy	to	rescue	the	financial	
sector.	In	broad	terms,	one	can	say	that	transfers	to	the	fund	did	help	mitigate	
the	pressure	on	 resources	 in	Kazakhstan’s	economy	during	 the	upswing,	and	
left	 it	better	prepared	for	the	external	shock	that	finally	came.	Moreover,	it	was	
crucially	important	that	the	bulk	of	the	fund’s	assets	were	invested	externally	in	
liquid	assets,	and	that	it	thus	was	able	to	serve	as	a	risk	buffer	and	as	a	form	of	
“collateral”	for	the	economy	during	the	crisis.	In	this	regard,	the	favorable	impact	
of	the	fund	far	exceeded	the	actual	drawings	made	to	support	the	economy.			
From	the	2010	CEAS	Survey	we	found	that	70%	of	respondents	support	the	
fact	that	the	money	from	the	NFRK	was	used	during	the	recent	crisis,	only	4%	of	
respondents	thought	that	it	was	a	bad	idea,	and	25%	were	undecided.	
With	 regards	 to	 the	 educational	 level,	 respondents	 with	 a	 low	 level	 of	
education	were	generally	more	in	favor	of	the	Kazakhstani	government	spending	
money	 from	 the	NFRK	during	 the	2007-2009	crisis	 period	 (70-75%);	whereas	
the	respondents	with	a	higher	level	of	education	were	less	supportive	of	this	(60-
65%).
Across	 the	 regions,	 respondents	 in	 Kostanaiskaya	 region	 were	 very	
supportive	of	the	governmental	decision	of	spending	funds	from	the	NFRK;	a	high	
level	of	support	was	also	registered	in	the	SKO,	Aktubinskaya	and	Pavlodarskaya	
regions	(92.4%,	74.5%	and	75%,	respectively).	The	least	support	for	this	policy	
was	 found	 in	 the	Almatyinskaya,	Akmolinskaya	 and	Mangistau	 regions	 (52%-
58%).
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Table 2.  
Summary of the Anti-Crisis Plan in the Republic of Kazakhstan
Amount (US$, bln)
Comment
Allocated Disbursed 
Support to:
Financial	sector	 4.0 4.0 Capital	and	deposits	provided.
Mortgage	loan	refi-
nancing	
1.0 1.0
Provided	to	banks	to	refinance	
existing	mortgages.	
Construction	sector 2.0 0.0
To	finish	uncompleted	housing	
projects.
Agriculture	 1.0 0.0 Provided	to	KazAgro.
SMEs 1.0 1.0
Provided	to	banks	for	onlend-
ing.
Infrastructure/Industry	 1.0 0.0
TOTAL: 10.0 6.0
Financing	from:
NBRK 10.0 10.0
US$9	bln.	Already	transferred	
to	Samruk-Kazyna	and	US$1	
bln.	to	KazAgro.
Memo	items:
Distressed	Asset	Fund 1.0 0.6 Capital	provided	from	budget.
Tax	cuts	 4.0 … Implemented	Jan	1,	2009.
Lower	reserve	require-
ments	
3.0 …
Source: Kazakhstani authorities and the IMF, 2009.
Overall,	the	2010	Survey	highlighted	that	the	Kazakhstani	population	felt	that	
the	impact	of	the	crisis	was	relatively	limited	as	for	the	economy	as	a	whole	and	
their	personal	lives	(58%-59%).	This	could	be	explained	by	the	“cushion”	which	
the	 NFRK	 provided	 to	 the	 Kazakhstani	 economy	 during	 2007-2009	 crisis.	An	
interesting	implication	of	the	success	of	the	use	of	the	NFRK	by	the	Kazakhstani	
authorities	has	been	expressed	in	the	strong	opinion	of	support	by	the	respondents	
across	 the	 regions	 for	 the	 greater	 governmental	 (state)	 prominent	 role	 in	 the	
economic	 life	of	Kazakhstan	 (the	actual	question	was	Taking into account the 
recent financial crisis, do you consider that the Kazakhstani economy requires 
stronger government control?) Almost	 90%	 of	 respondents	 supported	 greater	
government	control	in	banking,	oil	&	gas,	manufacturing	and	education.
There	 are	 some	 doubts	 in	 the	 country	 about	 the	 complete	 effectiveness	
of	using	US$	10bln;	mainly	 that	not	all	 the	money	 is	still	 “implemented”	 to	 the	
economy.	There	is	certain	criticism	that	the	NFRK	was	“forced”	to	buy	securities	
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in	the	Kazakh	Tenge	denomination	(5	bln	KZ	Tenge)		issued	by	Samryk-Kazyna	
and	KazAgro,	and	by	 this	 the	NFRK	has	now	two	parts	 (a	KZ	Tenge	part	and	
a	hard	currency	part),	although	 the	Tenge	part	 is	not	 large	compared	with	 the	
currency	part.	So,	at	 the	end	of	2009,	according	 to	 the	NFRK	Annual	Report,	
the	total	market	value	of	the	NFRK	portfolio	was	US$26	bln,	including	currency	
portfolio	US$24	bln	and	securities	portfolio	Samryk	Kazyna	and	Kazagro	US$1.8	
bln.
3. Policy recommendations
3.1 Future challenges for the NFRK
The	NFRK	is	new	and	therefore	it	 is	necessary	to	keep	this	fact	in	mind	in	
order	to	 judge	its	performance,	success	and	failures.	The	establishment	of	the	
sovereign	wealth	fund	is	itself	a	major	change	in	fiscal	practice,	as	the	NFRK	was	
required	to	accumulate	funds	for	five	years	without	spending	from	it.		The	recent	
market	context	of	high	oil	prices	provided	some	test	as	to	whether	the	existence	
of	the	funds	will	result	in	greater	fiscal	restraint.	
In	parallel	with	this	public	sector	restraint,	however,	the	economy	experienced	
a	massive	private	sector	boom,	 fuelled	by	capital	 inflows	 through	 the	banking	
system,	 and	much	 of	 this	 activity	 centred	 on	 the	 real	 estate	 sector.	 By	 2007	
commercial	bank	foreign	borrowing	reached	around	70%	of	total	funding	in	some	
cases	and	at	the	same	time	the	loan/deposit	ratios	at	some	banks	we	accounted	
at	400%.	The	private	sector	is	significantly	much	more	externally	exposed	than	
the	Kazakhstani	economy.	By	2007	net	foreign	assets	of	commercial	banks	were	
around	 35%	 of	 Kazakhstani	 GDP.	 In	 addition,	 Kazakhstan	 has	 accumulated	
reserves	 abroad,	 which	 made	 the	 country	 attractive	 to	 foreign	 lenders.	 As	 a	
consequence	the	banking	sector	became	particularly	vulnerable	to	the	liquidity	
crisis	started	in	the	US	and	Europe.
“The	oil	wealth	accumulated	 in	 the	oil	 funds	was	central	 to	 the	authorities’	
response	 to	 the	 2008-09	 global	 financial	 crisis”	 (Goldsworthy	 and	 Zakharova,	
2010:3).	 In	 order	 to	 preserve	 its	 banking	 sector	 and	 boost	 the	 economy	 the	
Kazakhstani	government	did	not	have	a	choice	but	to	use	US$10	bln	from	NBRK	
to	 support	 the	economy	and	 recapitalize	 the	banking	system,	 to	 shore	up	 the	
domestic	 equity	market,	 and	 to	 push	 credit	 to	 small	 and	medium	enterprises.	
Overall,	Kazakhstan	was	able	 to	mobilize	 resources	created	during	 the	period	
of	raising	oil	prices	to	find	the	options	to	respond	to	the	crisis	and	to	finance	the	
significant	fiscal	stimulus	in	2009	in	order	to	support	domestic	demand.		There	is	
no	doubt	that	Kazakhstan	made	the	right	decision	to	use	the	NFRK’s	money	to	
save	the	banking	system.	It	is	clear	that	the	Kazakhstani	economy	would	have	
suffered	a	much	more	serious	“meltdown”	without	the	oil	fund,	and	that	it	would	
also	have	recovered	much	more	slowly	after	the	crisis.	
The	challenge	ahead	for	the	Kazakhstani	economy	is	clear:	to	ensure	that	the	
economic	progress	initiated	by	the	seed	capital	of	hydrocarbon	development	prior	
to	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	proves	stable	and	sustained.	The	experience	to	
date	of	 resource-rich	countries	 in	operating	oil	 funds	demonstrates	empirically	
that	 these	 are	 no	 panacea	 for	 the	 “paradox	 of	 plenty,”	 but	 the	 Kazakhstani	
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government	which	prudently	built	up	the	large	SWF	disbursed	its	funds	under	the	
anti-crisis	plan.	The	path	of	oil	prices	over	time	does	not	encourage	a	view	that	
funds	can	be	designed	to	achieve	an	optimal	smoothing	of	income	or	assurance	
of	inter-temporal	equity.	
The	government	of	Kazakhstan	discussed	the	need	to	have	a	long-term	vision	
and	determination	in	pursuing	their	policies	of	management	of	the	oil	revenues,	
which	 should	 contribute	 to	 the	 sustainable	 development.	Among	 these	 goals,	
greater	 confidence	 in	 the	 transparent	management	 of	 the	NFRK,	 and	 greater	
public	understanding	of	 its	objectives	and	operations,	are	essential	 in	order	 to	
safeguard	the	sustainability	and	efficiency	of	the	future	for	the	NFRK.
So,	already	in	March	2010,	Kazakhstan	decided	to	restrict	the	amount	state-
owned	companies	can	borrow	from	the	NFRK	by	imposing	caps.		According	to	
Economic	Development	and	Trade	Minister	Zhanar	Aitzhanova,	annual	spending	
on	servicing	government	debt	must	not	exceed	the	NFRK’s	“annual	conditional	
set	investment	income”	of	4.5%.	The	amount	of	money	in	the	NFRK	which	cannot	
be	 used	must	 be	 equal	 to	 at	 least	 20%	 of	 planned	GDP.	 The	 government	 is	
confident	that	these	measures	will	help	the	NFRK	to	grow	to	US$90	bln	by	2020,	
equal	to	about	30%	of	GDP	(Bloomberg.com;	16	March	2010).		
A	long	period	of	time	is	needed	to	determine	the	real	impact	of	the	fund.	One	
important	lesson	is	that	its	emphasis	on	liquid	external	savings	helped	moderate	
the	domestic	boom	and	also	allowed	a	credible	insurance	or	collateral	role	during	
the	crisis.	A	second	is	that	there	was	then	scope	–	at	least	for	a	period	–	to	use	
resources	in	the	fund	to	help	repair	the	damage	to	the	domestic	economy.	Time	
will	tell	how	efficient	these	latter	involvements	will	have	been,	and	also	how	easy	
it	is	to	restore	the	former	insurance	role	by	building	up	liquid	foreign	assets	in	the	
future.
But	under	all	options	for	its	investment	strategy,	the	case	made	in	this	paper	
is	the	core	importance	in	Kazakhstan	of	continuing	to	enhance	governance	and	
transparency	of	the	sovereign	wealth	fund	in	order	to	maximize	the	chances	of	
success.	Inevitably	this	limits	government	discretion	in	disposing	of	the	mineral	
wealth	of	the	nation.	It	is,	however,	essential	to	build	public	support	for	the	funds,	
and	 to	 leverage	 their	 economic	 impact	 through	 a	 strong	 influence	 on	market	
expectations.	
By	 establishing	 periodic	 auditing	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	 management	
performance,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 ensure	 the	 sustainability	 and	 efficiency	 of	 the	
management	 revenue.	The	 fund’s	assets	should	be	placed	abroad	 (to	provide	
protection	 from	 the	populist	 ideas	 to	help	 the	 local	economy	with	 investments	
from	the	fund)	and	greater	diversification	of	the	assets	portfolio	is	required	(as	it	
was	demonstrated	in	case	of	the	NFRK).	To	date	it	is	difficult	to	confirm	whether	
the	NFRK	has	gained	public	support.	The	public	is	hardly	aware	that	such	funds	
exist.	
An	 important	 issue	 related	 to	 the	 future	 development	 of	 the	 NFRK	 (its	
sustainable	growth)	is	the	fiscal	regime	that	would	be	designed	in	order	to	secure	
the	government’s	maximum	hydrocarbon	revenue	and	at	the	same	time	to	provide	
an	optimal	regime	for	the	investors	to	undertake	the	hydrocarbon	activities.	The	
key	point	here	is	provision	by	the	government	of	an	adequate	return	associated	
with	 the	 risk	 to	 the	 investors.	 “The	 country	 experiences	 of	 Azerbaijan	 and	
Kazakhstan	suggest	that	aggregate	fiscal	discipline	is	essential	for	the	effective	
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management	of	oil	revenues”	(Usui,	2007:11).
In	2009	Kazakhstan	introduced	the	New	Tax	Code,	according	to	which	the	
rent	tax	on	crude	oil	and	gas	condensate	exports	(between	7%	and	32%)	is	to	
be	paid	by	all	physical	persons	and	legal	entities	that	export	crude	oil	and	gas	
condensate.	Exempt	were	companies	that	enjoy	a	stable	tax	regime	under	PSAs	
signed	with	the	government	of	Kazakhstan	before	January	1,	2009.	However,	in	
January	2010	statements	made	by	Kazakhstan	President	Nursultan	Nazarbayev	
and	Minister	 of	Energy	 and	Mineral	Resources	Sauat	Mynbayev	 suggest	 that	
Kazakhstan	will	take	steps	to	implement	new	laws	regarding	the	taxes	and	duties	
that	IOCs	will	be	obliged	to	pay,	canceling	the	original	agreements	(PSAs)	that	were	
negotiated	in	the	1990s.	According	to	the	PSAs,	the	international	oil	companies	
(IOCs)	were	for	the	most	part	allowed	to	develop	and	export	hydrocarbons	under	
exemption	from	normal	customs	procedures.	
President	Nazarbayev	said	at	a	government	meeting	on	22	January	2010	that	
foreign	companies	currently	enjoying	a	special	status	could	lose	this	protective	
immunity	if	adjustments	are	made	to	the	country’s	tax	laws.	“We	have	to…depart	
from	this	arrangement	of	immunity	so	that	everyone	works	in	line	with	the	same	
legislative	changes	that	will	happen	in	the	future,”	he	said,	according	to	the	SRI 
news	agency.	“All	the	contracts	currently	operate	in	accordance	with	the	legislation	
that	was	 in	place	at	 the	 time	of	 their	signing…	Times	are	changing	and	 life	 is	
changing	the	entire	world,	and	state	interests	are	pushing	us	in	this	direction.	We	
have	to	work	more	thoroughly	and	constructively.”	Energy	Minister	Mynbayev	told	
the	Kazakhstani	parliament	on	26	January	 that	 following	 the	president’s	order	
would	not	be	a	simple	matter:	“Abandoning	tax	exemptions	is	a	big	question.	We	
will	separately	discuss…how	we	will	implement	it	through	concrete	steps,	taking	
into	account	the	order.”	(Middle	East	Economic	Survey,	http://www.mees.com/cms/
category/oil-gas/)	This	new	step	by	the	Kazakhstani	government	is	considered	as	
another	attempt	to	draw	larger	financial	benefit	and	consolidate	more	influence	
over	the	hydrocarbon	sector	of	the	country,	and	now	there	are	doubts	that	in	the	
future	this	step	will	have	its	implications	on	the	assets	of	the	NFRK.
In	2010	the	Kazakhstani	government	presented	a	draft	of	a	“New	Concept	
of	Forming	and	Using	Assets	of	the	NFRK”	according	to	which	the	stabilisation	
function	of	 the	 fund	will	be	 implemented	 through	 the	guarantee	 transfer	 to	 the	
Republican	Budget,	which	will	 be	 fixed	 on	 a	 level	 of	US$8	 bln	 instead	 of	 the	
previous	rule	of	1/3	of	the	assets	of	the	NFRK.	The	rest	of	the	assets	which	should	
be	not	less	than	20%	of	the	GDP	forecasted	are	defined	for	the	implementation	of	
the	savings	function.	The	Kazakhstani	government	realised	that	the	management	
of	the	NFRK	is	playing	a	key	role	in	the	sustainable	development	of	the	country	
and	 is	one	of	 the	most	 important	 factors	 in	 the	governmental	economic	policy.	
Therefore	 the	New	Concept	 contains	 the	 following	 restrictions	with	 regards	 to	
using	the	assets	of	the	NFRK:	annual	expenditures	for	serving	the	state	debt	on	
average	during	the	decade	should	not	be	more	than	15%	of	the	income	to	the	
budget,	 including	 the	 transfer	 from	 the	NFRK.	Loans	 to	 the	quasi-state	sector	
from	the	NFRK	and	other	additional	transfers	are	prohibited.		
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3.2 Recommendations
What	 should	 be	 the	 core	 of	 the	 long-term	 strategy	 for	 the	 Kazakhstani	
government	based	on	the	lessons	of	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis?	First	of	all,	
it	is	crucial	that	in	the	future	the	government	be	determined	to	achieve	the	non-
resource	fiscal	balance	with	the	robust	programme	of	diversification.	
Secondly,	it	would	be	beneficial	if	the	Kazakhstani	government	could	establish	
a	system	of	particular	indicators	for	the	non-resource	deficit	in	order	to	monitor	
as	well	as	to	reduce	resource	dependency.	“Tracking	the	non-resource	balance	
allows	 for	a	 solid	 sense	of	 the	available	development	 financing,	which	 should	
also	help	calibrate	 the	medium	and	 long-term	fiscal	 framework.	This	approach	
assumes	that	governments	have	the	capacity	to	determine	and	adjust	long	term	
commodity	prices	independent	from	political	pressures”	(Heuty	and	Aristi,	2009).	
Thirdly,	 the	 fact	 that	 domestic	 investment	 for	 economic	 diversification	
provides	more	 stability	 and	 economic	 resilience	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	
when	the	Kazakhstani	government	is	designing	an	investment	portfolio	strategy	
of	 the	NFRK	 for	 the	near	 future.	This	policy	will	 require	a	medium	 term	fiscal	
framework	that	step	by	step	increases	the	share	of	resource	revenues	used	for	
public	investment	until	 investment	represents	100	percent	of	resource	revenue	
spending.	
Fourth,	 although	 Kazakhstan	 did	 not	 accept	 the	 Santiago	 Principles,	 a	
transparent	and	accountable	governance	structure	of	 the	NFRK	is	required	for	
the	future	success	of	the	policies	conducted	by	the	fund.		An	effective	strategy	
will	also	require	that	fiscal	instruments	are	integrated	into	the	budget	process	in	
order	to	provide	a	guarantee	in	terms	of	long-term	development	strategy	of	the	
country	as	well	as	optimal	management	of	hydrocarbon	windfalls.	This	strategy	
also	requires	close	coordination	with	future	monetary	policies	in	order	to	avoid	
the	creation	of	asset	bubbles	 like	 those	Kazakhstan	experienced	 in	 the	recent	
past.	Kazakhstan	and	 the	NFRK	need	 to	 reconsider	 their	perception	 to	GAPP	
and	if	not	accept	them,	at	 least	get	a	more	pragmatic	basis	for	the	investment	
strategy	of	the	NFRK	in	the	short	term.
In	 light	 of	 the	 recent	 crisis	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	Kazakhstan	will	 soon	 join	 the	
Santiago	Principles;	however,	it	is	crucial	that	the	Kazakhstani	government	and	
society	 would	 be	 able	 to	 recognise	 the	 importance	 of	 transparency	 towards	
international	markets	rather	 than	domestic	accountability	 to	citizens	as	well	as	
a	straightforward	framework	without	room	for	different	 interpretations.	It	should	
be	a	normal	 practice	 that	 the	NFRK	 is	 systematically	monitored	against	 good	
practice	and	international	benchmarks	to	make	sure	that	the	Kazakhstani	citizens	
benefit	from	their	hydrocarbon	sector	in	the	optimal	way.
It	 would	 be	 desirable	 that	 the	 international	 working	 group	 of	 sovereign	
wealth	funds	(IWG)	make	contact	with	the	NFRK	and	establish	a	dialogue	on	the	
Santiago	principles	and	the	NFRK’s	involvement	in	this	process.
Fifth,	it	is	clear	that	hydrocarbon	wealth	is	going	to	play	a	vital	role	in	ensuring	
economic	stability	and	sustainability	of	public	finance	of	Kazakhstan.	This	make	
Kazakhstan	focused	on	reducing	raw	materials	dependency	in	order	to	mitigate	
Dutch	disease,	while	financing	crucial	public	sector	 reforms.	Well-managed	oil	
wealth	would	be	central	in	financing	these	reforms,	and	at	the	same	time	it	would	
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be	important	not	to	misuse	the	NFRK	in	strategically-oriented	investment	rather	
than	commercial	investment.	
Sixth,	 in	 its	 investment	 strategy	 the	 NFRK	 has	 to	 arrive	 over	 time	 at	 a	
diversification	 in	 its	asset	allocation	which	would	correspond	 to	 the	 longer-run	
needs	and	welfare	of	Kazakhstani	citizens.	This	will	mean	carefully	reviewing	how	
efficient	its	recent	domestic	resource	allocation	has	been,	following	the	crisis,	and	
learning	 lessons	where	needed.	But	 it	will	also	mean	considering	how	 far	and	
how	fast	the	fund	can	rebuild	its	role	as	an	external	buffer	for	the	economy,	as	
well	as	an	institution	that	dampens	domestic	pressures	when	energy	prices	are	
rising	sharply.	Both	of	these	latter	goals	would	seem	to	imply	a	return,	over	time,	
to	a	role	where	increases	in	the	fund’s	resources	are	quite	strongly	allocated	to	
external	liquid	assets.
Finally,	 at	 the	present	 time	Kazakhstan	already	has	a	history	 in	designing	
an	 effective	 framework	 for	 managing	 its	 hydrocarbon	 wealth;	 however,	 the	
improvement	in	the	petroleum	taxation	regime	would	be	required	as	an	additional	
instrument	in	managing	of	the	oil	and	gas	revenues;	namely	neutrality,	capture	of	
rent,	stability	and	timing	of	revenue,	progressivity	and	adaptability,	administrative	
simplicity	and	enforceability	as	well	as	international	competitiveness	(based	on	
Goldsworthy	 and	 Zakharova,	 2010).	 The	 Kazakhstani	 government	 needs	 to	
reassess	its	risk	preferences	and	its	willingness	to	share	them	with	the	investors	
in	the	oil	and	gas	sector	after	recent	crisis.	
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Appendices
Appendix 1. New Rules of NFRK
From	 July	 2006	 changes	 took	 place	 in	 the	 NFRK’s	 rules.	 New	 mid	 term	
strategy	with	formalised	method	of	the	balanced	budget	is	outlined	below:
E=GNO+Go+D,	where		 	 	 	 	 (1.1)
E	-	national	budget	expenditures
GNO	-	non-oil	sector	revenue
Go-	guaranteed	transfer	from	the	fund	estimated	based	on	the	average	volume	
of	expenditures	for	budgetary	development	programmes	for	a	certain	period
D	-	net	public	borrowings,	for	which	the	annual	average	value	limit	for	a	5	year	
period	is	set	the	level	of	1%	of	GDP	for	a	respective	year.
Go=A+bNFRKt-1e	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.2)
A	-	const	approved	by	the	law	and	set	in	Tenge
b	-	coefficient	equal	to	the	average	level	of	investment	income	for	a	certain	
period
NFRKt-1	-	assets	of	the	NFRK	as	of	the	beginning	of	a	financial	year	
e	-	Tenge	rate	to	the	reference	currency	of	the	fund	
So,	as	you	could	see	 from	equation	 (1.2)	 the	main	concern	 is	constant	A,	
which	 is	 set	 up	 by	 the	 parliament.	Although	 “by	 selecting	 various	 parameters	
for	 the	 rule”	 there	 is	a	hope	 that	 the	selection	will	be	driven	by	 “how	much	of	
the	volatility	 in	prices	and	quantities	will	be	transferred	to	the	economy	via	the	
fiscal	 framework”	 (World	 Bank,	 2005:35),	 the	main	 concern	 is	 remained:	 how	
independently	and	based	on	the	economic	sense	rather	than	on	a	political	one	
this	process	could	be.
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Appendix 2. Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP)—
Santiago Principles
Principle General Description 
GAPP	1
The	legal	framework	for	the	SWF	should	be	sound	and	support	its	ef-
fective	operation	and	the	achievement	of	its	stated	objective(s).
GAPP	1.1.	
Sub-	principle	
The	legal	framework	for	the	SWF	should	ensure	the	legal	soundness	
of	the	SWF	and	its	transactions.
GAPP	1.2.	
Sup-principle
The	key	features	of	the	SWF’s	legal	basis	and	structure,	as	well	as	the	
legal	relationship	between	the	SWF	and	the	other	state	bodies,	should	
be	publicly	disclosed.
GAPP	2
The	policy	purpose	of	the	SWF	should	be	clearly	defined	and	publicly	
disclosed.
GAPP	3
Where	the	SWF’s	activities	have	significant	direct	domestic	macroeco-
nomic	implications,	those	activities	should	be	closely	coordinated	with	
the	domestic	fiscal	and	monetary	authorities,	so	as	to	ensure	consis-
tency	with	the	overall	macroeconomic	policies.
GAPP	4
There	should	be	clear	and	publicly	disclosed	policies,	rules,	proce-
dures,	or	arrangements	in	relation	to	the	SWF’s	general	approach	to	
funding,	withdrawal,	and	spending	operations.
GAPP	4.1.	
Sub-	principle
The	source	of	SWF	funding	should	be	publicly	disclosed.
GAPP	4.2.	
Sub-	principle
The	general	approach	to	withdrawals	from	the	SWF	and	spending	on	
behalf	of	the	government	should	be	publicly	disclosed.
GAPP	5
The	relevant	statistical	data	pertaining	to	the	SWF	should	be	reported	
on	a	timely	basis	to	the	owner,	or	as	otherwise	required,	for	inclusion	
where	appropriate	in	macroeconomic	data	sets.
GAPP	6
The	governance	framework	for	the	SWF	should	be	sound	and	estab-
lish	a	clear	and	effective	division	of	roles	and	responsibilities	in	order	
to	facilitate	accountability	and	operational	independence	in	the	man-
agement	of	the	SWF	to	pursue	its	objectives.
GAPP	7
The	owner	should	set	the	objectives	of	the	SWF,	appoint	the	members	
of	its	governing	body(ies)	in	accordance	with	clearly	defined	proce-
dures,	and	exercise	oversight	over	the	SWF’s	operations.
GAPP	8
The	governing	body(ies)	should	act	in	the	best	interests	of	the	SWF,	
and	have	a	clear	mandate	and	adequate	authority	and	competency	to	
carry	out	its	functions.
GAPP	9
The	operational	management	of	the	SWF	should	implement	the	SWF’s	
strategies	in	an	independent	manner	and	in	accordance	with	clearly	
defined	responsibilities.
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GAPP	10
The	accountability	framework	for	the	SWF’s	operations	should	be	
clearly	defined	in	the	relevant	legislation,	charter,	other	constitutive	
documents,	or	management	agreement.
GAPP	11
An	annual	report	and	accompanying	financial	statements	on	the	
SWF’s	operations	and	performance	should	be	prepared	in	a	timely	
fashion	and	in	accordance	with	recognized	international	or	national	
accounting	standards	in	a	consistent	manner.
GAPP	12
The	SWF’s	operations	and	financial	statements	should	be	audited	an-
nually	in	accordance	with	recognized	international	or	national	auditing	
standards	in	a	consistent	manner.
GAPP	13
Professional	and	ethical	standards	should	be	clearly	defined	and	made	
known	to	the	members	of	the	SWF’s	governing	body(ies),	manage-
ment,	and	staff.
GAPP	14
Dealing	with	third	parties	for	the	purpose	of	the	SWF’s	operational	
management	should	be	based	on	economic	and	financial	grounds,	
and	follow	clear	rules	and	procedures.
GAPP	15
SWF	operations	and	activities	in	host	countries	should	be	conducted	in	
compliance	with	all	applicable	regulatory	and	disclosure	requirements	
of	the	countries	in	which	they	operate.
GAPP	16
The	governance	framework	and	objectives,	as	well	as	the	manner	in	
which	the	SWF’s	management	is	operationally	independent	from	the	
owner,	should	be	publicly	disclosed.
GAPP	17
Relevant	financial	information	regarding	the	SWF	should	be	publicly	
disclosed	to	demonstrate	its	economic	and	financial	orientation,	so	as	
to	contribute	to	stability	in	international	financial	markets	and	enhance	
trust	in	recipient	countries.
GAPP	18
The	SWF’s	investment	policy	should	be	clear	and	consistent	with	its	
defined	objectives,	risk	tolerance,	and	investment	strategy,	as	set	by	
the	owner	or	the	governing	body(ies),	and	be	based	on	sound	portfolio	
management	principles.
GAPP	18.1.	
Sub-	principle
The	investment	policy	should	guide	the	SWF’s	financial	risk	exposures	
and	the	possible	use	of	leverage.
GAPP	18.2.	
Sub-	principle
The	investment	policy	should	address	the	extent	to	which	internal	and/
or	external	investment	managers	are	used,	the	range	of	their	activities	
and	authority,	and	the	process	by	which	they	are	selected	and	their	
performance	monitored.
GAPP	18.3.	
Sub-	principle
A	description	of	the	investment	policy	of	the	SWF	should	be	publicly	
disclosed.
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GAPP	19
The	SWF’s	investment	decisions	should	aim	to	maximize	risk-adjusted	
financial	returns	in	a	manner	consistent	with	its	investment	policy,	and	
based	on	economic	and	financial	grounds.
GAPP	19.1.	
Sub-	principle
If	investment	decisions	are	subject	to	other	than	economic	and	finan-
cial	considerations,	these	should	be	clearly	set	out	in	the	investment	
policy	and	be	publicly	disclosed.
GAPP	19.2.	
Sub-	principle
The	management	of	an	SWF’s	assets	should	be	consistent	with	what	
is	generally	accepted	as	sound	asset	management	principles.
GAPP	20
The	SWF	should	not	seek	or	take	advantage	of	privileged	information	
or	inappropriate	influence	by	the	broader	government	in	competing	
with	private	entities.
GAPP	21
SWFs	view	shareholder	ownership	rights	as	a	fundamental	element	
of	their	equity	investments’	value.	If	an	SWF	chooses	to	exercise	its	
ownership	rights,	it	should	do	so	in	a	manner	that	is	consistent	with	its	
investment	policy	and	protects	the	financial	value	of	its	investments.	
The	SWF	should	publicly	disclose	its	general	approach	to	voting	secu-
rities	of	listed	entities,	including	the	key	factors	guiding	its	exercise	of	
ownership	rights.
GAPP	22
The	SWF	should	have	a	framework	that	identifies,	assesses,	and	man-
ages	the	risks	of	its	operations.
GAPP	22.1.	
Sub-	principle
The	risk	management	framework	should	include	reliable	information	
and	timely	reporting	systems,	which	should	enable	the	adequate	moni-
toring	and	management	of	relevant	risks	within	acceptable	parameters	
and	levels,	control	and	incentive	mechanisms,	codes	of	conduct,	busi-
ness	continuity	planning,	and	an	independent	audit	function.
GAPP	22.2.	
Sub-	principle
The	general	approach	to	the	SWF’s	risk	management	framework	
should	be	publicly	disclosed.
GAPP	23
The	assets	and	investment	performance	(absolute	and	relative	to	
benchmarks,	if	any)	of	the	SWF	should	be	measured	and	reported	to	
the	owner	according	to	clearly	defined	principles	or	standards.
GAPP	24
A	process	of	regular	review	of	the	implementation	of	the	GAPP	should	
be	engaged	in	by	or	on	behalf	of	the	SWF.
Source: IWG (2008) Sovereign Wealth Funds. Generally Accepted Principles 
and Practices. “Santiago Principles”. http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiago-
principles.pdf
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Russian Sovereign Wealth Funds
Sergey Drobyshevsky
Head	of	Macroeconomics	and	Finance	Division	of	the	Gaidar	Institute	for	Economic	Policy	
(Moscow,	Russia)	
Russia	 has	a	 relatively	 long	but	 rather	 peculiar	 history	 of	 sovereign	 funds	
development.	Having	started	in	2004	with	one	fund	-	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	the	
Russian	Federation	-	the	country	had	two	fairly	large	funds,	including	the	National	
Welfare	Fund,	in	2008	on	the	verge	of	the	crisis.	However,	at	the	end	of	the	crisis	
in	the	medium	term,	both	funds	may	cease	functioning,	having	met	only	a	part	of	
their	objectives.
Short History, Mission and Type
Creation	 of	 the	 first	Russian	 sovereign	 fund,	 the	Stabilization	Fund	 of	 the	
Russian	Federation,	was	related	 to	 the	 idea	of	 institutionalizing	 federal	budget	
surplus	generated	in	the	form	of	balances	on	the	budget	accounts	with	the	Central	
Bank	 of	 Russia	 since	 2000.	 Understanding	 the	 situational	 nature	 of	 budget	
revenues	in	the	background	of	rising	oil	prices	in	the	world	market,	and	wishing	
to	avoid	a	proportional	growth	of	the	budget	expenditure	commitments,	the	RF	
government	 in	 2003	 proposed	 establishment	 of	 the	 Stabilization	 Fund,	 which	
would	be	formed	from	the	excessive	revenues	from	oil	production	and	exports	(as	
compared	with	the	estimated	long-term	oil	price,	cut-off	price	or	baseline	price).
Federal	Law	«On	Amendments	to	the	Budget	Code	of	the	Russian	Federation	
regarding	the	establishment	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	the	Russian	Federation”	
No.	184-FZ,	on	the	basis	of	which	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	the	Russian	Federation	
was	created	in	2004,	was	adopted	December	23,	2003.
The	purpose	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	of	Russia	was	to	ensure	the	federal	
budget	 balance	during	a	decrease	 in	 oil	 prices	below	 the	baseline.	According	
to	 the	RF	Ministry	of	Finance,	 “the	Fund	contributes	 to	stability	and	economic	
development;	it	is	one	of	the	main	instruments	of	binding	the	excessive	liquidity,	
which	 is	 reducing	 inflationary	 pressures	 and	 the	 dependence	 of	 national	
economy	 from	 adverse	 fluctuations	 of	 revenue	 from	 commodity	 exports.”	
Thus,	at	 the	 initial	stage	of	establishment,	 the	Fund	 is	a	classic	version	of	 the	
commodity	fund,	designed	to	suppress	fluctuations	of	the	market	revenue	of	the	
federal	government.	The	Fund	assets	could	be	used	to	cover	the	federal	budget	
deficit	only	in	the	case	of	oil	prices	dropping	below	the	baseline.	However,	if	the	
accumulated	amount	of	the	Fund	exceeded	500	billion	rubles,	the	excess	could	
be	used	for	other	purposes.
From	January	1,	2004	 the	base	price	was	set	at	$20	per	barrel	 for	Urals,	
and	on	January	1,	2006,	the	cut-off	price	was	raised	to	$27.	Despite	continued	
growth	in	oil	prices,	there	was	no	further	increase	in	the	«cut-off	price»	because	
of	the	risk	of	rising	inflation	and	increasing	budget	dependence	on	the	external	
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economic	situation.
Since	 in	 2005	 the	 Fund	 exceeded	 the	 level	 of	 500	 billion	 rubles	 (RUR	
1,387.8	bln),	a	part	of	the	assets	was	addressed	to	other	purposes,	namely	for	
the	payment	of	external	 debt	of	 the	Russian	Federation	 (RUR	643.1	bln)	and	
replenishment	of	the	deficit	of	the	Pension	Fund	of	the	Russian	Federation	(30	
billion	rubles,	see	Table	1).
Table 1. RF Stabilization Fund Assets: Dynamics in 2004-2007 (RUR bln)
Year
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2004 522.3 240.8 175.5 106.0 – – – 522.3
2005 1387.8 663.4 507.3 217.1 643.1 – 30.0 1237.0
2006 1708.6 991.2 646.7 47.8 604.7 – – 2346.9
2007 1895.9 918.9 674.7 156.7 33.7 300.0 – 3849.1
Total 5514.6 2814.8 2004.1 527.6 1281.5 300.0 30.0
Source: RF Federal Treasury
In	2005,	at	the	expense	of	the	Stabilization	Fund,	repayment	of	external	debt	
of	Russia	was	made	in	the	amount	of	643.1	bln,	including:
•	 93.5	 billion	 rubles	 (equivalent	 to	 USD	 3.3	 billion)	 -	 the	 debt	 to	 the	
International	Monetary	Fund;
•	 430.1	billion	rubles	(equivalent	to	USD	15	billion)	-	the	debt	to	the	member	
countries	of	the	Paris	Club;	
•	 123.8	 billion	 rubles	 (equivalent	 to	 USD	 4.3	 billion)	 -	 the	 debt	 to	
Vnesheconombank	under	credit	granted	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance	of	the	Russian	
Federation	in	1998-1999	for	the	repayment	and	servicing	of	external	government	
debt	of	the	Russian	Federation. 
In	2006,	604.7	billion	rubles	and	in	2007,	33.7	billion	rubles	were	spent	for	
external	debt	redemption.	In	2005,	30.0	billion	rubles	(equivalent	to	1.04	billion	
U.S.	dollars)	were	allocated	to	cover	the	deficit	of	the	RF	Pension	Fund,	and	in	
2007	–	300.0	billion	 rubles	 to	 finance	development	 institutions	 (Rusnano	 -	 30	
billion	rubles,	VEB	-	180	billion	rubles,	Investment	Fund	-	90	billion	rubles).
By	the	time	the	Fund	split	in	2008,	the	assets’	total	volume	was	3,851.8	billion	
rubles	(157.38	billion	U.S.	dollars),	reaching	approximately	11.6%	of	annual	GDP	
of	Russia	(Fig. 1).
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Figure 1. The total volume of the RF Stabilization Fund
Source: RF Ministry of Finance
Starting	in	February	1,	2008	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	Russia	was	divided	into	
two	parts:	the	Reserve	Fund	(with	an	initial	volume	of	RUR	3069.0	bln)	and	the	
National	Welfare	Fund	(initially	RUR	782.8	billion),	hereinafter	referred	to	as	FNB.
The	Reserve	Fund,	like	the	earlier	Stabilization	Fund,	is	a	part	of	the	federal	
budget.	The	Fund	is	intended	to	assist	the	government	to	uphold	budget	spending	
commitments	in	the	event	of	low	oil	and	gas	revenues.	The	normative	value	of	
the	Reserve	Fund	is	established	at	a	level	equal	to	10%	of	GDP.	In	contrast	to	
the	Stabilization	Fund	of	 the	Russian	Federation,	 in	addition	 to	 federal	budget	
revenues	from	oil	production	and	export,	the	sources	forming	the	Reserve	Fund	
also	include	federal	budget	revenues	from	gas	production	and	gas	export.
Figure 2. Reserve Fund Total Assets Volume 
Source: RF Ministry of Finance
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The	National	Welfare	Fund	is	a	part	of	the	federal	budget	subject	to	separate	
accounting	 and	 management	 to	 ensure	 co-financing	 of	 voluntary	 retirement	
savings	of	 the	Russian	citizens,	as	well	as	 to	cover	 the	deficit	of	 the	Pension	
Fund	budget.
Figure 3. National Welfare Fund Total Assets Volume 
Source: RF Ministry of Finance
The	Reserve	Fund	actually	became	a	functional	successor	of	the	Stabilization	
Fund	as	a	part	of	the	federal	budget	with	separate	accounting	and	management	
for	 the	purpose	of	oil	and	gas	 transfers	 in	 the	event	of	 insufficient	oil	and	gas	
revenues	for	the	financial	support	of	this	transfer.	The	reserve	fund	is	financed	by	
excess	oil	revenues	of	the	federal	budget	in	the	scope	authorized	for	the	financial	
year	in	the	amount	of	oil	and	gas	transfers,	provided	that	the	accumulated	amount	
of	 the	 Reserve	 Fund	 does	 not	 exceed	 its	 established	 value,	 as	 well	 as	 from	
revenues	derived	from	the	management	of	the	Reserve	Fund.	In	other	words,	it	
is	a	classic	commodity	fund.
In	turn,	the	FNB	is	close	to	the	sovereign	funds	or	future	generations	funds	
in	nature,	and	is	accumulated	from	oil	and	gas	revenues	of	the	federal	budget	
exceeding	the	amount	of	oil	and	gas	transfers	approved	for	the	financial	year,	in	
the	case	that	the	accumulated	amount	of	the	Reserve	Fund	reaches	(exceeds)	its	
established	value,	as	well	as	revenues	derived	from	FNB	management.	
As	of	June	1,	2010	the	Reserve	Fund	of	Russia	has	been	reduced	to	RUR	
1,197.66	billion	(USD	39.27	billion).	The	volume	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	is	
RUR	2,616.54	billion	(USD	85.8	billion).
Legal basis, accountability and reporting 
As	mentioned	above,	in	2003	the	Federal	Law	“On	Amendments	to	the	Budget	
Code	of	the	Russian	Federation	regarding	the	establishment	of	the	Stabilization	
Fund	 of	 the	Russian	 Federation”	 of	 23.12.2003	No.	 184-FZ	was	 adopted,	 on	
the	basis	of	which	in	2004	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	the	Russian	Federation	was	
established.	The	 law	has	 introduced	Chapter	 13.1	 in	 the	Budget	Code,	which	
 
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
3 000
3 500
 0
1.
02
.2
00
8
01
.0
3.
20
08
01
.0
4.
20
08
01
.0
5.
20
08
01
.0
6.
20
08
01
.0
7.
20
08
01
.0
8.
20
08
01
.0
9.
20
08
01
.1
0.
20
08
01
.1
1.
20
08
01
.1
2.
20
08
01
.0
1.
20
09
01
.0
2.
20
09
01
.0
3.
20
09
01
.0
4.
20
09
01
.0
5.
20
09
01
.0
6.
20
09
01
.0
7.
20
09
01
.0
8.
20
09
01
.0
9.
20
09
01
.1
0.
20
09
01
.1
1.
20
09
01
.1
2.
20
09
01
.0
1.
20
10
01
.0
2.
20
10
01
.0
3.
20
10
01
.0
4.
20
10
01
.0
5.
20
10
bi
lli
on
 ru
bl
es
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
bi
lli
on
 d
ol
la
rs
in billion rubles in billion dollars
134                                                                                                                                   
stipulated	fundamentals	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	and	its	management	procedure.
According	 to	 the	 law,	 the	Stabilization	Fund	 is	a	part	of	 the	 federal	budget	
assets,	formed	from	the	excess	of	oil	prices	over	the	baseline	price,	subject	to	
separate	accounting,	management	and	use	in	order	to	balance	the	federal	budget	
in	case	of	a	decrease	in	oil	prices	below	the	baseline.	
The	sources	of	the	initial	formation	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	were:	
•	 federal	budget	surplus	revenues,	which	are	assessed	as	an	excess	oil	
prices	over	the	baseline	price;
•	 balances	of	 the	 federal	budget	assets	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	 relevant	
fiscal	year,	including	the	proceeds	from	the	Stabilization	Fund	assets	allocation.
Additional	federal	budget	revenues	to	be	credited	to	the	Stabilization	Fund	in	
the	current	month	were	assessed	as	the	sum	of: 
•	 actual	 revenue	 to	 the	 federal	budget	 from	 the	export	customs	duty	on	
crude	oil	obtained	in	the	current	month,	multiplied	by	the	ratio	of	the	difference	
between	the	rate	of	export	duty	on	crude	oil	effective	in	the	current	month	and	
the	estimated	rate	of	that	duty	with	the	baseline	price	for	oil	to	the	rate	of	export	
customs	duty	on	crude	oil	effective	in	the	current	month;
•	 actual	revenue	of	the	federal	budget	from	severance	tax	(oil)	obtained	in	
the	current	month	multiplied	by	the	ratio	of	the	difference	between	the	severance	
tax	rate	effective	in	the	current	month	for	oil	extraction	and	the	estimated	rate	of	
this	tax	with	the	baseline	price	oil	extraction	tax	rate	effective	in	the	current	month	
on	extraction	of	minerals	(oil).	
Only	one	 target	was	 foreseen	 in	 the	RF	Budget	Code	 for	 the	Stabilization	
Fund,	namely	-	financing	of	the	federal	budget	deficit	“in	the	case	of	a	decrease	
in	oil	prices	below	the	baseline,	as	well	as	for	other	purposes,	if	the	accumulated	
volume	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	exceeds	500	million	rubles.”
According	to	Art.	96.4	BC	RF,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	of	Russia	was	authorized	
to	manage	the	Stabilization	Fund,	but	some	relevant	functions	could	be	performed	
by	the	Central	Bank	of	the	Russian	Federation.	The	list	of	functions	performed	by	
the	CBR	was	not	specified	in	the	Budget	Code.
As	an	effect	of	Chapter	13.1	of	the	RF	Budget	Code,	amendments	were	made	
mainly	in	regard	to	the	baseline	for	oil	prices,	but	not	affecting	the	management	
of	the	Fund	or	their	target	use.	At	the	executive	level,	the	management	procedure	
of	 the	 Stabilization	 Fund	 was	 governed	 by	 a	 number	 of	 legal	 acts,	 the	most	
important	of	which	are:
•	 The	RF	Government	Regulations	No.	508	of	30.09.2004	and	No.	229	
from	 21.04.2006	 “On	 the	 Procedure	 of	 the	 Stabilization	 Fund	 of	 the	 Russian	
Federation	Management”
•	 The	RF	Government	Regulation	No.	31	of	23.01.2004	“On	Approval	of	
the	Rules	of	transfer	to	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	the	Russian	Federation	of	the	
additional	 federal	 budget	 revenues,	 balances	 of	 the	 federal	 budget	 as	 of	 the	
beginning	of	the	fiscal	year,	and	revenues	from	the	allocation	of	the	Stabilization	
Fund	of	the	Russian	Federation”
•	 Order	of	the	RF	Ministry	of	Finance	No.	20	of	28.01.2004	“On	Approval	
of	Rules	 of	 assessment	 and	 transfer	 to	 the	Stabilization	Fund	 of	 the	Russian	
Federation	 of	 the	 federal	 budget	 surplus	 revenues	 and	 fund	 balances	 of	 the	
federal	budget	by	the	beginning	of	the	fiscal	year,”	and
•	 Order	of	the	RF	Ministry	of	Finance	No.	158	of	22.05.2006	“On	approval	
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of	 the	minimum	and	maximum	timelines	 for	 repayment	of	 the	debt	 liabilities	of	
foreign	 countries,	 in	 which	 the	 Stabilization	 Fund	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	
assets	can	be	invested.”
Of	 particular	 interest	 are	 the	 RF	 Government	 Regulation	 No.	 508	 of	
30.09.2004,	 “On	 the	order	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	of	 the	Russian	Federation	
assets	 management,”	 and	 No.	 229	 from	 21.04.2006	 “On	 the	 order	 of	 the	
management	of	funds	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	the	Russian	Federation.”	One	
of	 the	 key	 tasks	 in	 the	 first	 stage	was	 to	 set	 conditions	 for	 investment	 of	 the	
RF	Stabilization	Fund	by	the	Central	Bank	abroad	and	to	provide	at	least	some	
safeguards	 to	protect	 them	 from	claims	of	 foreign	creditors.	As	 investments	 in	
foreign	financial	 instruments,	federal	funds	lose	the	status	of	public	funds	and,	
accordingly,	any	state	jurisdictional	immunity.
The	 Regulation	 No.	 508	 of	 30.09.2004	 stipulated	 the	 following	 allocation	
of	 investments.	 The	 Fund	 assets	 were	 legally	 separated	 from	 the	 assets	 of	
the	 Central	 Bank1	 and	 were	 legally	 considered	 “commercial”	 investments	 of	
the	Russian	Federation	as	a	 legal	entity.	This	created	certain	 risks	 for	 foreign	
investments	of	the	Stabilization	Fund,	since	there	was	no	jurisdictional	immunity	
of	 the	Russian	 Federation	 in	 regard	 to	 those	 funds.	As	 a	 result,	 there	was	 a	
possibility	of	foreclosure	on	the	Stabilization	Fund	from	foreign	creditors.
The	 government	 feared	 the	 risk	 of	 foreclosure	 on	 these	 funds2,	 and	 the	
adoption	of	“on	the	procedure	for	managing	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	the	Russian	
Federation”	No.	229	from	21.04.2006	tried	to	give	them	the	status	of	funds	used	
for	 “governmental	 and	 non-commercial”	 purposes3,	 which	 are	 protected	 with	
jurisdictional	immunity.	To	this	end,	the	assets	placed	abroad	were	transferred	to	
the	status	of	funds	belonging	to	the	Central	Bank	of	Russia.
The	Regulation	provided	the	following	procedure	for	investing	the	Stabilization	
Fund	assets:	they	passed	to	the	Federal	Treasury,	and	the	Treasury	then	placed	
them	in	a	special	account	with	the	RF	Central	Bank,	not	on	the	basis	of	the	assets	
management	contract	as	it	was	before,	but	on	the	basis	of	a	contract	for	a	bank	
account.	 Since	 the	 funds	 deposited	 in	 an	 account	 with	 the	 bank	 are	 formally	
transferred	to	its	ownership,	it	allowed	the	Central	Bank	to	invest	them	abroad	as	
its	own	funds	used	for	“public	non-commercial	purposes.”	Herewith,	the	Ministry	
of	Finance	has	retained	the	key	responsibility	for	management	of	the	investment	
process	for	allocation	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	assets4.	
In	particular,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	was	authorized	to	define:
•	 the	standard	currency	structure	of	the	Stabilization	Fund,	the	procedure	
of	pursuing	the	standard	currency	structure;
•	 standards	of	minimum	and	maximum	maturity	of	debt	securities,	
1		The	assets	were	transferred	under	the	management	contract,	concluded	between	the	Russian	
Finance	Ministry	and	Central	Bank,	and	did	not	legally	become	the	property	of	RF	Central	Bank.
2		See,	for	instance,	United	Nation	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development.	World	Investment	
Report:	Transnational	Corporations,	Extractive	Industries	and	Development.	new	York	and	Geneva,	
2007.	P.	XVII.;	McKnight	A.	The	Law	of	International	Finance.	Oxford	University	Press,	2008.	P.	368,	
369.
3	 	 Immunity	 to	 this	 category	 of	 funds	 is	 provided	 under	 the	United	Nations	Convention	 “On	
Jurisdictional	Immunity	of	the	States	and	their	Property”	from	02.12.2004.
4		This	Decree	stipulates	“management	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance	of	
the	Russian	Federation”.
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•	 the	procedure	for	accounting	and	crediting	interest	accrued	on	balances	
of	the	Stabilization	Fund	accounts,	as	well	as	other	conditions	of	the	bank	account	
contract;	and
•	 the	 procedure	 of	 interaction	with	 the	 Federal	Treasury	 in	 carrying	 out	
transactions	with	the	accounts	of	the	Stabilization	Fund.
Monitoring	 of	 the	Russian	Finance	Ministry	 control	 functions	 over	 the	 use	
of	the	Stabilization	Fund	was	limited	to	the	duties	of	providing	quarterly	annual	
reports	to	the	Government	of	Russia	on	the	status	of	the	following	indicators:
•	 the	 amount	 of	 authorized	 foreign	 currency	 purchased	 and	 foreign	
currency	placed	on	the	accounts	of	the	Stabilization	Fund;
•	 estimated	interest	rates	for	the	allocation	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	assets	
in	the	accounts;	
•	 estimated	 income	 for	 the	allocation	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	assets	 in	
the	accounts;	
•	 names	 and	 basic	 characteristics	 of	 foreign	 countries’	 debt	 liabilities	
acquired	with	the	Stabilization	Fund	assets;	
•	 income	derived	from	the	placement	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	assets	into	
bonds	of	foreign	countries	by	type	of	debt	liabilities	of	foreign	countries;	
•	 information	on	balances	of	 the	accounts	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	(per	
year);and
•	 details	of	interest	paid	over	the	past	year	for	the	use	of	Stabilization	Fund	
assets	placed	in	the	accounts	(per	year).
In	2007,	the	procedure	for	the	formation	of	funds,	accumulating	oil	and	gas	
revenues	of	 the	 federal	budget,	and	 the	procedure	 to	manage	 the	 funds	were	
radically	 amended.	 Relevant	 amendments	 were	 made	 with	 the	 Federal	 Law	
No.	63-FZ	of	26.04.2007	“On	Amendments	to	the	Budget	Code	of	the	Russian	
Federation	 in	 terms	 of	 regulating	 the	 budgetary	 process	 and	 bringing	 certain	
legislative	acts	of	 the	Russian	Federation	 in	 line	with	 the	budget	 legislation	of	
the	Russian	Federation.”	Under	this	Act,	the	Stabilization	Fund	was	split	into	two	
parts,	and	the	following	were	established:	
1.	a	Reserve	Fund	in	order	to	minimize	the	risks	of	the	Russian	economy	in	
the	case	of	a	sharp	drop	in	energy	sources’	prices	in	the	world	markets	(Art.	96.9	
of	the	RF	Budget	Code)
2.	 a	 National	 Welfare	 Fund,	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 co-financing	 voluntary	
retirement	savings	of	the	Russian	Federation	citizens,	as	well	as	to	ensure	the	
balance	 (cover	 the	 deficit)	 of	 the	 budget	 of	 the	Pension	 Fund	 of	 the	Russian	
Federation	(Art.	96.10	BC	Code).
In	addition,	starting	from	2007,	a	part	of	the	oil	and	gas	revenue	was	used	as	
a	part	of	the	federal	budget	to	implement	in	particular	large-scale	social	programs	
and	replenishment	of	the	federal	budget	deficit	through	the	so-called	“oil	and	gas	
transfers”	(Article	96.8	of	the	RF	Budget	Code).
Reserve Fund
The	 reserve	 fund	 is	 formed	 from	 the	 oil	 revenues	 of	 the	 federal	 budget	
exceeding	the	level	of	oil	and	gas	transfers	authorized	for	the	relevant	financial	
year,	provided	that	the	cumulative	Reserve	Fund	does	not	exceed	its	established	
value,	as	well	as	from	revenues	from	the	management	of	the	reserve	fund.
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Item	 2	 of	 art.	 96.9	 of	 the	 RF	 Budget	 Code	 established	 a	 procedure	 for	
estimation	of	 the	normative	values	of	 the	Reserve	Fund.	Under	 this	 item,	 it	 is	
assigned	 an	 absolute	 amount,	 assessed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 10	 percent	 of	 GDP	
planned	for	the	relevant	fiscal	year.
However,	a	large	part	of	the	provisions	of	Art.	96.9	of	the	RF	Budget	Code	
were	not	 set	 to	be	put	 into	effect	until	 2013.	The	 relevant	decision	was	 taken	
as	part	of	the	anti-crisis	measures	and	approved	by	the	Federal	Law	No.	314-
FZ	of	17.12.2009	 “On	Amendments	 to	Certain	Legislative	Acts	of	 the	Russian	
Federation”	in	connection	with	the	Federal	Law	“On	the	federal	budget	for	2010	
and	the	planned	period	of	2011	and	2012.”
Before	2013,	while	 the	 revenue	 from	 the	Reserve	Fund	management	was	
allocated	 to	 financing	 the	 budget	 expenditures,	 the	 procedure	 for	 the	 fund	
assessment,	stipulated	by	Item	2	of	Article	96.9,	could	be	ignored.	Also,	before	
2013,	 the	 RF	 Government	 could,	 without	 amending	 the	 federal	 law	 on	 the	
federal	budget,	make	decisions	on	the	use	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	and	other	
balances	 of	 the	 federal	 budget	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 payments,	 reducing	
debt	liabilities,	borrowing,	and	to	balance	the	federal	budget	execution	(including	
financial	 support	 of	 oil	 and	 gas	 transfers),	 including	 the	 excess	 of	 the	 total	
federal	budget	expenditures	within	increased	budgetary	allocations	of	the	federal	
budget	to	provide	intergovernmental	transfers	in	order	to	balance	the	budgets	of	
state	extra-budgetary	 funds	of	 the	Russian	Federation,	with	 the	corresponding	
amendments	to	the	budget	registry5.
National Welfare Fund
According	to	Art.	96.10	of	the	RF	Budget	Code,	the	National	Welfare	Fund	
is	 formed	 from	oil	 revenues	of	 the	 federal	budget	exceeding	 the	amount	of	oil	
and	gas	transfers	approved	for	the	financial	year,	if	the	accumulated	amount	of	
the	Reserve	Fund	reaches	(exceeds)	its	established	value,	as	well	as	from	the	
income	derived	from	the	National	Welfare	Fund	management.	The	latter,	as	well	
as	 income	 from	 the	Reserve	Fund	management	 from	2009	 through	2013,	are	
allocated	to	the	financing	of	the	budget	expenditures6.	
Art.	96.11	of	the	RF	Budget	Code	establishes	the	procedure	for	managing	the	
Funds’	assets,	as	well	as	setting	up	requirements	for	the	assets	of	the	Funds	that	
can	be	used	for	investments.	These	requirements	are	specified	in	detail	on	the	
sub-law	level.	According	to	this	article,	the	Reserve	Fund	and	National	Welfare	
Fund	are	managed	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance	of	the	Russian	Federation	in	the	
manner	 established	 by	 the	Government	 of	 the	Russian	 Federation.	Herewith,	
some	 responsibility	 for	managing	 the	Reserve	Fund	can	be	performed	by	 the	
Central	 Bank	 of	 the	Russian	 Federation,	 and	 some	 of	 those	 in	 regard	 to	 the	
National	Welfare	Fund	-	by	the	Central	Bank	of	the	Russian	Federation	and	by	
special	financial	institutions,	in	accordance	with	agreements	with	the	Ministry	of	
Finance	of	the	Russian	Federation	in	the	manner	prescribed	by	the	Government	
of	the	Russian	Federation.
5		See	Federal	Law	№	58-FZ	of	09.04.2009	“On	amendments	to	the	Budget	Code	of	the	Russian	
Federation	and	some	legislative	acts	of	the	Russian	Federation”
6		See	Federal	Law	№	58-FZ	of	09.04.2009	“On	amendments	to	the	Budget	Code	of	the	Russian	
Federation	and	some	legislative	acts	of	the	Russian	Federation”
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Currently,	the	procedure	for	the	management	of	the	Funds	is	governed	by:
•	 The	RF	Government	Regulation	No.	892	of	17.12.2007	“On	the	estimates	
and	transfer	of	funds	in	connection	with	the	formation	and	usage	of	oil	and	gas	
revenues	of	the	federal	budget,	oil	and	gas	transfers	and	the	assets	of	Reserve	
Fund	and	National	Wealth;”
•	 The	RF	Government	Regulation	No.	955	of	29.12.2007	“On	the	procedure	
of	the	Reserve	Fund	management;”
•	 The	RF	Government	Regulation	No.	18	of	19.01.2008	“On	the	procedure	
of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	assets	management;”
•	 The	 Order	 of	 the	 RF	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 No.	 3	 of	 16.01.2008	 “On	
approval	of	 the	authorized	shares	 in	the	total	volume	of	financial	assets	of	 the	
Reserve	Fund	and	the	procedure	for	assessment	of	the	actual	authorized	share	
of	 financial	 assets	 in	 the	 total	 assets	 of	 the	Reserve	Fund	 to	 bring	 them	 into	
conformity	with	the	established	rates;”
•	 The	 Order	 of	 the	 RF	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 No.	 26	 of	 24.01.2008	 “On	
approval	of	 the	authorized	shares	 in	the	total	volume	of	financial	assets	of	 the	
National	Welfare	Fund	and	the	procedure	for	assessment	of	the	actual	authorized	
share	of	financial	assets	in	the	total	volume	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	to	bring	
them	into	conformity	with	the	established	rates;”
•	 The	Order	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance	N	517	of	21.10.2008	“On	amendments	
to	the	Order	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance	of	the	Russian	Federation	N	26	on	January	
24,	2008;”
•	 The	 Order	 of	 the	 RF	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 No.	 24	 of	 24.01.2008	 “On	
approval	 of	 the	 established	 foreign	 currency	 structure	 of	 the	National	Welfare	
Fund	 and	 the	 Procedure	 to	 bring	 the	 actual	 foreign	 currency	 structure	 of	 the	
National	Welfare	Fund	into	compliance	with	the	established	rates;”	and
•	 The	 Order	 of	 the	 RF	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 No.	 5	 of	 16.01.2008,	 “On	
approval	of	the	list	of	foreign	government	agencies	in	which	the	debt	liabilities	of	
the	Reserve	Fund	can	be	allocated.”
In	general,	the	management	procedure	of	the	Funds,	established	on	the	basis	
of	the	Stabilization	Fund,	is	governed	by	the	logic	laid	down	by	the	government	
in	the	Regulation	No.	229	issued	in	2006.	According	to	the	“new”	Order	No.	892	
of	 17.12.2007,	 the	 key	 functions	 associated	 with	 management	 decisions	 are	
performed	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	while	the	Central	Bank	carries	out	technical	
work	related	to	ensuring	their	 implementation.	Relations	among	the	Ministry	of	
Finance,	Treasury	and	Central	Bank	are	based	on	the	bank	account	agreement.	
The	Agreement,	 as	 before,	 is	 reached	between	 the	RF	Central	Bank	and	 the	
Treasury.
•	 According	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance	Order	No.	25H	of	14.02.2008,	the	oil	
and	gas	revenues	of	the	federal	budget,	the	Reserve	Fund	and	National	Welfare	
Fund	 are	 registered	 in	 special	 accounts	 of	 the	 federal	 budget	 opened	 for	 the	
Federal	Treasury	with	 the	Central	Bank	 of	 the	Russian	Federation.	 For	 these	
purposes,	in	accordance	with	the	Bank	Account	Agreement	entered	into	by	the	
Federal	Treasury	and	the	Central	Bank	of	the	Russian	Federation,	on	the	balance	
of	account	No.	40105	“The	federal	budget,”	separate	accounts	are	opened:
•	 to	account	for	oil	and	gas	revenues	of	the	federal	budget;	
•	 to	account	for	the	Reserve	Fund	assets	in	the	national	currency	of	the	
Russian	Federation	in	the	special	account	of	the	Reserve	Fund;
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•	 to	account	for	the	National	Welfare	Fund	assets	in	the	Russian	national	
currency	and	account	for	the	recording	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	assets.
Transfer	of	the	oil	and	gas	revenues	of	the	federal	budget,	the	Reserve	Fund	
and	National	Welfare	Fund	 in	 the	national	currency	of	 the	Russian	Federation	
is	 performed	 by	 the	 Federal	 Treasury	 upon	 instructions	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Finance	of	the	Russian	Federation	to	conduct	transactions	on	the	accounts	for	
the	accounting	of	oil	and	gas	revenues,	the	Reserve	Fund	and	National	Welfare	
Fund,	as	well	as	payment	documents.
All	 the	 above-mentioned	 laws	 provide	 for	 the	 minimum	 requirements	 in	
relation	to	the	control	process	over	investing	the	Reserve	Fund	and	the	National	
Welfare	Fund	assets.
Control	arises	from	the	fact	that	the	Finance	Ministry	provides	quarterly	and	
annual	reports	on	the	management	of	the	Funds	assets	to	the	government	of	the	
Russian	Federation.	The	reports	provided	to	the	Government	comprise:
•	 information	on	the	balances	of	the	Funds;	
•	 information	on	the	volume	of	the	bought	and	sold	assets;	
•	 information	on	the	estimated	 interest	 rates	 for	 the	usage	assets	of	 the	
Fund	allocated	to	the	accounts;
•	 information	on	the	estimated	amounts	of	income	derived	from	the	use	of	
the	funds	allocated	to	the	accounts	of	the	Funds;	
•	 the	 names	 and	 basic	 characteristics	 of	 financial	 assets,	 in	 which	 the	
Funds’	assets	were	placed;
•	 details	of	income	received	from	the	placement	of	funds.
In	addition,	no	later	than	on	the	20th	of	each	month,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	
compiles	 and	 publishes	 in	 its	 website	 monthly	 summary	 reports	 available	 for	
public	 use.	 Published	 reports	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 total	 assets	 of	 the	
National	Welfare	Fund	as	of	 the	beginning	of	 the	 reporting	month,	 as	well	 as	
information	on	 the	assets	credited	 to	 the	 fund,	 their	placement	and	use	 in	 the	
reporting	month.
These	requirements	on	the	control	over	investment	of	oil	and	gas	revenues	
are	 limited.	Speaking	of	 controlling	 the	use	of	 the	 funds,	one	should	also	pay	
attention	to	the	fact	that	the	representative	bodies	of	the	state	power	are	virtually	
not	involved	in	the	control	of	the	funds’	investments,	and	do	not	make	management	
decisions	on	these	issues.
Moreover,	as	noted	above,	from	2009	to	2013	the	decisions	on	the	use	of	the	
Reserve	Fund	were	made	by	the	RF	Government	with	no	changes	to	the	law	on	
the	federal	budget;	that	is,	the	fund	not	only	invests,	but	also	partly	spends	the	
Fund	assets	without	the	approval	of	the	Parliament.	Therefore,	the	management	
of	the	Funds	is	virtually	beyond	the	Parliament’s	control.
On	May	6,	2010	the	RF	Government	Regulation	No.	267	of	21.04.2010	“On	
the	suspension	of	the	acts	of	the	RF	Government	on	the	formation	and	use	of	
oil	 and	 gas	 revenues	 of	 the	 federal	 budget,	 income	 from	management	 of	 the	
Reserve	 Fund	 and	National	Welfare	 Fund”	 came	 into	 effect,	 under	which	 the	
following	requirements	for	the	Ministry	of	Finance	are	cancelled:
•	 publishing	 of	 information	 on	 the	 Russian	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 website	
about	the	collection	and	use	of	oil	and	gas	revenues	of	the	federal	budget,	their	
enrollment	in	the	Reserve	Fund	and	National	Wealth	Fund,	and	the	admission	of	
income	from	management	of	the	Reserve	Fund	and	National	Wealth	Fund	to	the	
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Fund	(before	February	1,	2012);
•	 submission	of	reports	to	the	Government	of	Russia	on	the	formation	of	
the	Reserve	Fund	and	National	Welfare	Fund	and	on	the	revenue	from	the	use	of	
oil	and	gas	revenues	of	the	federal	budget	(before	January	1,	2013).
In	addition,	issues	of	the	formation	and	usage	of	the	oil	and	gas	revenue	from	
before	 January	 1,	 2013	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 review	 for	 the	 formulation	 and	
approval	of	the	federal	budget	for	the	next	fiscal	year	and	the	planned	three-year	
term.
Thus,	this	Regulation	establishes	a	departure	from	the	concept	of	separation	
of	the	budget	by	oil	and	gas	and	non-oil	and-gas	components	and	of	oil	and	gas	
transfer	 as	 a	 source	 of	 funding	 the	 non-oil	 budget	 deficit,	 and	makes	 the	RF	
Ministry	of	Finance	and	the	Government	of	Russia	virtually	unaccountable	to	the	
State	Duma	in	terms	of	both	Funds’	assets	management.
However,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	RF	Ministry	 of	 Finance	 continued	 to	
publish	information	on	the	status	of	the	Funds	on	its	website	as	of	June	1,	2010.
Institutional base and institutional quality
Creation	of	the	RF	Stabilization	Fund	in	2004,	although	it	goes	beyond	the	
chronological	framework,	should	be	considered	in	the	context	of	the	overall	logic	
of	economic	 reforms	of	V.V.	Putin’s	 first	 term	 in	office	 (2000-2003),	of	 the	so-
called	 “Gref	 Program”7	 or	 “Strategy-2010.”	 In	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 program,	
radical	 tax	 reform	was	 carried	 out,	 the	 foundation	was	 laid	 for	 the	 new	 fiscal	
policy	 (transition	 to	 three-year	 budget	 planning),	 and	 the	 contours	 of	 major	
institutional	reforms	were	outlined	(administrative	reform,	judicial	reform,	reform	
of	natural	monopolies),	although	 the	 latter	ones,	unfortunately,	have	 remained	
largely	unimplemented.	In	addition,	when	making	economic	policy	decisions,	the	
then-recent	events	of	 the	crisis	 that	happened	 in	August	1998	were	taken	 into	
account,	leading	to	the	national	currency	devaluation,	the	enlarged	debt	burden	
on	the	budget	and	the	fear	of	uncontrolled	government	deficit.	In	particular,	the	
dynamics	 of	 oil	 prices	 in	 the	 world	markets,	 even	 in	 the	 short	 term,	 seemed	
extremely	volatile,	as	there	was	a	high	probability	of	a	new	decline	thereof	to	the	
level	of	$9-10	per	barrel,	as	was	observed	in	1998-1999.
In	this	context,	the	authors	of	the	concept	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	faced	the	
task	of	developing	a	reliable,	sustainable	mechanism	for	the	protection	of	export	
revenues	to	the	budget	from	their	usage	for	the	current	budget	commitments	and	
emerging	new	budgetary	commitments	 in	 the	case	of	a	short-term	 increase	 in	
oil	prices,	as	well	as	minimization	of	the	negative	impact	of	the	inflow	of	export	
revenues	on	 the	economy	 in	general	 (namely,	 preventing	 the	accumulation	of	
liquidity	in	the	economy,	the	situation	of	a	deficit	of	investment	projects,	and	the	
willingness	of	businesses	and	banks	to	invest	in	the	real	sector).
Thus,	as	stated	above,	in	institutional	terms,	the	RF	Stabilization	Fund	was	a	
part	of	the	federal	budget	assets,	subject	to	separate	accounting,	management	
and	utilization.	In	other	words,	the	Fund	assets	were	accounted	for	and	placed	
in	a	special	account	of	the	RF	Ministry	of	Finance	with	the	RF	Central	Bank	of	
Russia.	The	planned	 revenue	 to	 the	Fund	 for	 the	 relevant	 fiscal	 year	and	 the	
7	 	Named	after	the	Minister	of	Economic	Development	G.	O.	Gref.
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amount	of	the	Fund	as	of	the	end	of	each	financial	year	were	approved	by	the	
Federal	Assembly	(Parliament)	of	Russia	by	the	law	on	the	federal	budget	for	the	
next	fiscal	year	and	the	planned	three-year	term.
Management	of	 the	Fund	was	executed	by	 the	RF	Central	Bank	under	an	
agreement	with	the	RF	Ministry	of	Finance.	Herewith,	the	Bank	of	Russia,	in	fact,	
acted	as	the	management	company,	and	the	RF	Government	and	the	Russian	
Ministry	of	Finance	defined	the	strategy	for	the	management	of	the	Fund	and	a	
scope	of	permissible	assets.
The	RF	Reserve	Fund	of	Russia	and	the	National	Welfare	Fund	also	make	up	
a	part	of	the	federal	budget	subject	to	separate	accounting	and	management.	At	
the	same	time,	they	are	(at	least	until	the	beginning	of	May	2010)	subject	to	the	
same	institutional	constraints	and	conditions	as	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	Russia.	
Assessing	the	overall	quality	of	the	institutional	environment	of	the	Russian	
sovereign	funds,	one	can	distinguish	the	following	advantages	and	disadvantages.	
Advantages
•	 Strong	 legal	 status	 of	 the	 Funds	 through	 the	 addition	 of	 individual	
Chapters	to	the	Budget	Code,	which	before	the	crisis	created	a	reliable	system	
for	protecting	the	Funds’	assets	from	political	and	situational	temptations	on	the	
part	of	both	the	RF	Government	and	representatives	of	the	power	authorities.
•	 Formation	of	the	funds	in	special	accounts	of	the	RF	Government	in	the	
Bank	 of	 Russia,	 which	minimized	 the	 effect	 of	 additional	 situational	 revenues	
from	oil	exports	not	only	to	the	budget	system,	but	also	on	monetary-credit	and	
exchange	rate	policies.
•	 An	adequate	linking	of	the	sources	of	the	Funds’	formation	with	the	market	
revenues	from	oil	exports.	Calculations	show	that	in	2005-2008,	when	the	level	
of	oil	prices	in	the	world	market	was	above	$35-40	per	barrel	versus	the	national	
market,	up	to	95%	of	the	surplus	income	from	oil	exports	were	addressed	to	the	
Stabilization	Fund	in	the	form	of	export	duties	and	mineral	extraction	tax.
•	 Splitting	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	 into	 the	Reserve	Fund	and	National	
Welfare	Fund	in	2008.	Even	during	the	worst	crisis	situation	in	Russia,	in	2008-
2009,	 and	 the	 high	 budget	 deficit	 in	 the	 subsequent	 years,	 the	 institutional	
conditions	allowed	the	National	Welfare	Fund	to	be	saved	as	a	sovereign	fund	
for	future	generations,	using	it	for	financing	the	federal	budget	deficit.	Obviously,	
if	 only	one	of	 the	Stabilization	Funds	had	been	maintained	during	 this	period,	
its	 funds	would	have	been	 fully	spent	 for	 the	solution	of	 the	current	budgetary	
problems.
Shortages
•	 The	conservative	management	scheme	of	the	Funds.	Management	of	all	
Fund	assets	remains	in	the	hands	of	the	agencies,	for	which	this	issue	is	outside	
their	 main	 objective	 (RF	 Central	 Bank	 and	 the	 Russian	 Ministry	 of	 Finance).	
Involvement	of	private	professional	management	companies	(Russian	or	foreign)	
in	the	management	of	the	Funds	remains	politically	unacceptable.
•	 The	 lack	of	a	 legal	 framework	 for	 targeted	parameters	of	 the	National	
Welfare	Fund.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	objective	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	was	
declared	the	“co-financing	of	voluntary	retirement	savings	of	Russian	citizens,”	
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as	well	as	“recovering	of	the	(deficit)	budget	of	the	Pension	Fund,”	the	required	
parameters	 are	 not	 in	 place	 to	 link	 to	 the	 pension	 fund	 reform.	 Under	 these	
circumstances,	the	National	Welfare	Fund	could	exclusively	become	a	source	of	
funding	for	the	current	deficit	of	the	Pension	Fund,	and	not	a	tool	for	solving	long-
term	problems	of	the	pension	system	in	the	Russian	Federation.
•	 The	 lack	 of	 institutional	 capacity	 to	 develop	 individual	 strategies	 for	
managing	the	assets	of	the	two	existing	Funds,	not	only	based	on	principles	of	
risk	management,	but	also	to	ensure	maximum	yield	at	a	given	level	of	risk.
Investment Portfolio and Asset Management
In	the	period	from	2004	to	2006,	the	following	requirements	were	applied	to	
assets	that	can	be	invested	in	the	Stabilization	Fund:
a)	the	issuer	of	the	debt	liabilities	should	have	a	long-term	credit	rating	of	not	
lower	 than	the	 level	“AAA”	by	the	classification	of	Fitch	Ratings	or	Standard	&	
Poor’s,	or	not	below	the	level	of	“AAA”	under	the	rating	agency	Moody’s	Investors	
Service;
b)	maturity	of	debt	securities	 is	fixed;	 the	terms	of	 issue	and	circulation	do	
not	provide	the	issuer	the	right	to	affect	their	early	redemption	(maturity)	or	the	
right	of	the	owner	to	submit	them	for	redemption	(maturity)	by	the	issuer	of	debt	
instruments	ahead	of	schedule;	
c)	the	current	maturity	date	of	issue	does	not	exceed	one	year	for	discount	
liabilities	or	10	years	for	coupon	bonds;
d)	coupon	rate	paid	on	coupon	bonds	is	fixed
e)	the	bond	value	is	denominated	in	one	of	the	authorized	foreign	currencies	
and	 payments	 toward	 the	 debt	 liabilities	 are	 made	 in	 the	 currency	 of	 its	
denomination;
f)	the	volume	of	the	debt	liabilities	issued	in	circulation	is	not	less	than	US$	
1	billion	for	the	debt	liabilities	denominated	in	U.S.	dollars,	Euro	1	billion	for	debt	
liabilities	denominated	 in	Euro,	or	GBP	1	billion	 for	 the	bonds	denominated	 in	
pounds	sterling.
From	2006	to	2007	the	requirements	underwent	minimal	changes	whereby	
the	volume	of	debt	 liabilities	 in	circulation	and	denominated	 in	pounds	sterling	
was	reduced	from		GBP	1	billion	to	0.5	billion.
Also	 in	 the	Resolution	No.	 229	 of	 21.04.2006	 there	 appeared	 a	 clarifying	
requirement	that	the	issuance	of	debt	liabilities	in	which	investments	are	made	
should	not	be	issues	intended	for	private	(non-public)	placement.	In	addition,	it	
was	stated	in	the	Regulation	that	the	standards	of	the	minimum	and	maximum	
term	to	maturity	of	the	bond	issues	are	established	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance.
The	distribution	of	shares	among	the	various	types	of	investment	instruments	
used	 for	 placement	 of	 the	 Fund	 assets	 was	 established	 by	 the	 Order	 of	 RF	
Ministry	 of	 Finance	No.	 157	 of	 22.05.2006,	 providing	 for	 the	 following	 foreign	
currency	structure	of	the	Stabilization	Fund:
•	 U.S.	Dollar	-	45%;
•	 Euro	-	45%;	
•	 Pound	Sterling	-	10%.
The	 limits	 of	 permissible	 deviations	 of	 actual	 monetary	 structure	 of	 the	
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Stabilization	Fund	from	the	estimated	foreign	currency	structure	were: 
•	 for	the	Stabilization	Fund	in	U.S.	dollars	-	+	/	-	5	percentage	points;
•	 for	the	Stabilization	Fund	in	Euro	-	+	/	-	5	percentage	points
•	 for	the	Stabilization	Fund	in	British	pounds	sterling	-	+	/	-	2	percentage	
points.	
In	2007,	the	Finance	Ministry	also	clarified	the	requirements	for	the	minimum	
and	maximum	maturity	of	debt	by	the	Order	of	the	RF	Ministry	of	Finance	No.	737	
of	05.12.2007	“On	approval	of	standards	for	the	minimum	and	maximum	maturity	
term	of	bond	issues	of	foreign	countries	in	which	the	assets	of	the	Stabilization	
Fund	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 may	 be	 located.”	 For	 the	 debt	 instruments	
denominated	in	U.S.	dollars	and	Euro,	the	minimum	term	to	maturity	has	been	
set	at	2	months,	and	the	maximum	-	15	months.	For	the	liabilities	denominated	in	
British	pounds	sterling	the	minimum	term	to	maturity	was	set	at	3	months	and	the	
maximum	term	-	36	months.
During	 the	functioning	period	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	the	procedure	of	 its	
investment	 policy	 had	 been	 developed	 only	 in	 general	 and	 was	 insufficiently	
detailed8.	There	were	no	rules	governing	the	formation	of	the	investment	policy	
of	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Finance.	In	particular,	there	was	no	clear	regulation	of	
the	order	of	information	interaction	between	the	Ministry	of	Finance	and	Treasury,	
although	the	need	for	such	a	procedure	was	mentioned	in	the	regulations	of	the	
Government.
Once	 the	Stabilization	Fund	was	split	 into	 the	Reserve	Fund	and	National	
Welfare	 Fund,	 the	 regulation	 of	 matters	 related	 to	 investment	 of	 their	 assets	
was	 detailed9.	 In	 particular,	 the	 order	 of	 the	 RF	Ministry	 of	 Finance	 No.	 25H	
from	14.02.2008	regulated	the	issues	of	the	information	exchange	with	the	RF	
Treasury.
According	to	Resolutions	No.	955	and	No.	18,	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Finance	
established:
a)	a	standard	foreign	currency	structure	of	assets	of	both	funds,	the	procedure	
for	bringing	the	actual	foreign	currency	structure	of	the	Funds	into	alignment	with	
the	established	standards;
b)	 the	 share	 of	 financial	 assets	 authorized	 for	 allocation	 in	 the	 total	 Fund	
assets	within	 the	 prescribed	 requirements	 and	 procedure	 for	 estimates	 of	 the	
actual	share	of	financial	assets	authorized	for	allocation	in	the	total	Fund	assets	
(bringing	them	into	conformity	with	the	normative	shares);
c)	standard	minimum	and	maximum	maturity	terms	of	debt	liabilities	of	foreign	
countries,	foreign	government	agencies	and	central	banks,	and	of	international	
financial	organizations,	including	those	in	securities;
d)	a	list	of	foreign	government	agencies	into	the	debt	instruments	of	which	the	
Fund	assets	can	be	placed;
e)	standard	minimum	and	maximum	terms	of	placing	 the	 funds	on	deposit	
with	foreign	banks	and	credit	institutions;
f)	procedures	for	estimates	of	credits	and	interest	earned	on	funds	deposited	
in	the	Fund	accounts	and	other	provisions	of	the	bank	account	contracts;
8	 	These	were	provided	 in	 the	RF	government	Regulation	No.	508	of	30.09.2004	and	 in	 the	
Annex	to	the	RF	government	Regulation	No.	229	of	21.04.2006.
9		List	of	normative	acts	regulating	the	management	of	investment	funds	policy	is	given	above.
144                                                                                                                                   
g)	 procedures	 of	 interaction	 with	 the	 Federal	 Treasury	 in	 carrying	 out	
transactions	with	the	Fund	accounts	in	the	management	of	the	Reserve	Fund;
h)	procedures	of	interaction	with	Federal	Treasury	in	determining	the	terms	of	
the	contract	with	bank	accounts	in	the	management	of	the	Funds	assets.
In	 addition,	 the	 two	Regulations	 (in	 the	 annexes)	 have	 approved	 detailed	
requirements	for	financial	assets	in	which	the	National	Welfare	Fund	and	Reserve	
Fund	assets	may	be	placed.
Thus,	 the	 regulation	 of	 issues	 related	 to	 the	 process	 of	 the	 Funds’	
management	has	become	more	detailed	in	general.	However,	the	procedures	are	
still	insufficient	to	regulate	how	individual	authorities	manage	the	Funds’	assets	
by	means	of	specialized	financial	institutions,	as	well	as	their	involvement	in	the	
implementation	of	those	powers10.
There	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 in	 the	 issues	 related	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	
investment	transactions	by	the	Central	Bank	that	carries	out	the	actual	allocation	
of	the	funds.	Currently,	there	are	no	internal	Central	Bank	regulations	governing	
such	functions	in	this	area.	
Thus,	 in	 2004	 and	 2005	 there	 were	 no	 investment	 transactions	 of	 the	
Stabilization	 Fund	 assets.	 During	 the	 period	 from	 July	 24,	 2006	 (the	 starting	
date	of	 investment	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund)	 through	December	15,	2007,	 the	
total	 income	 from	 the	 investments	amounted	 to	174.8	billion	 rubles.	 (Over	 the	
year	from	December	15,	2006	to	December	15,	2007	the	revenue	reached	151.9	
billion	rubles).	Therefore,	the	returns	from	investments	in	U.S.	dollars	for	the	year	
amounted	to	10.94%	per	annum	and	in	rubles	-	about	5%.	Given	the	annual	rate	
of	inflation	(respectively	11.7%	and	10.9%),	we	can	see	a	negative	return	on	the	
Fund.
Table 2. Stabilization Fund Growth Rate in RUR1) and in USD2), %
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Source: RF Ministry of Finance
10		The	need	for	such	regulation	is	expressly	provided	by	the	Resolution	№	18,	which	obliged	the	
Ministry	of	Finance	jointly	with	other	agencies	(Ministry	of	Economic	Development,	Federal	Financial	
Markets	Service,	the	Ministry	of	Justice	and	Central	Bank)	to	“develop	and	submit	to	the	Government	
of	the	Russian	Federation	the	draft	Regulation	in	the	established	procedure.”
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Requirements for placing assets of the Reserve Fund
In	general,	the	requirements	for	the	Fund	assets	are	stipulated	in	Art.	69.11	
of	the	RF	Budget	Code,	and	also	given	in	detail	at	the	sub-law	level11.	The	Article	
presents	various	requirements	for	the	investment	of	the	two	Funds.
Options	for	allocation	of	the	Reserve	Fund	assets	are	much	more	limited	than	
those	for	the	placement	of	the	Fund	of	National	Welfare	assets.	Reserve	Fund	
assets	may	be	placed	in	foreign	currency	and	in	the	following	types	of	financial	
instruments	denominated	in	foreign	currency:
•	 debt	liabilities	of	foreign	countries;
•	 debt	liabilities	of	foreign	government	agencies	and	central	banks12;
•	 debt	 liabilities	 of	 international	 financial	 organizations,	 including	
securities13;
•	 deposits	and	balances	 in	bank	accounts	with	 foreign	banks	and	credit	
organizations;
•	 deposits	 and	 account	 balances	 with	 the	 Central	 Bank	 of	 Russian	
Federation.
RF	Government	Regulation	No.	 955	 of	 29.12.2007	 «On	 the	management	
procedure	of	administration	of	the	Reserve	Fund»	clarifies	these	requirements,	
setting	minimum	and	maximum	shares	of	the	allocated	assets,	as	well	as	more	
detailed	requirements	for	them.
Thus,	 the	 share	 of	 foreign	 countries’	 debts	 should	 be	 from	 50	 to	 100%.	
Herewith,	such	assets	can	be	invested	exclusively	in	debt	instruments	in:	Austria,	
Belgium,	 Britain,	 Germany,	 Denmark,	 Ireland,	 Spain,	 Canada,	 Luxembourg,	
Netherlands,	USA,	Finland,	France	and	Sweden.
The	Regulation	contains	an	open	list14	of	recommended	international	financial	
institutions	whose	debt	 liabilities	 can	be	used	 for	 investment.	They	are:	Asian	
Development	Bank,	ADB;	Council	of	Europe	Development	Bank,	CEB;	European	
Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development,	EBRD;	European	Investment	Bank,	
EIB;	Inter-American	Development	Bank,	IADB;	International	Finance	Corporation,	
IFC;	 International	 Bank	 for	 Reconstruction	 and	 Development,	 IBRD;	 Nordic	
Investment	Bank,	NIB;	and	International	Monetary	Fund,	IMF.
The	 right	 to	 define	 the	 currency	 structure	 of	 both	 Funds,	 as	 before,	 was	
provided	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	According	to	the	Sub-Item	A,	Item	4	of	the	
Regulation	 No.	 955,	 «On	 management	 of	 the	 Reserve	 Fund,	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Finance	 approves	 ...	 normative	 currency	 structure	 of	 the	Reserve	 Fund»	 and	
11		See	the	RF	Government	Decree	№	955	of	29.12.2007	“On	the	management	procedure	of	the	
Reserve	Fund”	and	the	RF	Government	Decree	№	18	of	19.01.2008	“On	the	management	procedure	
of	the	Fund	of	National	Welfare”.
12	 	The	 share	 of	 foreign	 government	 agencies	 and	 central	 banks	 assets	 should	 not	 exceed	
30%.	See	the	RF	Government	Decree	№	955	of	29.12.2007	“On	the	management	procedure	of	the	
Reserve	Fund”.
13	 	The	 share	of	 these	assets	 should	 be	15%.	See	 the	RF	Government	Decree	№	955	 	 of	
29.12.2007	“On	the	management	procedure	of	the	Reserve	Fund”
14	 	 The	 regulation	 uses	 the	 following	 wording:	 “the	 debt	 liabilities	 of	 international	 financial	
organizations,	in	which	the	Funds	assets	can	be	invested	include	the	debt	liabilities,	securities	among	
them,	of	the	following	financial	 institutions	....”	That	is,	other	instruments	besides	those	among	the	
listed	“including	the	securities”	are	likely	to	be	used.
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the	procedure	for	bringing	the	actual	currency	structure	of	the	Reserve	Fund	into	
accordance	with	the	established	standard.
Currently	 the	 currency	 structure	 of	 the	 Reserve	 Fund	 is	 governed	 by	 the	
Order	of	the	RF	Ministry	of	Finance	No.	3	of	16.01.2008.	The	Order	established	
the	following	authorized	shares	in	the	total	amount	of	the	Reserve	Fund:
•	 debt	liabilities	of	foreign	countries	-	95%;
•	 debt	liabilities	of	foreign	government	agencies	and	central	banks	-	0%;	
•	 debt	liabilities	of	international	financial	organizations,	including	securities	
-	5%;	
•	 deposits	in	foreign	banks	and	credit	institutions	-	0%.
This	limits	the	permissible	deviations	of	actual	shares	of	the	financial	assets	
in	the	total	amount	of	allocated	funds	from	the	Reserve	Fund	from	the	established	
shares	as	follows:
•	 for	the	debt	liabilities	of	foreign	countries	-	+/-	5	percentage	points;
•	 for	 the	 debt	 liabilities	 of	 international	 financial	 organizations,	 including	
securities,	-	+/-	5	percentage	points. 
In	addition,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	has	approved	the	formula	for	assessment	
of	the	actual	share	of	financial	assets	of	the	Reserve	Fund	and	deviations	of	the	
actual	share	of	financial	assets	from	the	established	share	of	financial	assets.
The	Regulation	No.	955	of	29.12.2007	imposes	the	following	requirements	
for	the	debt	instruments	for	the	investment	of	the	Reserve	Fund:
•	 the	issuer	of	the	debt	instruments	should	have	a	long-term	credit	rating	not	
lower	than	«AA-	according	to	the	classification	of	Fitch-Ratings	or	the	Standard	
&	Poor's	rating	agencies	or	not	below	the	«GaAs»	by	classification	of	Moody's	
Investors	Service	rating	agency.	If	the	issuer	of	debt	liabilities	is	assigned	different	
long-term	credit	ratings	by	those	agencies,	the	lowest	assigned	long-term	credit	
rating	 is	 selected.	Compared	with	 the	 requirements	 to	 the	 selection	 criteria	 in	
relation	to	assets	used	to	invest	the	Stabilization	Fund	assets,	the	requirements	
contained	in	the	RF	Government	Regulation	No.	955	of	29.12.2007	were	reduced.	
As	mentioned	above,	previous	requirements	to	the	assets	were		«AAA»15	level	
or	«AAA»16	ratings;	
•	 Maturity	terms	of	the	debt	liabilities	are	fixed;	the	conditions	of	issue	and	
circulation	do	not	provide	the	issuer	the	right	to	carry	out	their	early	redemption	
(maturity)	and	the	rights	of	the	owner	of	the	debt	to	submit	them	for	redemption	
(maturity)	by	the	issuer	ahead	of	schedule;
•	 standards	 of	 the	minimum	and	maximum	maturity	 terms	 for	 the	 bond	
issues,	 established	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Finance	of	 the	Russian	Federation,	 are	
mandatory;
•	 coupon	yield	rate	on	coupon	bonds,	and	the	nominal	value	of	the	debt	
liabilities,	are	fixed;
•	 denomination	 of	 debt	 is	 expressed	 in	 U.S.	 dollars,	 Euro	 and	 Pounds	
Sterling,	 and	 payments	 under	 debt	 liabilities	 are	 made	 in	 the	 currency	 of	
denomination;
•	 the	volume	of	debt	liabilities	issued	in	circulation	is	not	less	than	US$	1	
billion	for	debt	liabilities	denominated	in	U.S.	dollars,	not	less	than	EUR	1	billion	
15		According	to	classifications	of	Fitch-Ratings	or	Standard	&	Poor’s	rating	agencies.
16		According	to	classifications	of	Moody’s	Investors	Service	rating	agency.
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for	the	debt	liabilities	denominated	in	Euro,	and	at	least	BSP	0.5	billion	for	debt	
liabilities	denominated	in	pounds	sterling;
•	 debt	liability	issuance	is	not	intended	for	private	(non-public)	placement;
•	 the	nominal	amount	of	debt	liabilities	purchased	from	one	issue	should	
not	exceed	15	percent	of	the	nominal	amount	of	the	issue;
•	 the	 total	 volume	 of	 the	 Reserve	 Fund	 invested	 on	 deposit	 in	 foreign	
banks	or	credit	institutions	shall	not	exceed	25	percent	of	the	total	Reserve	Fund.
Requirements for placing assets of the National Welfare 
Fund
According	to	Art.	96.11	of	the	RF	Budget	Code,	the	National	Welfare	Fund	
may	 also	 be	 allocated	 in	 all	 of	 the	 above	 instruments,	 except	 for	 deposits	 in	
foreign	banks.	However,	the	Fund	assets	may	additionally	be	invested	in:
•	 deposits	and	bank	account	balances	with	banks	and	credit	organizations,	
as	well	as	in	the	State	Corporation	«Bank	for	Development	and	Foreign	Economic	
Affairs	(Vnesheconombank);»
•	 debt	securities	and	stocks	of	legal	entities;
•	 shares	(stakes)	of	investment	funds.
In	addition,	the	National	Welfare	Fund	assets	can	be	transferred	to	the	trust	
management	of	specialized	financial	institutions.17
Provisions	of	the	Budget	Code	are	detailed	in	the	RF	Government	Regulation	
No.	18	of	19.01.2008		«On	the	procedure	of	management	of	the	Fund	of	National	
Welfare.”	To	a	large	extent,	they	repeat	the	requirements	for	assets	used	for	the	
placement	of	the	Reserve	Fund.	Thus,	the	Resolution	No.	18	has	stipulated:	
•	 a	similar	list	of	countries	whose	debt	liabilities	(as	well	as	the	liabilities	of	
their	agencies	and	central	banks)	may	be	used	for	allocation	of	assets;	
•	 a	similar	list	of	international	financial	organizations,
•	 similar	requirements	for	long-term	credit	rating	of	foreign	issuers	of	debt	
liabilities.
However,	 since	 the	 list	of	assets	used	 to	 invest	 the	National	Wealth	Fund	
assets	is	broader,	the	RF	Government	Regulation	No.	18	of	19.01.2008	mentions	
a	number	of	specific	requirements.	Thus:
-	among	other	things,	the	Regulation	includes	the	following	requirements	to	
the	debt	 liabilities	of	the	Russian	companies.	Russian	issuers	of	debt	 liabilities	
should	 have	 a	 long-term	 credit	 rating	 not	 lower	 than	 the	 “BBB-”	 level	 by	 the	
classification	of	Fitch	Ratings	or	Standard	&	Poor's,	or	not	lower	than	the	level	
of	“Baa3”	by	the	classification	of	Moody's	Investors	Service	rating	agency.	If	the	
Russian	issuer	is	assigned	different	long-term	credit	ratings,	the	lowest	assigned	
is	selected	as	the	long-term	credit	rating.
Thus,	 the	 requirements	 for	 the	 debt	 liability	 rating	 of	 foreign	 issuers18 are 
higher	than	the	requirements	for	the	Russian	ones.
17		The	founder	of	the	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	trust	management	is	the	Russian	Federation.	
The	Ministry	of	Finance	of	the	Russian	Federation	is	in	charge	of	legal	relations	in	connection	with	the	
establishment	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	trust	management	on	behalf	of	the	Russian	Federation.
18	 	As	mentioned	 above,	 their	 rating	 has	 to	 be	 at	 least	 level	 “AA-”	 under	 the	 classification	
of	Fitch-Ratings	or	Standard	&	Poor’s,	 or	 at	 least	 level	 “АаЗ”	 under	 the	 classification	of	Moody’s	
Investors	Service.
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-	in	relation	to	shares	and	stocks	(shares	of	participation)	of	investment	funds,	
the	following	requirements	are	established19:	
•	 shares	of	legal	entities	should	be	included	in	the	quotation	list	of	at	least	
one	stock	exchange;
•	 shares	of	foreign	issuers	should	be	included	in	the	lists	of	securities	used	
to	estimate	the	stock	indices	of	MSCI	World	Index	and	FTSE	All-World	Index;
•	 shares	of	Russian	companies	should	be	included	in	the	lists	of	securities	
used	to	estimate	the	stock	indices	of	RTS	or	MICEX;
•	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 assets	 of	 investment	 funds,	whose	 issued	 shares	
(stakes)	should	include	only	the	authorized	financial	assets.
-	in	relation	to	deposits	and	accounts	with	the	banks	and	credit	institutions,	the	
following	requirements	are	established.	The	bank	or	credit	organization	should	
have	a	long-term	credit	rating	not	lower	than	“AA-”	according	to	the	classification	
of	 Fitch-Ratings	 or	 Standard	 &	 Poor's	 rating	 agencies	 or	 not	 below	 the	 level	
of	 “Aa3”	 by	 the	 classification	 of	Moody's	 Investors	Service	 rating	 agency.	 If	 a	
bank	or	credit	organization	is	assigned	a	different	of	long-term	rating	by	of	those	
agencies,	the	lowest	rating	is	assigned	as	a	long-term	credit	rating;
-	in	relation	to	deposits	of	the	State	Corporation	«Bank	for	Development	and	
Foreign	Economic	Affairs	 (Vnesheconombank),	 the	 following	 requirements	are	
established:
•	 the	funds	can	be	placed	on	deposit	in	Russian	rubles,	U.S.	dollars,	Euro	
and	Pounds	Sterling;
•	 the	maximum	total	amount	to	be	placed	on	deposits	 in	Russian	rubles	
is	655	billion	rubles.	At	the	same	time,	up	to	175	billion	rubles	can	be	placed	on	
deposit,	the	amount,	term	and	other	essential	provisions	of	which	are	determined	
by	the	Ministry	of	Finance.
With	regard	to	the	National	Welfare	Fund,	the	Ministry	of	Finance20	has	also	
established	 the	 authorized	 standard	 shares	 of	 the	 total	 assets	 of	 the	 Fund	 in	
foreign	currency	to	be	invested	in	financial	instruments,	denominated	in	foreign	
currency:
•	 debt	instruments	of	foreign	countries	-	80%;
•	 debt	liabilities	of	foreign	government	agencies	and	central	banks	-	15%;
•	 debt	liabilities	of	international	financial	institutions,	including	securities	-	
5%;	
•	 deposits	 and	 balances	 in	 the	 accounts	 with	 foreign	 banks	 and	 credit	
institutions	-	0%;	
•	 stocks	and	shares	(stakes)	of	foreign	legal	entities	-	0%;
•	 debt	liability	securities	of	foreign	legal	entities	-	0%.
•	 the	Order	of	the	RF	Ministry	of	Finance	No.	24	of	24.01.2008	approves	
the	following	normative	currency	structure	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund:
•	 U.S.	Dollar	-	45%	+/-	5	percentage	points,
•	 Euro	-	45%,	+/-	5	percentage	points;
19		If	acquired	shares	of	legal	entities	or	stocks	(shares	of	participation)	of	investment	funds	do	
not	match	any	of	the	above	requirements,	such	shares	or	stocks	(shares	of	participation)	of	investment	
funds	are	to	be	sold	within	3	months	from	the	date	of	inconsistency	arising.
20		See	the	Order	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance	No.	517	from	21.10.2008	“On	Amending	the	Order	
of	the	Ministry	of	Finance	of	the	Russian	Federation	No.	26	of	January	24,	2008”.
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•	 Pound	Sterling	-	10	%,+/-	2	percentage	points.
Thus,	the	currency	structure	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	is	no	different	from	
the	currency	structure	of	the	Stabilization	Fund.
During	the	first	year	after	the	Reserve	Fund	and	the	National	Welfare	Fund	
formation	(from	February	1,	2008	to	February	1,	2009),	their	management	had	
negative	US$	 returns,	which	amounted	 to	 -2.47%.	Given	 those	dynamics,	 the	
Russian	Ministry	of	Finance	has	proposed	a	new	index	--	the	so-called	aggregate	
profitability--	which	does	not	take	into	account	the	fluctuations	of	the	Euro,	Pound	
Sterling	and	US	dollar.	The	aggregated	index	of	return	in	the	currency	basket	for	
the	year	amounted	to	5.41%	(see Table. 3).
Table 3. Annual Revenue from the Reserve Fund and National Welfare 
Fund management (over the year from 02.2008 to 02.2009),%
Currency Account currency In USD In RUR
USD 3.9 3.9 35.14
Euro 5.94 –4.99 23.67
GBP 9.58 –19.8 4.57
Total 5.41 –2.47 26.92
Source: RF Ministry of Finance
When	converted	into	Euro,	the	total	gain	would	amount	to	9.3%	per	annum,	
and	 into	 rubles	 -	more	 than	26%	per	annum.	The	main	 reason	 for	 the	 loss	of	
funds	 in	dollar	 terms	was	the	U.S.	dollar’s	strengthening	against	 the	Euro	and	
British	pound	sterling	 in	2008.	Setting	a	tight	 limit	on	currencies	prevented	the	
compensation	for	the	negative	impact	of	weakening	currencies,	in	which	55%	of	
both	funds	were	denominated.
Macroeconomic and fiscal linkages; highlights of political 
economy
In	terms	of	macroeconomic	effects	and	implications	of	the	sovereign	wealth	
funds’	formation	in	Russia,	there	are	three	noteworthy	aspects:
1.	Intertemporal	stabilization	of	the	federal	budget.
2.	Support	 to	 the	RF	Central	Bank’s	anti-inflationary	policy	and	policies	of	
limited	RUR	appreciation.
3.	Funding	of	anti-crisis	measures	in	2008-2009.
Budget Policy
As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 main	 objective	 of	 the	 RF	 Stabilization	 Fund	
establishment	 was	 institutionalized	 accumulation	 of	 surpluses	 of	 the	 federal	
budget	 under	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 external	 environment	 due	 to	 the	 high	
oil	 revenues.	 Oil	 and	 gas	 revenues	 include	 proceeds	 from	 taxes	 on	 mineral	
extraction	of	hydrocarbons,	export	duties	on	crude	oil,	natural	gas,	and	goods	
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produced	from	crude	oil.
Some	 oil	 and	 gas	 revenues	 are	 addressed	 toward	 financing	 current	
expenditures	of	 the	 federal	budget	 (oil	and	gas	 transfer),	and	 the	balance	can	
be	saved.	To	assess	the	short-term	risks	in	terms	of	stability	of	public	finances,	
the	non-oil	deficit	indicator	is	important,	representing	the	difference	between	the	
non-oil	revenue	and	the	total	budget	expenditures	(see	Table.	4).	Accordingly,	the	
amount	of	the	fund	is	increasing	(see Figs. 4).
Table 4. Revenues and Expenditures of the Federal Budget in 2000-
2009. (% of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Expenditures	
(1)
14.2 14.8 18.9 17.8 15.8 16.3 15.9 18.1 18.2 24.7
Revenues	(2) 15.5 17.8 20.3 19.5 20.1 23.7 23.3 23.6 22.3 18.8
Including	non-
oil	revenue		
(2.1)
11.7 13.1 15.1 14.1 13.5 13.6 12.7 14.6 11.8 11.2
Oil	revenue		
(2.2)
3.8 4.7 5.2 5.4 6.6 10.1 10.9 9.0 10.6 7.6
RF	federal	
budget	sur-
plus
(3)=(2)–(1)
1.4 3 1.4 1.7 4.3 7.4 7.5 5.5 4.1 –5.9
Non-oil		deficit
(4)=	(2.1)–(1)
2.5 1.7 3.8 3.7 2.3 2.7 3.4 3.5 6.4 13.5
Note: when assessing the non-oil deficit in 2009, income from the man-
agement of the Reserve Fund and National Welfare Fund, which amounted to 
respectively 0.8% of GDP, were taken into account.
Source: Federal Treasury of Russia
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Figure 4. Stabilization Fund, Reserve Fund, the National Welfare Fund 
in 2004-2009, % of GDP
Note: The Stabilization Fund is a hypothetical fund equal to the amount of 
the Reserve Fund and National Welfare Fund
Thus,	during	the	period	of	a	favorable	external	market	situation,	the	presence	
of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	was	a	serious	 institutional	constraint	 to	 the	growth	of	
budgetary	expenditures.	At	the	same	time,	even	such	a	constraint	had	a	limited	
effect,	and	in	2007-2008,	during	in	the	peak	in	oil	prices,	a	marked	increase	in	the	
federal	budget	expenditures	was	observed	in	real	terms.
In	turn,	in	2009-2010,	the	Reserve	Fund	became	the	main	source	of	financing	
the	 federal	budget	deficit,	 formed	due	 to	reduction	of	 the	budget	 revenues,	as	
well	 as	 due	 to	 adoption	 of	 the	package	of	 anti-crisis	measures.	However,	 the	
scope	of	the	budget	deficit	 in	the	RF	(like	in	many	countries	around	the	world)	
clearly	exceeds	expectations.	For	example,	 if	 the	 initially	estimated	scope	 the	
Stabilization	Fund,	and	then	the	Reserve	Fund,	was	assessed	based	on	the	need	
to	finance	the	deficit	of	3%	of	GDP	for	the	term	not	exceeding	three	years,	when	
in	2009	the	deficit	of	the	federal	budget	amounted	to	5.9%,	in	2010	it	is	expected	
to	amount	to	6-7%	of	GDP,	which	means	a	complete	exhaustion	of	the	Reserve	
Fund	already	in	the	current	year.	Because	in	the	future	the	government	of	Russia	
expects	the	federal	budget	deficit	to	be	sustained	(with	a	gradual	decrease	to	2%	
of	GDP	in	2013	with	an	average	oil	price	of	not	below	70	dollars	per	barrel),	there	
is	a	risk	of	needing	the	involvement	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	for	the	budget	
deficit	financing	as	well.
Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy
The	availability	of	budgetary	sovereign	funds,	as	well	as	their	allocation	in	the	
international	reserves	of	the	Bank	of	Russia,	has	important	implications	for	the	
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monetary	and	exchange	rate	policy	in	Russia.
Thus,	the	total	volume	of	monetary	supply,	withdrawn	from	the	economy	and	
allocated	to	the	accounts	with	the	RF	Central	Bank	as	of	January	1,	2009,	was	
approximately	120%	of	the	monetary	base	(high-powered	money)	at	 that	time.	
Saving	this	volume	of	monetary	supply	 in	 the	economy	over	2004-2008	would	
increase	 the	 rate	 of	 the	 monetary	 supply	 growth	 by	 about	 15-20	 percentage	
points	per	year.	The	inflationary	consequence	of	this	could	be	the	increase	of	the	
average	annual	inflation	rate	from	11.35%	per	annum	(which	is	one	of	the	highest	
rates	in	the	world)	to	13.5-14%	per	annum.
At	the	same	time,	the	total	amount	of	funds	placed	in	the	foreign	currency	is	
about	35-40%	of	the	total	surplus	of	the	Russian	balance	of	payments	from	2006	
through	 the	first	 six	months	of	2008.	Accordingly,	a	demand	was	 formed	 from	
the	Russian	Ministry	of	Finance	for	such	inflow	of	the	currency	to	the	domestic	
market,	which	has	helped	the	Bank	of	Russia	to	keep	the	ruble	rate	at	a	level	no	
higher	than	23.5-24.0	rubles	per	dollar.	Modeling	a	situation	where	in	2006-2008	
there	was	no	need	 to	allocate	 the	 funds	 in	 foreign	currency	shows	 that	 in	 this	
case,	the	nominal	ruble	exchange	rate	could	rise	to	the	level	of	13-15	rubles	per	
dollar	by	August	2008.	Accordingly,	the	real	effective	ruble	rate	by	the	beginning	
of	the	crisis	in	autumn	2008	would	have	amounted	not	to	116.5%	as	compared	
with	July	1998	(the	maximum	value	of	 the	real	exchange	rate	before	the	1998	
crisis),	but	to	180-200%,	which	would	mean	a	complete	loss	of	competitiveness	
of	domestic	producers	and	a	sharp	slowdown	in	economic	growth,	even	against	
the	background	of	high	prices	for	oil	and	other	Russian	export	goods	in	2007.
Anti-crisis measures funding in 2008-2009
Financing	of	large-scale	measures	for	the	support	of	the	national	economy	
without	the	involvement	of	external	borrowing	in	2008-2009	was	possible	thanks	
to	 the	 reserves	accumulated	during	 the	economic	growth.	 In	 fact,	 oil	 and	gas	
revenues	became	the	main	sources	to	support	the	balance	of	the	federal	budget	
in	2009.	 In	particular,	 to	finance	 the	budgetary	expenditures	 from	the	Reserve	
Fund,	about	RUR	2.964	trillion	was	allocated.	This	fact	allows	us	to	conclude	that	
the	idea	of	forming	an	oil	and	gas	fund	was	fully	justified,	and	can	be	regarded	as	
an	advantage	in	the	national	fiscal	policy.																																																																																																																																	
Table 5. Dynamics of Formation and Use of Oil and Gas Assets in 2009
(RUR bln) 
Fund	
Balance	
as	of	late	
2008*
Revenue	over	
2009:
Expenditure	over	
2009:
Balance	as	of	
late	2009*Oil	and	
gas	rev-
enue
Revenue	
from	
assets	
manage-
ment
Support	of	
the	federal	
balance	
solvency
Support	
of	oil	
and	gas	
transfer
Reserve	
Fund
4027.6
(9.8%	of	
GDP)
488.5 205.0 2964.8 179.4
1830.5
(4.7%	of	GDP)
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National	
Welfare	
Fund
2584.5
(6.3%	of	
GDP)
– 92.5 – –
2769.0
(7.1%	of	GDP)
Total
6612.1
(16.0%	of	
GDP)
488.5 297.5 2964.8 179.4
4599.5
(11.8%	of	
GDP)
* Balances are estimated at the exchange rates of January 1, 2009 and 
January 1 of  2010, accordingly.
Source: Federal Treasury
Formally,	the	assets	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	were	not	used	to	finance	
the	 federal	 budget	 deficit	 and	 the	 financing	 of	 anti-crisis	measures.	However,	
starting	 from	October	 13,	 2008,	 the	RF	President	Dmitry	Medvedev	 signed	 a	
package	of	 laws	previously	 enacted	by	 the	State	Duma	and	approved	by	 the	
Federal	Council	on	the	stabilization	of	 the	financial	system	during	the	financial	
crisis:	 in	particular,	 legislative	amendments	allowed	placement	of	 the	National	
Welfare	Fund	assets	with	 the	Vnesheconombank	deposits	until	December	31,	
2019,	totaling	no	more	than	450	billion	rubles	at	the	rate	of	7%	per	annum.
Thus,	there	was	only	a	change	in	the	portfolio	of	fixed	assets	for	the	allocation	
of	 the	 National	Welfare	 Fund;	 it	 was	 replenished	 with	 the	 ruble-denominated	
deposits	of	the	RF	Vnesheconombank.	In	the	future,	the	use	of	those	resources	
for	 the	 implementation	 of	 anti-crisis	 measures	 was	 already	 implemented	 by	
the	RF	Vnesheconombank.	 In	particular,	404	billion	 rubles	were	granted	 to	14	
Russian	commercial	banks	in	the	form	of	subordinated	loans	and	30	billion	rubles	
were	transferred	to	the	“Russian	Development	Bank”	for	crediting	SME.
In	general,	analyzing	the	role	of	the	Reserve	Fund	as	a	source	of	financing	of	
the	federal	budget	deficit	in	Russia	over	2009-2010,	one	should	take	into	account	
three	issues	related	to	the	proper	understanding	of	the	“reserve”	nature	of	these	
funds:
1.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 use	 of	 the	 Reserve	 Fund	 assets	 to	 cover	 the	
budget	 deficit	 	 is	 a	 common	monetary	 emission	of	 the	Central	Bank,	 since	 in	
practice	such	an	operation	means	the	flow	of	funds	in	the	RF	Central	Bank	from	
the	special	accounts	of	the	RF	Government	to	the	monetary	base	(through	the	
current	account	of	the	Government).	The	non-emission	nature	of	this	operation	
could	take	place	if	the	Bank	of	Russia	at	the	same	time	would	sell	foreign	currency	
(which	is	formally	a	counterpart	of	the	Reserve	Fund),	but	after	a	downfall	to	its	
lowest	 level	 in	January	2009,	 the	 international	 reserves	of	 the	Bank	of	Russia	
have	considerably	grown.	Thus,	 in	terms	of	monetary	policy,	 the	Fund	is	not	a	
reserve,	but	is	a	separate	channel	for	the	money	inflow	in	the	economy.
2.	 On	the	other	hand,	the	described	effect	of	monetary	emission	from	the	
budget	 account	 is	 observed	 every	 time	when	 the	 government	 spends	money	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 existing	RF	 system	of	 the	Treasury,	which	 has	 budgetary	
accounts	with	the	Bank	of	Russia,	i.e.	those	withdrawn	from	the	monetary	supply.	
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Irregular	 fluctuations	 are	 observed	 within	 the	 year	 (e.g.,	 the	 sharp	 growth	 of	
monetary	assets	in	December,	when	the	budget	expenses	are	performed	when	
the	money	base	is	reduced	each	month	in	the	last	days	of	the	month,	when	taxes	
are	paid),	but	by	virtue	of	the	budget	reporting	term,	namely	the	fiscal	year,	as	a	
rule,	only	the	final	impact	of	the	budget	execution	on	the	money	supply	is	taken	
into	account.	If,	however,	we	extend	the	period	of	consideration	from	one	to,	for	
example,	5	years,	then	the	use	of	the	Reserve	Fund	shall	cease	to	be	a	mere	
emission,	since	the	money	accumulated	in	it	within	such	a	term	may	be	regarded	
as	temporarily	withdrawn	and	returned	to	the	economy	assets.
3.	 From	another	perspective,	in	terms	of	fiscal	and	debt	policy,	the	Reserve	
Fund	assets	certainly	can	be	regarded	as	a	reserve	of	the	RF	Government,	as	
they	make	it	possible	to	replenish	the	budget	deficit	without	borrowing	in	the	debt	
market	and	avoiding	the	increase	of	the	government	debt.	At	the	same	time,	as	
the	experience	of	EU	countries,	USA,	Japan,	UK	and	others	shows,	the	growth	
of	public	debt	to	finance	the	anti-crisis	measures	package	has	become	one	of	the	
key	challenges	for	the	economic	policy	at	the	stage	of	recovery	from	the	crisis.	
In	this	regard,	the	existence	of	the	Reserve	Fund	in	Russia	can	be	regarded	as	
a	potential	allowing	the	country	to	avoid	the	growth	of	debt	burden	and	to	shift	
current	budget	expenses	for	the	future	generations.
The impact on poverty eradication, social policy and labor market
From	the	point	of	view	of	the	current	social	effects	and	support	of	the	living	
standards	of	the	population	of	Russia,	the	sovereign	wealth	funds	provide	limited	
and,	for	the	most	part,	 indirect	effects.	It	 is	extremely	difficult	to	distinguish	the	
impact	of	each	of	the	existing	funds.
From	our	point	of	view,	 the	most	 important	 impact	on	 the	population	 living	
standards	 is	 the	 provision	 of	 an	 anti-inflationary	 effect	 of	 the	RF	Stabilization	
Fund	(see	above).		We	estimate	the	total	increase	in	income	in	real	terms	due	to	
lower	inflation	in	the	period	of	2004-2008	at	about	20	percentage	points.
Another	important	consequence	of	the	Reserve	Fund’s	existence	is	funding	of	
the	federal	budget	deficit	in	2009.	The	social	projects	in	particular,	which	allowed	
a	growth	in	real	incomes	by	2.3%	in	the	situation	of	a	severe	crisis	(decline	in	real	
GDP	in	2009	by	7.9%),	reduced	the	negative	impact	of	lower	domestic	demand	
and	ensured	the	growth	of	household	savings.	Herewith,	as	noted	above,	those	
expenditures	have	been	financed	without	increasing	the	national	borrowing	and,	
consequently,	the	growth	of	the	borrowing	puts	a	burden	on	the	future	generations.
The	role	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	in	solving	the	social	problems	at	the	
moment	is	extremely	small.	Moreover,	the	National	Welfare	Fund	obviously	does	
not	play	the	role	 imposed	on	 it--	but	not	ensured	 in	 institutional	and	 legislative	
terms--	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 the	 long-term	 solutions	 of	 the	pension	 system	 in	
Russia.	We	will	consider	the	tentative	options	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	in	this	
area	in	the	final	section	of	this	memo.
Compliance with Santiago Principles
Table 6	shows	our	expert	assessment	of	compliance	of	the	RF	Reserve	Fund	
and	National	Welfare	Fund	with	the	Generally	Accepted	Principles	and	Practices	
(GAPP),	or	Santiago	Principles.	Compliance	with	 these	principles	 is	presented	
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for	 each	 fund	 separately,	 although,	 as	 shown	 above,	 the	 legal	 provisions	 of	
their	operation,	management	system	and	the	requirement	to	investments	of	the	
funds	are	practically	 identical.	Nevertheless,	based	on	the	different	nature	and	
purposes	of	each	of	the	funds’	formations,	the	extent	of	their	compliance	with	the	
Santiago	Principles	varies.
Table 6. Santiago Principles and Implementation thereof for the Rus-
sian Sovereign Wealth Funds
Principles RF Reserve fund RF National Welfare Fund
GAPP	1
GAPP	1.1
GAPP	1.2
+
+
+
+
+
+
GAPP	2 + –
GAPP	3 + +/–
GAPP	4
GAPP	4.1
GAPP	4.2
+
+
+
+
+
+/–
GAPP	5 +	(?) +	(?)
GAPP	6 +/– –
GAPP	7 +/– –
GAPP	8 +/– –
GAPP	9 – –
GAPP	10 +/– +/–
GAPP	11 + +
GAPP	12 – –
GAPP	13 – –
GAPP	14 – –
GAPP	15 + +
GAPP	16 +/– +/–
GAPP	17 + +/–
GAPP	18
GAPP	18.1
GAPP	18.2
GAPP	18.3
+/–
+/–
+
+/–
–
–
+/–
+/–
GAPP	19
GAPP	19.1
GAPP	19.2
+/–
+
+/–
–
+/–
–
GAPP	20 + +
GAPP	21 – –
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GAPP	22
GAPP	22.1
GAPP	22.2
–
–
+/–
–
–
+/–
GAPP	23 +/–	(?) +/–	(?)
GAPP	24 – –
Therefore,	 as	 seen	 from	 the	 above	 estimates	 for	 the	 RF	 Reserve	 Fund,	
compliance	with	 the	Santiago	Principles	 is	observed	 in	nine	positions	 (and	six	
sub-positions),	and	partial	compliance	in	eight	positions	(four	sub-positions).	In	
seven	positions	(and	one	sub-position)	there	is	no	compliance.
For	the	National	Welfare	Fund,	the	situation	looks	even	worse:
•	 compliance	-	in	6	positions	(3	sub-positions)
•	 partial	compliance	–	in	5	positions	(5	sub-positions)
•	 inconsistency	–	in	13	positions	(3	sub-positions).
It	should	be	noted	that	 for	both	Funds	full	compliance	by	one	position	and	
partial	compliance	with	the	other	positions	are	in	question	because	of	the	above-
mentioned	 decision	 of	 the	RF	Government,	which	 has	 refused	 to	 provide	 the	
information	on	the	Funds’	status	for	public	disclosure	since	May	2010.
Perspectives and Predictability after the Global Economic Crisis
As	stated	above,	the	situation	with	the	dynamics	of	both	Russian	sovereign	
funds	 during	 the	 recent	 crisis	 is	 ambiguous.	At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 crisis	 in	
the	Russian	Federation	 in	autumn	2008	 (October	1,	2008),	 the	volume	of	 the	
Stabilization	Fund	of	Russia	amounted	to	about	141	billion	US	dollars,	and	the	
National	Welfare	Fund	–	48.7	billion	US	dollars.	All	assets	were	placed	in	highly	
reliable	securities	denominated	in	US	dollars,	Euro,	pounds	sterling	and	Japanese	
yen.	Thus,	from	the	beginning	of	the	crisis	despite	the	devaluation	of	the	ruble,	as	
well	as	lower	interest	rates	in	the	leading	global	economies	for	the	ruble,	assets	
began	to	grow.	In	contrast	to	the	assets	of	other	sovereign	funds,	in	the	Russian	
funds	there	were	no	assets	in	corporate	securities	(stocks),	so	the	downfall	in	the	
stock	market	did	not	have	serious	consequences	on	them.
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 federal	 budget	 deficit	 and	 the	 RF	
Government's	need	for	additional	financial	resources	have	resulted	in	attracting	
the	funds	to	meet	current	financial	demands.	Falling	oil	prices	in	the	world	markets	
and	the	reduced	inflow	of	export	earnings	to	the	country	led	to	the	disappearance	
of	the	income	part	of	both	funds.	By	early	June	2010,	the	balance	in	the	Reserve	
Fund	should	not	exceed	40	billion	US	dollars,	and	all	the	money	from	the	fund	
should	be	allocated	 to	 finance	 the	 federal	 budget	 deficit	 in	 2010.	However,	 in	
our	view,	the	utilization	of	the	fund	in	2009-2010	can	not	be	regarded	as	a	loss	
because	the	assets	were	used	for	the	implementation	of	the	fund’s	main	objective	
-	to	recover	a	budget	deficit	that	arose	in	consequence	of	short-term	and	cyclical	
swings	in	revenues.	In	addition,	availability	of	this	source	to	finance	the	budget	
deficit	allows	Russia	to	avoid	the	trap	into	which	other	economies	of	the	world	
fall,	namely	the	rapid	accumulation	of	public	debt.	The	renewal	of	revenue	inflow	
to	the	Reserve	Fund	of	Russia	is	expected	not	earlier	than	in	2012-2013	(in	the	
case	of	the	moderately	optimistic	scenario,	reviving	the	global	economy	and	the	
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preservation	of	the	global	oil	prices	at	not	less	than	70	US	dollars	per	barrel).
National	Welfare	Fund	assets	were	not	directly	used	to	finance	the	federal	
budget	 deficit,	 and	 the	 assets	 spent	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 anti-crisis	measures	
package	 for	 operations	 in	 the	 stock	market	 of	 Russia	 and	 the	 support	 of	 the	
banking	system	in	Russia	were	provided	as	the	conversion	of	funds	from	foreign	
currency	 into	rubles	and	their	allocation	 in	ruble	assets	(approximately	20%	of	
the	National	Welfare	Fund).	Those	RUR	investments	are	potentially	lost,	but	due	
to	their	long-term	nature	they	will	be	reflected	in	an	explicit	form	later.	Thus,	with	
regard	to	the	effect	of	the	ruble	devaluation	and	the	fact	that	buying	the	Russian	
companies’	shares	was	carried	out	at	close	to	a	minimum	price,	specifically	 in	
times	of	 crisis,	 the	Fund	has	not	 suffered	 losses	 in	 ruble	 terms.	 Losses	were	
recorded	in	2010,	as	the	nominal	exchange	rate,	and	consequently,	ruble	ratings	
were	reduced,	affecting	the	fund	assets.	Similar	losses	were	observed	in	the	pre-
crisis	period,	when	 the	 ruble	was	also	 rapidly	strengthening	against	 the	major	
world	currencies.
However,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 fiscal	 consolidation	 in	 2011-2013,	 the	 RF	
government	will	be	compelled	to	finance	the	federal	budget	deficit	at	the	expense	
of	the	National	Welfare	Fund,	down	to	its	full	exhaustion	(except	for	the	amount	of	
the	long-term	ruble-denominated	investments	made	in	the	framework	of	Anti-Crisis	
Measures).	Accordingly,	one	can	mention	the	following	main	recommendations	to	
improve	the	functioning	of	the	Russian	sovereign	funds:
1.	With	respect	to	the Reserve Fund of Russia	–	the	soonest	return	to	the	
accumulation	of	the	assets	at	the	high	profitability	in	the	long	term	period.
2.	With	respect	to	the	National Welfare Fund	–	the	RF	Government	should	
clearly	define	the	strategic	objectives	of	the	Fund.	Currently	the	Fund,	in	essence,	
is	a	separate	fund	of	the	RF	Government,	protected	from	spending	to	cover	the	
budget	deficit	financing	(so	far!),	which	has	no	clear	purpose.	For	the	purposes	
of	 the	 Fund,	 one	 can	 propose	 its	 transformation	 into	 a	 savings	 pension	 fund	
(for	 example,	 like	 the	Government	Pension	 Fund	 of	Norway),	 i.e.,	 it	 could	 be	
addressed	to	resolve	the	shortage	in	the	pension	system	over	the	prospect	of	at	
least	15-20	years.	It	is	therefore	necessary	to	revert	to	the	accumulation	of	assets	
in	the	National	Welfare	Fund.
Current	volume	of	the	Fund	(less	than	10%	of	GDP)	is	clearly	insufficient	to	
solve	any	serious	problem.	In	addition	to	the	short-term	revenues	from	exports	
of	raw	materials,	the	most	obvious	source	for	the	replenishment	of	the	Fund	may	
be	the	proceeds	of	privatization	of	the	state	assets	and	real	assets	owned	by	the	
state.	As	of	2007	(prior	to	the	crisis	events	in	the	global	economy),	assessment	
of	such	assets	and	property	is	not	less	than	57%	of	the	Russian	GDP.	In	the	case	
of	transfer	of	these	funds	to	the	National	Welfare	Fund,	with	a	real	return	on	the	
investments	of	the	Fund	at	the	level	of	4.5%	per	year,	the	amount	of	the	Fund	by	
the	end	of	2015	should	amount	to	70.6%	of	GDP	and	by	the	end	of	2025	–	80.5%,	
which	is	enough	to	keep	the	replacement	rate	of	retirement	pension	at	30%	until	
2025.
3. With respect to both funds	-	principles	and	approaches	to	managing	the	
funds’	assets	should	be	differentiated.	 In	particular,	 the	National	Welfare	Fund	
should	 be	managed	 essentially	 on	 different	 terms	 than	 the	Reserve	 Fund.	 In	
other	 words,	 an	 authorized	 structure	 of	 assets	 and	 management	 mechanism	
should	be	revised.
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First,	the	National	Welfare	Fund	has	a	longer	prospectus	for	investment	than	
the	Reserve	Fund,	and	the	National	Welfare	Fund	assets	can	be	invested	in	more	
volatile	and	profitable	financial	instruments.
Secondly,	the	National	Welfare	Fund	short-term	liquidity	has	a	lower	value,	
and	consequently,	it	is	permissible	to	invest	it	in	non-marketable	assets.
Third,	international	experience	shows	that	to	improve	efficiency	of	management	
and	profitability	of	such	a	sovereign	fund,	it	is	reasonable	to	transfer	management	
of	such	a	sovereign	fund	to	private	professional	management	companies,	rather	
than	to	the	Central	Bank	or	a	specialized	state	agency.
Therefore,	a	change	in	the	institutional	and	legal	bases	of	both	funds’	functions	
is	required	to	improve	their	compliance	with	the	Santiago	Principles.
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